THE

HISTORY

OF THE

CAMPAIGN

OF

1796,

IN

GERMANY AND ITALY.

London:

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Lieut.t Colonel Graham Stirling

PREFACE.

NO Perſon can be ignorant, how totally the war, which has deſolated Europe for five years, has differed from all preceding ones in its nature, in the means that have been employed for the proſecution of it, and in the conſequences that have reſulted from it. Its hiſtory, inſeparable from that of the French Revolution will, doubtleſs, be the moſt remarkable feature of the annals of this age. The campaigns of 1794 and 1796, will particularly attract the attention of poſterity. In the firſt of theſe, political errors, ſtill more than force of arms, enabled the French to become maſters of the Netherlands, of Holland, and of all the

countries on this ſide of the Rhine. The union of Belgium to France, and the application of the French ſyſtem to Holland, left no doubt of the project formed by the French, to enlarge their territory, and to compel Europe to ſubmit, either to their arms, or their principles. The ſpirit of moderation, which the ſucceſſors of Roberſpierre were obliged to affect for ſome time, as well as other political reaſons, prevented the French from purſuing their ambitious deſigns, during the year 1795. They reſumed the execution of them in 1796, employed more conſiderable means, and combined them with greater ability. They knew how to take advantage of the diſunion and the errors of their enemies; diminiſhed their numbers, partly by terror, partly by ſeduction; invaded Germany as well as Italy; and were on the point of accompliſhing their plan of general diſorganization in its fulleſt extent. One young hero ſaved Germany: but a young man alſo, on the other

other ſide, was almoſt conſtantly victorious in Italy.

The diſaſtrous conſequences which theſe events might have brought with them on Europe, the effects which they have already produced, and thoſe which may reſult from them hereafter, attach a conſiderable degree of importance and of intereſt to the campaign of 1796. Poſſibly there may be ſome perſons who would wiſh to have before them, in one view, all the various facts which compoſe it, combined, arranged, and connected. This is what I now preſume to offer to the public. I have neglected no enquiries, nor pains, to give to this hiſtorical account exactneſs and perſpicuity, the only merits of which a work of this ſort will admit. It ſeems to me, that he who writes, not on Theories, but on Facts, is abſolutely bound to be impartial, both with reſpect to things, and to perſons, whatever may be his own intereſts and opinions.

—I have endeavoured to prove myſelf ſuch to my readers.

The materials from which I have compoſed this Work, have been partly collected from the accounts officially publiſhed at London, Vienna, and Paris; and partly procured through means of a correſpondence which I have conſtantly kept up with ſome diſtinguiſhed military characters on the Continent. Some of theſe have been and ſtill are, actually engaged in this war; and the others have watched its progreſs with the moſt attentive and intelligent obſervation. I have ſpared no pains to put together and to compare theſe various materials. This Work is, in fact an abſtract and a combination of all theſe accounts.—I have endeavoured to draw from the whole, a reſult, if not abſolutely correct, at leaſt, as nearly ſo, as it was in my power to make it.

The

The knowledge which I myſelf have perſonally had of the greater part of the theatre of the war, of ſome of the armies which are engaged in it, and of ſeveral of the Generals who command them, joined to ſome degree of experience in the ſubject which I treat of, cannot have failed to be of conſiderable uſe to me.

I hope it will not be expected, that there ſhould be found in this hiſtorical detail, a conſtant and minute criticiſm on the operations of the commanders, and on the cauſes of their ſucceſs or their failures. On this point I have thought it right to impoſe on myſelf a good deal of reſerve.—For if the art of war preſents ſo many difficulties to thoſe who are carrying it on; if its chances are attended with ſo many viciſſitudes; if accident ſo often deceives the foreſight of the moſt able commander, or gives him unexpected ſucceſs; would it not be ridiculous in any man to preſume, in his cloſet, to form

form a correct judgment of military operations, the object, as well as the probable advantages and inconveniencies of which, are often unknown, even to thoſe who are employed to execute them?

Anxious as I am to avoid this reproach, I have nevertheleſs endeavoured to explain the motives for the different movements of the armies, and have not refrained from preſuming to cenſure or to applaud, where there was evidently room either for the one or the other. If, notwithſtanding the choice of my correſpondents, and my earneſt endeavour to relate the exact truth, I have (as I have too much reaſon to fear) fallen into ſome errors, I hope to derive my pardon from the reflection that will occur to candid minds, on the difficulty of ſtating facts quite correctly, when one is at once ſo diſtant from the countries, and ſo near to the period, in which the events to be recorded took place.

Note.

Note. I could have wiſhed to add to this book, ſome military maps of Germany and Italy, in which the reader might be able to follow the march of the armies, and to trace the manœuvres of the Generals. But I could meet with none in London of a proper form and ſcale to anſwer this purpoſe. I could neither procure thoſe of Chauchard or Jæger, which are the beſt for Germany; nor have I been more fortunate with reſpect to Italy. However, thoſe of my readers, who do not wiſh to look very much into the detail of military operations, will probably have ſome general map where they will be able to trace the more important movements of the armies, and find the names of the principal places. With reſpect to thoſe who being of the military profeſſion, or from taſte, would wiſh to follow ſtep by ſtep the marches of the ſmalleſt corps, and to form an exact knowledge of all their poſitions, they will hardly have waited till now to procure maps ſufficiently detailed. As it may be however uſeful to ſome, I juſt obſerve, that the beſt maps which I have met with in London, are, for Germany, that of the banks of the Rhine by Mr. Deliſle; it is in three

three ſheets, which takes in a great part of the theatre of war in 1796. It is to be had at almoſt all the Mapſellers, as are alſo two others for the campaign in Italy. The firſt, which conſiſts of two ſheets, is by Mr. D'Anville, and comprehends all Italy, Sicilly, Sardinia, and Corſica. The ſecond is a map of the Duchy of Mantua; it was publiſhed at the end of laſt year, by J. Cary, is well executed, and on a ſufficiently large ſcale. Mr. Faden, Geographer to the King, received, a ſhort time ago, twenty copies of a very good map of Lombardy, by Chauchard, but they were bought up in a few days.

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CAMPAIGN

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CHAPTER I.

Relative ſituation of the Imperial and Republican Armies before the opening of the Campaign.—Eſtimate of their reſpective force.—Intereſt of the French to carry on an offenſive war.—Intereſt of the Imperialiſts to adopt a defenſive one.—Rupture of the Armiſtice.—Movements of the French on both banks of the Lower Rhine.—Battle of Uckerath and of Altenkirchen.—Evacuation of the Hundſruck, by the Archduke Charles.—March of that Prince to the Lahn.—Battles of Weſtlaer.—Second battle of Uckerath.—Retreat of the French beyond the Rhine and the Sieg.

IT is neceſſary, before we enter on a narrative of the events of this campaign, to explain the ſtrength and poſition of the adverſe armies, at the moment of its commencement, and to introduce

ſome details on the intereſts of the belligerent powers, on the objects to which their views were apparently directed, and on the means which they reſpectively poſſeſſed to attain them.

At the period of opening the campaign, the Imperial and French Armies were ſituated in the following manner.—The Rhine ſeparated them from the frontiers of Switzerland to the environs of the town of Spires, where it ceaſed to be their common barrier. Beyond that city, the cantonments which they reſpectively occupied at the diſtance of ſome leagues from each other, extended acroſs the upper Palatinate, the Dutchy of Deux Ponts, and the Hundſruck. The line occupied by the Imperial Army paſſed through the towns of Spires, Neuſtadt, Kayſerlautern, Kuſſell; and from thence, croſſing the Nahe, terminated at the Rhine, in the neighbourhood of Baccharach. At this point, that river again became the common ſeparation of both armies, and continued ſo to beyond Cologne, between the river Sieg, and the town of Duſſeldorf. The Auſtrians and French divided between them the ſpace between the river and the laſt-mentioned fortreſs, before which the army of the latter had an intrenched camp. The Imperialiſts poſſeſſed on the

the Rhine the ſtrong fortreſſes of Phillipſbourg, Manheim, Mayence, and Ehrebreitſtein. The French on their part poſſeſſed on the upper Rhine, thoſe of Alſace, and on the lower Rhine, that of Duſſeldorf.

With reſpect to the ſtrength of the oppoſed armies, it is obvious, that in order to be enabled to appretiate them with abſolute preciſion and certainly, it would be neceſſary that the author ſhould have been commander in chief, or at leaſt an officer of the ſtaff of both armies. His enquiries however on this point, have been numerous and extenſive, and he has addreſſed himſelf for the purpoſe to thoſe perſons, whom their local poſition, and their military ſituation equally placed within reach of very good information on the ſubject. The communication which he has received from them, enables him to form a near eſtimate of the numbers of the French and Imperial armies, at the opening of this campaign. He thinks himſelf authoriſed to ſtate, that at this time, the two French armies, commanded by Generals Jourdan and Moreau, amounted to more than 160,000 men; and that the Imperial forces commanded by his Royal Highneſs the Arch-

duke Charles, including the Saxons and other contingents of the empire, were nearly 150,000 men.

Every motive which determined the French Government to continue the war, made it likewiſe their intereſt, or rather indeed impoſed upon them the neceſſity to carry it beyond the Rhine, and into the heart of Germany. They had at their command a great number of ſoldiers, but were in want of money to pay them, of cloaths to cover them, and means to ſubſiſt them. The Netherlands, Holland, and the countries ſituated between the Meuſe and the Rhine, had borne, during two years, the whole burden of maintaining the French armies. Theſe countries, but a ſhort time before ſo rich and ſo abundant, were exhauſted; their whole ſpecie was abſorbed by contributions, their manufactures were ſuſpended, and their produce conſumed. An immenſe quantity of paper money without any real value, had operated to paralyze their commerce and their induſtry. The productions and commodities of the country were ſcarcely equal to the conſumption of the armies and of the inhabitants. Two years had been ſufficient to place the countries conquered by France on a level with herſelf, and to reduce them to one common equality

lity of dearth and miſery. It was become therefore abſolutely neceſſary, at whatſoever price it was to be accompliſhed, that the French ſhould march forward into other countries, in ſearch of ſubſiſtence, of horſes, of cloaths, and above all, of money. Theſe views were moſt unequivocally expreſſed by the directory in the order given to their Generals, that *they ſhould maintain their troops by victory.*

To this urgent call of neceſſity were added ſome motives of ambition, and reaſonings of political intereſt. The directory flattered itſelf, that by an invaſion of Germany, it would accompliſh the diſunion of the Germanic body; that the inferior Princes, ſtruck with terror, would haſten, by turns, to purchaſe a ſeparate peace; that the Emperor, reduced to his own forces, ſtripped of one part of his dominions, and fearing to loſe what remained, would in the end ſubſcribe to ſuch conditions of peace as it ſhould pleaſe his conquerors to impoſe; that at the concluſion of the war, its final reſult would place all the countries on their ſide the Rhine in the poſſeſſion of the French, and the fate of Germany in their diſpoſal; and would leave them enriched with its ſpoils, and dictating laws to Europe. Such was the brilliant perſpective which preſented itſelf

to

to the chiefs of the French Republic, and at once directed their views, and animated their expectations.

If from what has been here suggested, it should appear that their plan would of course be offensive, every thing on the other hand seemed to prescribe to the Court of Vienna, a line of conduct almost entirely the reverse. A concurrence of military and political considerations ought to have engaged it to persist in the defensive system, which it had adopted and pursued with advantage the preceding year. The situation of the French and Imperial armies offered to the latter but few means to ensure, and but little reason to expect success in an offensive war. Several campaigns (amongst others those of 1674 and 1793) [*Note* 1.] had sufficiently shewn them how extremely difficult it was to penetrate into Alsace, and above all to maintain themselves there. France was scarcely more vulnerable by the rout of the Sarre and the Morelle, which were defended by a great number of strong places. They could still less think of retaking the Netherlands, and of advancing between the Moselle and the Meuse, the French being masters of Dusseldorf, of all the fortified towns of the Meuse,

and

and of thoſe of Holland. At any rate, the Imperial army being of inferior force, would have been unable to penetrate to the frontiers of France, or even to the Meuſe, without fighting many battles. The advantages of the French, both in number and poſition, would have neceſſarily occaſioned the loſs of much time and many men; and could it even have been ſuppoſed that the Auſtrians would have been always victorious, the moſt ſucceſsful campaign could at beſt have probably ended only in putting them in poſſeſſion of one or two ſtrong places, and in effecting their arrival on the banks of the Meuſe.

The ſtrength and ſituation of the Republican armies did not however permit the Court of Vienna to hope for theſe ſucceſſes. It was evident that whether in Alſace, or on the Sarre, the Morelle, or the Meuſe, all the chances, and all the advantages were on the ſide of the French. The Auſtrians, therefore ought to have adopted a plan for the campaign, of which the baſis ſhould have been eſſentially defenſive, but the operations of which might be partially offenſive, according to circumſtances, and the nature of the countries.

If in a military point of view, the intereſt of the Emperor preſcribed to him a defenſive war, it was ſtill better adapted to his circumſtances in a political aſpect. The loſs of the Netherlands and Holland, and the defection of Pruſſia and Spain, deprived the reſt of the coalition of every poſſibility of making conqueſts upon France. Under the neceſſity of continuing the war, the combined plan of England and of Auſtria, was leſs directed againſt the armies of the Republic, than againſt her finances and military reſources. To follow up this ſyſtem with advantage, it became the object of the campaign to obſerve, to exhauſt, and to gain time, rather than to win battles. The great point was, to reduce the French to their own reſources alone for the payment and maintenance of their numerous armies, to confine them on their frontiers and on thoſe of the conquered coutries; in a word, to hinder them from penetrating into, and ſpreading in Germany.

The moſt natural and moſt eaſy method to accompliſh this object was, without doubt, to take the courſe of the Rhine as the line of defence, and to give to the different corps of the imperial army, the ſame diſpoſition which Marſhall Clairfait had eſtabliſhed

eſtabliſhed in 1795, a diſpoſition of which that General's ſucceſs had proved the advantage. It appeared adviſeable after his example to abandon to the French, the Hundſruck, and the Dutchy of Deux Ponts, countries of little importance in themſelves, already exhauſted by the war, and which belong always of courſe (except in the caſe of a great ſuperiority of force, to the poſſeſſor of Landau, Bitche, Sarrelouis, Treves, Traerbach, and Coblentz. By abandoning theſe countries, and carrying the greater part of their forces to the right bank of the Rhine, the Auſtrians would have been in a ſituation to ſtrengthen it with a ſufficient number of men to defend the paſſage of that River from Baſle to Manheim, and to place between the latter fortreſs, and that of Mayence a large body of troops, which could readily advance to the ſuccour of either of thoſe places, and ſupport their Garriſons. By adopting this diſpoſition, the Imperialiſts would have been enabled to place on the Lahn and the Sieg, more than a third of [illegible] army; to reinforce their right wing, the point where they were weakeſt and moſt menaced; to oppoſe a powerful reſiſtence to any enterpriſe of the French on the Lower Rhine; to confine them in their camp before Duſſeldorf, and

even to profit of any favourable opportunity to attack them there with advantage.

The diſpoſitions and firſt movements of the Auſtrian Generals ſeemed to indicate the adoption of a different plan. The army of the Upper Rhine, under the command of Marſhall Wurmſer was ſtrongly reinforced, which gave reaſon to ſuppoſe that it was intended he ſhould croſs the Rhine to penetrate into upper Alſace. At the ſame time the greater part of the army of the lower Rhine under the immediate orders of the Archduke Charles took poſt in the Hundſruck, and the Dutchy of Deux Ponts, and ſeemed to menace at once lower Alſace, and the fortreſſes on the Sarre and the Moſelle. The misfortunes which rapidly followed theſe indications ſoon obliged the Auſtrians to renounce their firſtdiſpoſitions, and to adopt in part thoſe which have been already mentioned. The armiſtice agreed upon at the end of the year 1795 between the French and Auſtrian Generals was put an end to by the latter on the 21ſt of May. One of the conditions of this ſuſpenſion of arms being, that there ſhould be an interval of ten days between its rupture and the renewal of hoſtilities, the reſpective armies became at liberty to recommence

mence them on the 31ſt of May. On that very day the French army of the Sambre and the Meuſe, commanded by [*Note* 2.] General Jourdan, made a movement forwards on the two banks of the lower Rhine. On the ſame and the following day, ſome trifling affairs of advanced poſts took place in the Hundſruck. It was on the right bank of the Rhine that the French employed the greater part of their force, and it was preciſely there that the Imperialiſts had the leaſt to oppoſe to them. There were not more than 20000 men to defend the Sieg, to cover the fortreſs of Ehrebreitſtein, and to line the right bank of the Rhine, between the Sieg and the Lahn. This corps was commanded by the Prince of Würtemberg, who had taken a poſition in front of the Sieg. He was attacked there on the 1ſt of June by the greater part of the army of the Sambre and Meuſe, under the order of General Kleber. After an engagement of ſeveral hours, the Auſtrians being forced at all points abandoned the Sieg, and retiring behind that river, took the ſtrong poſition of Uckerath. They loſt in this engagement 2400 men, of whom, if we are to give credit to the reports of General Kleber, 1000 were made priſoners.

That General did not allow the Prince of Würtemberg time to eſtabliſh himſelf in his poſt, and to receive reinforcements. The French being unable, without a great ſacrifice of men, to attack the formidable poſition of Uckerath in front, availed themſelves the next morning of the ſuperiority of their number, to outflank and turn it. The Prince of Würtemberg ſeeing himſelf on the point of being ſurrounded, quitted the poſition of Uckerath, and fell back on that of Altenkirchen, which was equally advantageous. He was attacked there the 4th of June in the morning. After a pretty vigorous reſiſtance, the ſuperiority of numbers again carried the point, and the Auſtrians were completely routed. They loſt, according to the French accounts, 12 pieces of cannon, part of their baggage, and 3,000 men made priſoners. The fruit of this victory to the French was the capture of ſome magazines, without which they would have been unable to ſubſiſt in a country exhauſted by the conſumption of the armies. It forced the Auſtrians to retire behind the Lahn, leaving uncovered by that means the Fortreſs of Ehrebreitſtein, which the French inveſted. The ſucceſs of the French on the Lower Rhine, and the appre-

apprehenſions that after forcing the paſſage of the Lahn, they would direct their march towards the Mein, and entirely turn his right, warned the Archduke of the preſſing neceſſity which there was to reinforce the Prince of Würtemberg, and to check the progreſs of the army oppoſed to him. Renouncing therefore his diverſion in the Palatinate, and the Hundſruck, he began on the 6th of June to retire from thoſe two countries, and directed his march rapidly towards Mayence with the greater part of his army. He there paſſed the Rhine on the 9th, and proceeded by forced marches to encounter the French, who occupied the Lahn to the number of 50,000 men.

The Archduke not doubting that General Jourdan would haſten to paſs the Rhine likewiſe with his diviſion of the army to join General Kleber, felt how important it was to get the ſtart of him, and to engage the French before their junction. Having ſecured the defence of the lower Lahn by three corps placed at Limbourg, Weilbourg, and Naſſau, he marched in perſon towards the upper Lahn againſt the left wing of the French army commanded by general Lefebvre.

On

On the 15th, the Archduke made the right wing of his army paſs the Lahn, and the Dille, at Weſtlaer. [*Note.* 3.] General Werneck, who commanded it, attacked the French, but was repulſed, and could not ſucceed in diſlodging them from the advantageous poſition which they occupied. A briſk cannonade continued on both ſides for the reſt of the day: but towards ſeven o'clock in the evening a reinforcement of Saxon cavalry being arrived, the Archduke immediately attacked the enemy. The Auſtrian Cuiraſſiers of Karakzay and Naſſau, in ſpite of the obſtacles ariſing from th nature of the ground, and a tremendous fire of grape ſhot, made their way up the heights which were defended by the French infantry, charged them ſeveral times with the greateſt intrepidity, and at length entirely broke them, and took from them ſeveral pieces of cannon. At the ſame moment a body of Auſtrian grenadiers attacked the enemy's center, and diſlodged them from the woods which they occupied.

The French driven from their poſition took up another in their retreat equally good with the former. They were very ſoon attacked again. Four ſquadrons of Auſtrians and Saxons gained the ſteep heights, on which

which ſome batallions of the enemy were poſted, charged them with impetuoſity, forced them and completed the victory. It coſt the Imperialiſts about 500 men; the loſs of the French was more conſiderable. Four of their battallions were cut to pieces by the Saxon and Auſtrian cavalry, which took alſo 12 pieces of cannon, and made a great many priſoners.

The French corps which defended the lower Lahn, not having met with better ſucceſs, were obliged to quit the banks of that river to fall back on the Sieg. The Archduke purſued them without allowing them any reſpite, took ſome more priſoners, and got poſſeſſion of a large quantity of proviſions, of cannon, of artillery waggons, and baggage, which the difficulty of the country, the animoſity of its inhabitants againſt the French, and the diſorder of their retreat, made it impoſſible for them to ſave.

His Royal Highneſs did not give them time to recover or to collect together again. He manœuvred in ſuch a manner, as to oblige General Jourdan, who had paſſed the Rhine at Neuwied on the 12th of June, to repaſs it on the 18th with the right wing of the French army. At the ſame time, he

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ſent forward his advanced guard, about 11000 men ſtrong, under the orders of General Kray, in purſuit of General Kleber, who was retiring towards the Sieg with 25,000 men.

On the 20th of June, General Kray came up with Kleber, who finding himſelf ſuperior in numbers, attacked the Auſtrians with all his forces, and carried almoſt every point of their poſition. This firſt ſucceſs promiſed the French a complete victory; but they were deprived of it by the bravery of three Auſtrian battallions, who unſhaken by the numerous artillery of the French, ſuffered nine batallions to advance to within a hundred yards, and charging them with fixed bayonets, put them completely to the rout. This advantage gave time to the Saxon and Auſtrian cavalry to rally, to return victorioufly to the charge, and finally to ſtop the progreſs of the enemy. The Imperialiſts loſt in this affair, 5 or 600 men; they killed and wounded of the enemy 1,500, and took 700 priſoners. In this action the Auſtrians performed prodigies of valour; the event was the more honourable for them, as the French more than doubled them in number.

General Kleber defeated in this very poſition, which 18 days before he had taken from the Auſtrians,

Auſtrians, was obliged to continue his retreat precipitately quite to the lines of Duſſeldorf.

Thus in fifteen days the Archduke marched from the banks of the upper Nahe to thoſe of the upper Lahn, gained two battles, and drove the French from the walls of Wetflaer to thoſe of Duſſeldorf. One cannot ſufficiently admire the bravery of this young Prince, the rapidity of his movements, and the ability of his manœuvres. In this ſhort ſpace of time, he gave ſufficient proofs of what his army and Germany might expect from him.

CHAP. II.

Opening of the Campaign on the upper Rhine—Evacuation of the Palatinate by Marſhal Wurmſer—Departure of that General with 30,000 *men to Italy—Paſſage of the Rhine and capture of Fort Kehl by the French—Their progreſs in the country of Baden—Battle of Renchen—Battle of Raſtadt—Paſſage of the Sieg and the Rhine by Generals Kleber and Jourdan—Battle of Montabauer—Battle of Friedberg—Capture of the Fort of Kœnigſtein by the French—Their entrance into Frankfort—Battle of Etlingem, and retreat of the Imperialiſts.*

WHILST theſe events took place on the lower Rhine, the Imperial army commanded by Field Marſhal Wurmſer, and the French, under the orders of General Moreau, [*Note* 4.] had alſo opened the campaign on the upper Rhine. When the Archduke quitted the Hundſruck to march to the right bank of the Rhine, Marſhal Wurmſer at the ſame time withdrew his troops from the lines of

of Spirebach, and made them take an excellent poſition before the fort of the Rhine, oppoſite to Manheim. His right extended to the town of Frankenthal, and was covered, as well as his front, by inundation and canals, that joined to the little river of Rhebach, which bounded and defended his left.

General Moreau made two attacks on this poſition on the 14th and 20th of June, which produced no effect but the loſs of ſome hundreds of men on both ſides, and to confine the Imperialiſts within their entrenched camp before the Fort of the Rhine. Moreau made theſe two feints merely to fix the attention of Mr. De Wurmſer to this point, and to deceive him with reſpect to his real deſigns. After leaving a ſmall corps before the Auſtrian camp to obſerve it, he turned ſuddenly back on the 21ſt, and marched rapidly with the greateſt part of his army towards Straſburg, where preparations were making for a more important enterprize.

The loſs of the Milaneſe, and the deſire of reconquering it, having determined the Court of Vienna to ſend Marſhal Wurmſer into Italy with 30,000 men of the army which he commanded in Germany, theſe troops began their march early

in June. Their departure diminiſhed the Imperial army on the upper Rhine, nearly one half, and of courſe increaſed proportionally the ſuperiority of the French, and may in fact be ſaid to have opened to them the gates of Germany. They were informed of this movement in good time, [*Note.* 5.] indeed before it had actually taken place; and determined to take advantage of the opening, which the departure of ſo large a force left in the line of defence on the upper Rhine, an opening which Prince Charles's expedition on the lower Rhine, would not admit of his filling up for a conſiderable time. The French could not have choſen a more favourable moment to attempt the paſſage of the Rhine, and to invade Suabia, of which they had already formed the project. They haſtened to carry it into execution; made their preparations with no leſs promptitude than ſecrecy; and diſguiſed them under the pretext and appearance of ſome other expedition.

On the 24th of June, before the break of day, General Moreau embarked in boats 3000 men, who landed on ſeveral ſmall iſlands that lye between Straſburg and the fort of Kehl. They eaſily drove from thence the Imperial Piquets, who in their retreat

retreat, either had not time or addreſs to break down the bridges which communicate with the right bank of the Rhine. The French therefore were enabled to paſs over them, and ſuddenly attacked the redoubts of the Fort of Kehl, which were occupied by ſome troops of the circle of Suabia. Theſe troops, ſurprized, and beſides as ill-diſciplined, as they were badly commanded, although attacked only by infantry without any cannon, either would not or did not know how to make uſe of the means of defence, with which this important poſt furniſhed them. They ſuffered it to be taken by the French, who found in it 500 men, and 15 pieces of cannon, and who when they had become maſters of it, loſt no time in putting themſelves in condition to keep it. They immediately re-inforced it with a conſiderable number of men; and worked hard in the courſe of the day to eſtabliſh a bridge of boats between Kehl and Straſburg.

The Imperial army on the upper Rhine having been conſiderably weakened by detaching 30,000 men from it to Italy, and Mr. De la Tour, who commanded in the room of Marſhal Wurmſer, not having at all ſuſpected that the French would

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attempt the paſſage of the river oppoſite to Kehl, the Auſtrians had but a ſmall number of light troops near that place. The neareſt corps to it was that compoſed of ſome thouſands of Suabians, who were encamped at Marle and Wildſtedt, about two or three leagues from Kehl. If theſe troops had been more vigilant, or better commanded, and had on the firſt diſcharge of cannon marched inſtantly towards the Fort, they certainly might have prevented the French from getting poſſeſſion of it, or even have re-taken it, before the latter could have been enabled to tranſport cannon and cavalry over the river

Theſe troops however of the Empire made no movement whatever, but ſuffered the French to eſtabliſh themſelves firmly on the right bank of the Rhine. The inexcuſable inaction, and unmilitary behaviour of the Suabian corps during the remainder of the campaign, expoſed their Generals to the ſuſpicion of holding correſpondence with the enemy. [*Note* 6.]

The French took advantage of this remiſſneſs and alarm of the Imperial troops, to complete their bridge of boats, and to paſs over with their cavalry and artillery. They ſpread themſelves

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over the plain, to prevent the approach of any force that might be ſent againſt them, either from Offenburg, or from Raſtadt. On the 26th they attacked the camp at Wildſtedt, and eaſily drove the Suabian troops from thence. The only reſiſtance they experienced was from the Auſtrian regiment of Anſpach Cuiraſſiers, who arriving at that inſtant, furiouſly charged a corps of French infantry, broke through them, and cut to pieces a conſiderable number.

As ſoon as Mr. De la Tour was informed of the French having paſſed the Rhine, and of their having invaded the territory of Baden, he gave inſtant orders to the regiments which were neareſt, to march, and put himſelf in motion with the greateſt part of his forces to meet the enemy, and to endeavour to ſtop his progreſs. The Prince of Condé was amongſt the firſt to ſet out with the corps which he commanded, and moved rapidly towards Offenburg, hoping to arrive there before the Republicans had made themſelves maſters of it. He accompliſhed this object and joined on the 27th at Biehl, before Offenburg, ſome Auſtrian detachments, as well as troops of the circles, which had been driven from the camp at Wildſtedt. On the 28th however,

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this corps of Imperialiſts was obliged to abandon its poſition, as well as the town of Offenburg, the French having brought againſt them ſeveral ſtrong columns. The latter made this movement to prevent the junction of the Prince of Condé with ſeveral ſmall Auſtrian corps, which were marching to his aſſiſtance, and thus to divide the Imperial army of the upper Rhine. This laſt object was of the utmoſt importance to them, and on its accompliſhment, the ſucceſs of the invaſion in a great meaſure depended. General Moreau was perfectly aware of this, and towards this point directed all his movements and employed all his means. He divided his army, 80,000 men ſtrong, into three columns; that on the right, under the orders of General Ferino, [*Note* 7.] was directed to drive back into the Briſgaw the corps of the Prince of Condé, and of General Frölich. It met with ſome ſucceſs againſt them, and got poſſeſſion of the town of Bibrach, in the valley of Kintzig.

The center, commanded by General St. Cyr, forced the paſſes which lead along the vallies of Renchen and Kintzig, to the mountains of Suabia. Continuing to advance he made himſelf maſter (on the

the 4th of July) of the mountain of Kniebis, and of the town of Freydenſtadt, poſts of the utmoſt importance, which the Suabians defended moſt ſhamefully, or rather, which they delivered up to the French. [*Note* 8.]

The left column, which was the ſtrongeſt of the three, was under the orders of General Deſaix. It was oppoſed to General La Tour; and was intended to act againſt the Auſtrian force, which was marching in great haſte from the lower Rhine. General Deſaix preſſed forward to attack Mr. De la Tour before its arrival. On the 29th of June, he gained a pretty conſiderable advantage over him at Renchen, [*Note* 9.] where the Auſtrians loſt 500 men and 10 pieces of cannon. He gained ground again on the following days; and on the 4th of July, puſhed forward to the river Murg, and the city of Raſtadt.

General La Tour, who had taken a very good poſition in front of this River, was attacked on the 5th along his whole line, by General Moreau, who was juſt arrived with a re-inforcement to General Deſaix. The action laſted the whole day, and was very bloody on both ſides. It terminated to the diſadvantage of the Imperialiſts, who were

under the neceſſity of retreating the next day to Etlingen.

The Archduke Charles having ſucceeded in driving the army of the Sambre and Meuſe acroſs the Rhine and the Sieg, immediately returned, ſuſpecting the project of the French on the upper Rhine, and ſenſible how much its defence was weakened by the large re-inforcements that had been ſent into Italy. He was then informed of the paſſage of the Rhine, and the capture of the Fort of Kehl. Leaving 30,000 men under the orders of Lieut. General Wartenſleben to cover the lower Rhine, and having re-inforced the Garriſons of Ehrebreitſtein and Mayence, he ſet out with the reſt of the army, and directed his courſe towards the upper Rhine by forced marches. He arrived on the banks of the Murg, at the moment when General La Tour was giving way to the efforts and the numbers of the French. His Royal Highneſs then took the command of that army, which formed a junction with his own at Etlingen.

The poſſeſſion of the paſs and town of Freydenſtadt by the enemy, opened to them an entrance into the Dutchy of Würtemberg, cut off the communication between the armies of the Prince of Condé

and

and General Frölich, and that of the Archduke, and at the ſame time threatened the left of his Royal Highneſs's poſition. This latter circumſtance obliged him to ſend a conſiderable corps into the mountains, to ſecure his left flank, and to endeavour to re-eſtabliſh his communication with the corps above-mentioned. Notwithſtanding the diſadvantage of his poſition in general, and the inferiority of his forces, His Royal Highneſs determined to riſque a battle. It afforded him the only chance by which he could hope to drive the French out of Suabia, and to maintain himſelf on the banks of the Rhine. It became the more neceſſary to looſe no time in hazarding this laſt reſource, as the new advances which the French had made on the lower Rhine encreaſed the Archduke's embarraſments, and made his ſituation every day more and more critical.

As ſoon as the French Generals, who commanded the different corps of the army of the Sambre and Meuſe, were informed of the paſſage of the Rhine, and the departure of the Archduke, they inſtantly reſumed offenſive operations; and on the 28th and 29th of June they marched from Duſſeldorf and Cologne to-

towards the river Sieg, from whence they eaſily drove the few light troops, which defended it. On the 2d of July, the commander in chief General Jourdan alſo paſſed the Rhine, oppoſite to Neuwied, where the Auſtrian General Fünck ſuffered himſelf to be ſurprized, and did nothing to oppoſe the paſſing of the French. The diviſions of the Generals, Jourdan, Grenier, Kleber, and Lefevre, then effected a junction, and advanced with more than 65,000 men againſt Mr. De Wartenſleben, who had ſcarcely 30,000 to oppoſe to them. This great inferiority made it impoſſible for the latter to face the French in all points. He gained however an advantage over them on the 3d of July, near Montabauer, where General Werneck took ſeveral hundred men, and ſome pieces of cannon. But having received a check the day following on his right, and finding that he was in danger of being ſurrounded by different corps of the enemy, M. De Wartenſleben retired behind the Lahn, which the whole French army paſſed on the 9th of July, in three columns.

The advanced guard of the left column was attacked on the ſame day by the Auſtrians, who routed

routed it; but the main body coming to its ſupport, a warm action enſued, the ſucceſs of which was various, but in which the Auſtrians had finally the advantage. On the 10th the latter were attacked on all the points which they occupied between the Mein and the Lahn; and after an obſtinate engagement which they maintained near Friedberg, [*Note* 10.] in which they ſuffered ſome loſs, General Wartenſleben was again obliged to retreat in order to ſecure the poſition of Bergen before Frankfort. On the 11th, the French inveſted the Fort of Kœnigſtein, which capitulated a few days afterwards from the want of water; the garriſon were made priſoners of war. On the 12th they arrived before the city of Frankfort, to which the Auſtrians had retired. The day following they ſummoned the Magiſtrates of this Imperial city to open its gates; but the Auſtrians, who were ſtill in poſſeſſion of it, would not permit them, and even ſhewed a diſpoſition to defend the city, the fortifications of which will not admit of its making a long reſiſtance. That which the Auſtrians maintained had no other object but to gain time to remove their proviſions and their magazines, of which Frankfort was the depôt. On the night

night of the 13th the French erected a battery of mortars, and bombarded the town, which they ſet fire to. The magiſtrates and inhabitants then renewed their entreaties to Mr. De Wertenſleben to evacuate the city, to which he aſſented, having accompliſhed his end; and on the 14th he agreed on the terms of capitulation with General Jourdan, who in conſequence entered Frankfort the day following.

After the evacuation of this city, the neceſſity of General Wartenſleben's giving way to the prodigious ſuperiority of numbers daily increaſed. He continued his retreat up the river Mein, directing his courſe towards Aſchaffenburg and Würtzbourg, in order that he might approach the Archduke's army, and eſtabliſh ſome communication with it.

Whilſt General Wartenſleben experienced this ill ſucceſs on the lower Rhine, His Royal Highneſs the Archduke Charles had not been more fortunate on the upper. After the retreat to Etlingen on the 6th of July before-mentioned, the Prince received the intelligence that General Jourdan had again croſſed the Rhine, and forced Mr. De Wartenſleben to renounce every attempt to defend

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the approaches to the Lahn. It was eaſy for him then to foreſee, that the latter, with ſo very inferior a force, would even be obliged to abandon Frankfort; and that he ſhould find himſelf between the victorious armies of Jourdan and Moreau. Placed in a ſituation ſo critical, the Prince ſaw that he could not eſcape from the dangers which threatened him, but by a deciſive victory; and that he had no other means of preventing the invaſion of the greater part of Germany. Reſolved to try the chance of a battle, and circumſtances not admitting of delay, he nevertheleſs found himſelf under the neceſſity of deferring it till the 10th, all the troops which he expected from the lower Rhine not being yet arrived. He employed the 7th and 8th in making the neceſſary preparations, and in fortifying his poſition.

His right extended to the Rhine, near to the village of Durmerſheim. His center was in front of Ettlingen; [*Note* 11.] and his left reſted againſt the town and mountain of Frauenalb.

The French were poſted in front of and along the river Murg: their left at Raſtadt; and their right in front of Guertſbach.

General

General Moreau, being informed that the Archduke had not received all the re-inforcements which he expected, and not doubting but that an attack would be made upon him the moment they arrived, resolved to prevent it. He re-inforced himself on the 8th with almost the whole of the center column commanded by General St. Cyr. In the morning of the 9th, whilst the Archduke was completing his dispositions, and placing the different corps which were to be engaged the following day, he found himself attacked in every point of his position, by the whole French Army. They directed their principal efforts against the left of the Imperialists, and endeavoured to turn it by getting round the mountains. Though all the troops which were to form the left of the Austrian line were not yet arrived, General Keim, who was at the head of it, made a very firm resistance. He repulsed four successive attacks; but the French having made a fifth with fresh troops, and the Saxons who were ordered to support General Keim not being yet come up, he was obliged to abandon his position, which the French had outflanked, and to fall back to Pfortsheim, where he was joined by the Saxons.

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The Archduke had been more fortunate on his right and in front, where he had completely repulſed all the attacks of the French. But the retrograde movement of General Keim having entirely uncovered the left of the army, and enabled the enemy to take poſſeſſion of the mountains which commanded it, the Prince found himſelf under the neceſſity of quitting the field of battle, and of retreating towards Pfortzheim, where he arrived on the following day.

The Imperialiſts loſt in this action 2,000 men, of whom 1,000 were made priſoners. It coſt the French full as dear, but the event of it gave them the important advantage of detaching the Auſtrians entirely from the banks of the Rhine, and from the fortified towns of Philipſburg and Manheim. The Archduke had had the precaution to throw into both ſufficient garriſons, as Mr. De Wartenſleben had done into Ehrebreitſtein and Mayence, before they were inveſted by the French.

By leaving near 25,000 men in theſe four fortified places, Prince Charles judged that the enemy would alſo be obliged to leave behind a part of their army to blockade them; and that the garriſons of Philipſbourg and Manheim might a good deal

interrupt the communication between the armies of Moreau and Jourdan, by threatning and harraſſing their rear, and by falling ſuddenly on their convoys and ſmall detachments. This judicious diſpoſition produced the full effect, which the Archduke expected from it. The garriſons of Manheim and Philipſbourg made many uſeful excurſions; diſturbed the formation of the enemy's magazines; puſhed their parties as far as Heilbron; and even fell in with and took ſome French couriers and detachments, in the very heart of Franconia.

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CHAP. III.

Battles of Canſtadt and Eſlingen—Contributions impoſed by the French—Armiſtice concluded by them, with the Duke of Würtemberg, the Margrave of Baden, and the circle of Suabia—Second battle of Eſlingen—Continuation of the retreat of the Imperial Army—Battle of Mettingen—Retreat of General Wartenſleben to Amberg, and of the Archduke to Donawert—Projects of that Prince.

AFTER the battle of Ettlingen, the Archduke, as has been before obſerved, retreated to Pfortzheim, where he remained the 11th, 12th, and 13th. On the 14th he learnt that the center of the enemy's army, meeting with little oppoſition from the troops of the Duke of Würtemberg, and thoſe of the circle of Suabia, had penetrated farther, and were directing their march towards the town of Studgard. That he might not loſe the communication with the Prince of Condé, the Archduke broke up his camp at Pfortzheim on the 14th, and encamped again near Vahingen, on the river Entz, where he

the 15th and 16th. The enemy continuing to advance into the Duchy of Würtemberg, the Archduke marched again on the 17th; arrived on the 18th at Ludwiſburg (a country houſe of the Duke of Würtemburg's, near the Neker) and ſent two ſmall corps the very ſame day, to poſt themſelves at Canſtadt and Eſlingen. It was of conſequence to the Archduke to make himſelf maſter of theſe places, on account of their ſituation on the Neker, and of the magazines which they contained. The French having entered Stutgard in the courſe of the ſame day, and knowing the importance of the poſt of Canſtadt, wiſhed to diſlodge the ſmall body of Auſtrians which defended it, under the command of General Baillet, (brother to General Latour,) attacking at the ſame time the corps at Eſlingen, which was under the orders of Prince John of Lichtenſtein. Theſe two Generals defended themſelves with great bravery. Notwithſtanding three ſucceſſive attacks, the French were unable to diſlodge General Baillet from Canſtadt. They were however, rather more ſucceſsful againſt the Prince of Lichtenſtein, and found means after repeated efforts, to make themſelves maſters of the heights which commanded his flank

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and rear. In this emergency the Prince hearing that a body of troops was ordered to his aſſiſtance, reſolved to ſtand at his poſt, and continue the combat. He was already on the point of being ſurrounded, when General de Vay at laſt made his appearance with the expected ſuccours. The French now found themſelves attacked in their turn, both in flank and rear, and at the ſame inſtant the Prince of Lichtenſtein preſſing hard upon their front, they were put to the rout, with the loſs of about 1,500 men. This advantage coſt the Auſtrians 900 men.

On the 19th, the Archduke, after having paſſed with his army over the Neker, pitched his camp at Feldbach, that he might cover the communication with the town of Ulm, and ſave the principal magazines on the upper Danube. Whilſt the French were thus forcing the Archduke to retire from the Rhine to the Neker, they likewiſe after ſeveral ſlight engagements, compelled the Prince of Condé, and General Frölich, to yield up the Briſgau, as well as the country of the Black Foreſt. Theſe two commanders effected a junction at Villingen; but being oppoſed to very ſuperior numbers, they found it neceſſary to fall back

back to Sigmaringen on the Danube. In the mean time General Wartenſleben continuing to give way before the numerous army of Jourdan, was retiring acroſs Franconia; and found himſelf when arrived at Würtſburg, on a line with the front of the Archduke; and from this time, (July 20th) the march of the reſpective armies became more regular and better combined.

From this period alſo the Imperial army commenced a methodical retreat, and a war of manœuvres. It was divided into three principal corps, amounting to nearly 80,000 men, having been reduced to that number by detaching 30,000 men to Italy, by leaving 25,000 to garriſon the different Fortreſſes, and by the loſſes ſuſtained in the different actions.

The firſt of theſe three corps, about 25,000 ſtrong, occupied both banks of the river Meyn, under General Wartenſleben, and was oppoſed to the army of Jourdan, which amounted to about 55,000 men. The Archduke, with 40,000 men, was poſted upon the Neker, which he defended againſt General Moreau, who commanded more than 50,000.

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The third body, conſiſting of about 15,000 men, was divided between the Prince of Condé and General Frölich, and defended the upper Danube againſt General Ferino, who having been re-inforced by General Laborde, was at the head of 20,000 men.

The loſſes ſuſtained in different engagements, and the neceſſity of leaving bodies of troops to blockade the fortified places, had weakened the armies of Jourdan and Moreau; the ſuperiority however of their numbers over the Imperialiſts, was ſtill greater than at the opening of the campaign. [*Note* 12.]

From the middle of the month of July, the French began to reap in part thoſe advantages which they expected from the invaſion of Germany. They found the country which they occupied, abundant in reſources of every kind; and they impoſed on the inhabitants heavy contributions. The weight of them was chiefly felt by the people of the Briſgau, who had taken up arms againſt the Republicans. The town of Frankfort was compelled, for the ſecond time ſince the commencement of the war, to ſhare its riches with the French, being taxed by General Jourdan, to

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the amount of ſix millions of French livres in ſpecie, and two millions in proviſions. The Margrave of Baden, the Duke of Würtemberg, the circle of Suabia, and all the petty Princes whoſe eſtates are comprehended in it, ſeeing themſelves on the point of becoming a prey to the French, who already occupied their territory, ſolicited a ſuſpenſion of arms, which they obtained ſeparately, but for which they paid dearly. Their joint contributions amounted to twenty-five millions of French livres, 12,000 horſes, an equal number of oxen, 500,000 quintals of wheat, rye, and oats; 200,000 pair of ſhoes, with an immenſe quantity of other neceſſaries. We have ſeen above, that the Archduke Charles had arrived on the 19th of July on the banks of the Neker, whilſt at the ſame time the corps of Condé, and of Frölich were on the Danube, and that of Mr. De Wartenſleben was poſted upon the Mein. The extreme inferiority of his force preventing the Prince from acting offenſively, his ſole object was to protract his defence, and to retire as ſlowly as poſſible, in order to give the Court of Vienna time to ſend him thoſe re-inforcements which it was then collecting.

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The Archduke having received information that the enemy meant to attack the important poſt of Eſſlingen, which commands the high road from Stutgard to Ulm, ſent re-inforcements thither on the 20th. The next day it was attacked by a numerous body of troops, as had been expected. General Hotze, and the forces under his command, defended the poſition with equal ſucceſs and bravery. The French were conſtantly repulſed, and loſt about 2,000 men. It did not coſt the Auſtrians more than half that number. They owed this ſucceſs entirely to the obſtinacy with which they fought. The moſt ſtriking proofs of it were given by one battallion of the Hungarian regiment of Spleny, which defended its poſt during the whole day, without being either relieved or re-inforced, and maintained its ground until night, though they had loſt in the courſe of the engagement 3 or 400 men.

On the 22d, the enemy having made a movement, which indicated an intention to turn the right wing of the Arckduke, by poſting themſelves on the road from Stutgard to Donauwert, he abandoned Eſſlingen and the banks of the Neker, on the night of the 22d, turned to the

right to fruſtrate the intention of the French, and fixed his head quarters at Gemund. From thence, he marched on the 26th, ſtill continuing to give ground. The progreſs made by the enemy on the Mein and Danube, again obliged the Prince to retreat. He moved on the 1ſt of Auguſt to Heydenheim, on the 2d to Nererſheim, and on the 3d to Nordlingen. [*Note* 13.] Several ſkirmiſhes took place during that interval, in which the Imperialiſts, although retreating, frequently had the advantage.

The Archduke was obliged to yield ſo much ground, on account of the advances made on his right and left by the enemy in the latter days of July. Jourdan's army had entered Würtſburg on the 26th, and General Wartenſleben had been compelled to fall back towards Bamberg, Nuremberg, and Anſpach. The three corps of the Prince of Condé, Generals Frölich and Wolf, had been forced to retire on the right bank of the Danube, thus abandoning upper Suabia to the French. [*Note* 14.]

The conqueſt of Suabia and Franconia, ſpread great alarm throughout Germany. The French were on the frontiers of Bohemia and Bavaria, and their

their great ſuperiority of numbers, excluded every hope of being able to put a ſtop to their progreſs. But neither the misfortunes which he had juſt experienced, nor thoſe he had to apprehend, were capable of diſcouraging the Archduke. He oppoſed the unſhaken conſtancy of his ſoldiers to the number of their enemies. He compenſated by his talents for the deficiency of his means; and did every thing which could be expected from the moſt conſummate General. Thinking it unneceſſary to cover Bohemia, where numerous obſtacles oppoſed themſelves to an invading enemy, [*Note.* 15.] the Prince wiſely took the reſolution of drawing towards himſelf the greater part of Wartenſleben's army. By theſe means, he had it in his power to meet with a greater maſs of force either of the French armies which might chuſe to attack him; and by keeping along the Danube, he reſerved to himſelf the power of moving with eaſe to either ſide of that river, according to the poſitions and motions of the enemy. This plan, as well executed as it was conceived, concentrated his defence, gave him the means of prolonging it, and more effectually protected the hereditary dominions.

On the 3d and 5th of Auguſt, the French attacked the advanced poſts of the Archduke. On the firſt of theſe days, they were victorious; but on the other, were defeated.

Several engagements at the ſame time alſo took place between the armies of Wartenſleben, and of Jourdan. One corps of the latter was repulſed with loſs on the 4th of Auguſt, by General Kray. They were again engaged on the 6th and 8th, on both which days the Auſtrian cavalry much diſtinguiſhed itſelf. The French General Doré was killed, and General Richepanſe wounded.

In ſpite of their bravery and partial ſucceſs, the Auſtrians could not prevent the French from gaining ground every day. The forces of General Wartenſleben were not ſufficiently numerous to oppoſe the different columns of Jourdan's army, which inceſſantly harraſſed their flanks, and threatened entirely to cut off their communication with the Archduke. The neceſſity there was for keeping up this communication, and the order which this commander had received to draw nearer to the Prince, determined him to leave Bamberg and the Mein, on the 7th, and to march firſt to Forch-

Forchheim, on the Rednitz, and then to Lauf, on the Pegnitz.

On the 8th, the French attacked and diſlodged one of the advanced corps of the Archduke, taking 2 or 300 priſoners. This advantage, and above all, the retreat of Mr. De Wartenſleben, induced Prince Charles to abandon his poſition at Nordlingen, to take another between that town and Donauwert, which he wiſhed to cover. He eſtabliſhed his head quarters at Mettingen, upon the little river Egar, his left extending towards Hohenalheim, and his right towards Allerſheim. The Prince of Condé had retreated to Mindelheim, and General Wolf had retired into the defiles near the town of Bregents, of which, the French took poſſeſſion.

On the 10th, at night the Republicans attacked the body of Auſtrians under the command of General Hotze with great impetuoſity, and forced a part of his poſition, taking 300 priſoners. This ſlight check was no obſtacle to the project which the Archduke had reſolved to carry into execution that very day. Being well-informed of the ſituation of General Moreau, he had judged that he might attack him with advantage, and had determined to do ſo on the

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night of the 10th. The Prince made his preparations for a general action, which was to take place in ſeveral columns. His principal object was, to turn the right of Moreau, and to fall ſuddenly on his rear, whilſt the whole length of his Front ſhould be attacked at the ſame time. As the French were very much ſuperior in number, the ſole hope of ſucceſs which the Archduke could poſſibly indulge, was reſted in the goodneſs of his diſpoſitions, and the effect of a ſurprize. He concerted his movements in ſuch a manner, that before break of day five of his principal columns might engage the enemy. A violent ſtorm which came on in the night and laſted ſeveral hours, damaged the roads to ſuch a degree, that the different corps could not reach the places of their deſtination ſo ſoon as was expected. This delay enabled the enemy to diſcover the meaſures taken againſt them, and gave them time to prepare their defence. The battle began about ſeven o'clock in the morning, and continued the whole day with various ſucceſs. The three columns which formed the centre of the Auſtrian army, and were commanded by the Prince of Furſtemberg, and the Generals Hotze and Latour, ſucceeded in

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diſlodging a part of the enemy's centre. The column on the right, under the orders of the Prince of Lichtenſtein was not ſo fortunate; General Moreau having marched all his corps de Reſerve to the left in the very beginning of the action, was enabled to repulſe the Prince of Lichtenſtein, and obliged him to yield a good deal of ground. This movement having laid open the right and center of the Imperialiſts, the French attacked them with advantage, and ſucceeded in driving them back alſo. The Archduke was occupied in reinforcing his right, for the purpoſe of recovering the ground it had loſt, when he received a report from General Wartenſleben, intimating that he had been compelled to abandon his poſt on the Pegnitz, and to retire to Amberg; that the right of Jourdan's army was arrived at Nuremberg on the 9th, and was approaching nearer to the army of Moreau. As this laſt movement put the right of the Archduke, which the French were endeavouring to turn and ſeparate from Mr. De Wartenſleben, into eminent danger, that Prince judged that whether he was conqueror or conquered, he ſhould be obliged in either caſe, to fall back to the banks of the

Danube

Danube and the town of Donawert. He determined therefore to put and end to a battle which now became uſeleſs. It was however with regret that the Prince formed this reſolution, having juſt learned that his left wing conducted by General Rieſe, had turned the right of the enemy, had advanced four leagues upon their rear, and made a great number of priſoners. The Archduke had ſufficient command over himſelf to make a ſacrifice of this brilliant ſucceſs, of which the conſequences might have been of the utmoſt importance; and to encamp with his whole army, on the very ſpot he had occupied before the action. This engagement coſt the Auſtrians 1,500 men, and the French 3,000, of whom 1,200 were taken priſoners; the latter likewiſe loſt ſeveral proviſion waggons, and ſeveral pieces of cannon.

The Prince having reſted his army on the 12th, retired on the 13th to Donauwert, where he eſtabliſhed his head quarters. The battle of the 11th diſconcerted the projects of Moreau for ſome time. His reſerve of artillery and military ſtores, on the point of falling into the hands of General Rieſe, had been obliged to fly a conſiderable way to effect their eſcape. This circumſtance

ſtance, as Moreau himſelf expreſſed in a letter to the directory, prevented him from attacking the Archduke during his march. The Prince profiting by this on the ſame day (the 13th) croſſed the Danube by the bridge of Donauwert, with the greateſt part of his forces. He however left two bodies of troops on the left ſide of that river, which occupied the roads from Nordlingen and Hœchſtedt to Donauwert. [*Note* 16.] It was at this period that Prince Charles conceived the bold project, which was afterwards productive of ſuch brilliant ſucceſs. Till that time nothing had been able to check the victorious march of the French. They were maſters of Suabia and Franconia. General Jourdan was directing his march towards the Danube, and threatened at the ſame time Bohemia, and upper Auſtria. The army of Moreau was on the frontiers of Bavaria; his right wing had ſeized the important poſts of Bregents, and was advancing into the Tyrol. The victories of Buonaparte in Italy, gave that General hopes that he likewiſe ſhould be able to penetrate into the Tyrol, and to form a junction with General Moreau. The French believed themſelves on the point of

realiſing the vaſt plan which they had framed; a plan, the object of which was to unite three large and victorious armies in the heart of Germany, and to pour their combined force againſt the hereditary ſtates of the Houſe of Auſtria.

Any other General but the Archduke, and any other army but his, might have been alarmed at ſuch a ſituation of affairs. But this young Prince, intruſted with the defence of his brother's dominions, and the ſafety of Germany, wiſhed to prove himſelf worthy of the confidence repoſed in him, and to ſhew that he was capable of ſuſtaining ſo great a load of reſponſibility. He ſaw that ſome daring and ſudden enterprize, was the only poſſible method of extricating himſelf from the ſurrounding dangers. Aſſured of the attachment of his Generals, and of the conſtancy of his troops, and conſcious of the example which he ſhould himſelf ſet them, he expected every thing from their courage, and ſomething from fortune. The forces and military means of the Prince increaſed daily, the nearer he approached to his brother's dominions. Conſiderable re-inforcements had been ſent him, which in ſome degree leſ-

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ſened the great diſparity of numbers between him and the French, who were beſides much weakened by the different engagements, and by the detachments they were under the neceſſity of leaving in their rear.

The Archduke, however, finding himſelf too weak to attack both the French armies at a time, reſolved to unite almoſt his whole force againſt one of them, and to riſk every thing to defeat and diſperſe it. As the army of Jourdan more immediately threatened the States of the Emperor, and was in all reſpects much leſs advantageouſly poſted than that of Moreau, the Prince reſolved to direct his operations againſt the former. He judged, that by leaving a part of his forces to keep General Moreau in check, he might gain ſome marches over him, and fall unexpectedly with the reſt of his army on General Jourdan. The Archduke was perfectly aware of the great dangers to which this plan expoſed him. He ſaw plainly that he left Moreau with little oppoſition or impediment; but he flattered himſelf that this General would hear of his march too late to be able to afford the leaſt aſſiſtance

to his colleague, and that even when he heard of it, and diſcovered the weakneſs of the corps oppoſed to him, he would be tempted to attack it, that he might make himſelf maſter of Munich, and create a diverſion in favour of Jourdan. The event ſhewed the juſtneſs of the Archduke's conjectures, and fully anſwered his expectations.

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CHAP. IV.

March of the Archduke—Retreat of General Wartenſleben behind the Naab—Battles of Teining and Neumarkt—Retreat of General Jourdan—Battle of Amberg—Defeat of General Jourdan at Würtſbourg—Surrender of the Citadel—Jourdan's retreat to the Lahn—Battle of Aſhaffembourg—Kœnigſtein re-taken by the Imperialiſts—Bad condition and loſſes of the army of Jourdan—That General repaſſes the Lahn—Death of the Republican General Marceau—The French retire beyond the Rhine and the Sieg—Prince Charles marches towards the upper Rhine.

ON the 14th of Auguſt, Prince Charles made at Donauwert every preparation neceſſary for the execution of the plan which he had formed. He left about half of his army with General Latour, with orders to defend Bavaria, and the river Lech. On the 15th, after having recalled all the corps from the other ſide of the Danube, he ordered the

the bridge of Donauwert to be burnt, and left that town with 20,000 of his beſt troops. The next day he continued to march rapidly along the right bank of the Danube, and croſſed that river on the 17th, at Neuburg and Ingolſtadt, leaving a garriſon in the latter place, which was capable of defence. He halted on the 17th and 18th before thoſe two towns. His reſolution had been to attack on the 19th that column of Jourdan's army, which had taken poſſeſſion of Nuremberg, and threatened Ratiſbon; but he was informed in the night of the 18th, that General Wartenſleben had been driven from the town of Amberg, and had retreated to Schwartzenfeld, behind the river Naab.

In conſequence of this change in the poſition of the armies of Jourdan, and Wartenſleben, the intended motion of the Archduke became extremely dangerous, as it would have rendered his communication with Mr. De Wartenſleben very precarious, and thrown conſiderable difficulties in his way, in caſe he had been obliged to retire.

The Prince, on this account, altered the direction of his march, advanced more to the right, and arrived on the 20th at Hemman. His van guard,

guard, led by Major General Nauendorf, proceeded the ſame day to take poſſeſſion of the heights of Taſwang; whilſt a column under the orders of Lieutenant General Hotze, marched towards Bellugrieſs, to ſecure at the ſame time the left of the Archduke, and the road from Ratiſbon to Nuremberg. The neceſſity of knowing preciſely the ſituation of Mr. De Wartenſleben, retarded, for one or two days, the Archduke's operations.

On the 22d, General Nauendorf attacked that column of the French which had advanced from Nuremberg and Neumarkt as far as the village of Teining, within a few miles of Ratiſbon. This body of the enemy, commanded by General Bernadotte, was diſlodged, and driven back to Neumarkt. It was again attacked at that place the day after, by the united columns of the Archduke and General Hotze, was driven from it, and purſued as far as the neighbourhood of Altdorf, to which place it retired. Several ſquadrons of Auſtrian cavalry, and ſome light infantry, were ſent by the Archduke, at the ſame time, to occupy the high road to Nuremberg.

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Theſe preparatory ſucceſſes, having placed that Prince on the right flank, and even in the rear of General Jourdan's army, who was ſtill upon the Naab, he haſtened to profit of his advantageous ſituation, and to accompliſh his deſigns. He had concerted with Mr. De Wartenſleben the plan of a general attack, for the execution of which the whole army ſet forward, on the 24th, divided into ſeven different columns. Of theſe, three marcheh againſt the front of the French army, whilſt the others were to turn to it upon the right and left.

As ſoon as Jourdan heard of Bernadotte's defeat, and of the movements which were making againſt himſeif, he abandoned with precipitation all the poſts which he occupied, and retired to Amberg in the night of the 23d, not daring to riſk a battle, which from the ſituation of the Archduke, and the difficulties of the country through which he would have been obliged to retreat, might in caſe of a defeat, have ended in the total deſtruction of his army. The Auſtrians, without giving him time for recollection, attacked and defeated him at Amberg, on the 24th. He was compelled to fall back to Sultzbach, leaving 900 men in the hands of the Auſtrians, who

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cut in pieces two battallions of his rear guard. [*Note* 17.] Jourdan continued to retreat on the next and following days by forced marches, paſſing ſucceſſively through Velden, Betzenſtein, Forcheim, Ebermanſtadt, and Bamberg, where he arrived on the 29th. His army croſſed the Mein at Eltman and Hallſtadt on the 30th, and halted at length near Lauringen and Schweinfurt. During theſe eight days of continued retreat, Jourdan was purſued and inceſſantly harraſſed by the Imperial light troops, who frequently intercepted his couriers, and got poſſeſſion of a part of his baggage. The celerity of his retreat prevented the Archduke from coming up with the main body of his army, and forcing him to engage. That Prince, however, directed the march of the different columns with ſo much ability, that one of them reached Nuremberg before the French, and prevented them from paſſing through that town, and along the great road of Franconia. This ſkilful manœuvre obliged the right wing of Jourdan's army to retire by a worſe and a longer rout, compelled that General to repaſs the Mein with his whole army, and deprived him of every hope of

being able to join Moreau, or of receiving any affiſtance from him.

To prevent the latter General from profiting too much by the weakneſs of Mr. La Tour's corps, and from cauſing any powerful diverſion in favour of Jourdan, the Archduke had ſent back General Nauendorf on the 25th of Auguſt, with 10,000 men to ſupport him. The Prince having thus freed his mind from all anxiety about what might happen in Bavaria, thought only of taking advantage of his late ſucceſſes over Jourdan, and forcing him to a complete retreat, either by a victory, or by the effect of his manœuvres. His Royal Highneſs having arrived on the 31ſt at Bamberg, and having informed himſelf of the poſts which the enemy occupied, was confirmed in his hopes of being able to drive him entirely out of Franconia, by compelling him to retire to the upper Lahn, acroſs the country of Fulde. To attain this end, it was neceſſary to make himſelf maſter of the town of Würtzburg; and that Prince neglected nothing which could give him ſpeedy poſſeſſion of it. The van guard of one of his columns, commanded by General Hotze, arrived before that town on the 1ſt of September, and forced its

way

way into it in ſpite of the reſiſtance of the French garriſon, which was driven out, and obliged to retire into the Citadel.

This van guard was followed by the whole of the Auſtrian army, divided into three different corps; that on the right commanded by the Archduke in perſon, that in center by General Kray, and that on the leſt by General Staray.

Jourdan, conſcious that the preſervation of Würtzburg was of the utmoſt conſequence, had made every exertion to arrive there before the Auſtrians. This however he found himſelf unable to effect, and did not appear before that town until ſeveral hours after it had been in the hands of his enemies. He then reſolved to diſlodge them, by attacking the corps which occupied the place before it could be ſupported by the reſt of the Imperial army.

On the 2d he fell with great impetuoſity upon General Staray who had joined his van guard under General Hotze, and ſucceeded in forcing a part of his poſition. But finding every effort to diſlodge him from the principal points fruitleſs, he retired at night to Kornach, nearly three leagues diſtant from Würtzburg. Well aware

that the Archduke would ſoon attack him if he remained in that poſition, he reſolved to make a ſtand, thinking it both his duty and his intereſt, before he abandoned the countries he had conquered, to riſk a battle, which if he was ſucceſsful, might reſtore to him Würtzburg and Franconia.

He waited for the Archduke in a very advantageous poſition; his right wing being placed on a height, at the foot of which ran the Mein and another ſmall river with very ſteep banks; his center was alſo poſted upon a chain of hills, the ſlope of which was bordered with wood, above which they placed a great number of cannon. Theſe eminences were terminated by a plain, on which Jourdan drew out his left wing compoſed almoſt entirely of cavalry. It was diſpoſed ſo as to protect the infantry which occupied the heights, and to be capable itſelf of receiving ſupport from the fire of the artillery and muſquetry. Jourdan had beſides left General Lefebvre with one diviſion of his army to cover the road from Schweinfurt to Fulde; and communicated with that General through the means of a ſmall intermediate corps.

The

The Archduke was no leſs deſirous to engage, knowing that the ſolidity of his ſucceſſes depended upon the celerity with which they were obtained; and that it was neceſſary to haſten the complete defeat of Jourdan, that he might have time and means to drive Moreau out of Germany.

On the 2d His Royal Highneſs cauſed two bridges to be thrown acroſs the Mein at Detelbach and Geroltſhoffen, with the intention of attacking the French the next day. He had for this purpoſe divided his army into three columns, that on the left being commanded by General Staray, that in the center by General Wartenſleben, and that on the right by General Kray.

General Staray was the firſt who was engaged, and met with ſome ſucceſs in the beginning of the action; but the paſſage of the Mein having retarded the march of the other two columns, he very ſoon had to ſupport alone the weight of the whole French army. He not only loſt the ground which he had gained, but even ſaw his own poſition in danger of being forced.

At this critical moment which might have ended in the loſs of the battle, the Archduke ſent orders to General Wartenſleben to ford the Mein immediately

immediately with all his cavalry, and to charge the left wing of the enemy without delay.

This manœuvre which was well executed, had the desired effect. Jourdan was forced by it to march back his troops to the left, and Mr. De Staray was in consequence relieved. The Austrian cavalry then charged that of the French in the plain, and compelled it to give way and seek for shelter under the fire of the infantry and artillery which were posted on the heights and in the woods which bordered them. The Imperial horse was so much annoyed by the fire from the batteries, that they were obliged to fall back, after having charged twice successively.

As the French could not be driven from their position without the assistance of infantry, the Archduke was under the necessity of waiting the arrival of the column under the orders of General Kray, and of the remaining part of that commanded by Mr. De Wartensleben. As soon as they appeared, the Prince ordered a general attack to be made on the whole of the enemy's line. Eight battallions of grenadiers penetrated the wood in spite of the heavy fire kept up from the batteries, and the swarm of *Tirailleurs* who were

were poſted in it. They advanced with fixed bayonets to the top of the hills which the French infantry occupied, and diſlodged them from thence in a few minutes.

From that inſtant Jourdan gave up all thoughts of defending his ground, and began to retire. His retreat was conducted for ſome time with order, under the brave and ſteady protection of his cavalry and flying artillery; but the former being attacked by the Auſtrian horſe was put to the rout, and the retreat was from that time conducted with the greateſt confuſion.

Night, and the exceſſive fatigue of the Imperialiſts, ſaved the French army from total deſtruction. It loſt on that day 2,000 men killed and wounded, more than 3,000 taken priſoners, 10 pieces of cannon, and a vaſt number of baggage and proviſion waggons. This victory coſt the Auſtrians no more than 800 men. They were indebted for it to the example ſet them by the Archduke, to his coolneſs, his quickneſs of perception, and to the ability of his manœuvres.

The defeat of Jourdan drew after it the ſurrender of the Citadel of Würtzburg, the garriſon of which conſiſting of 700 men with their commander

mander General Belmont, chief of the French artillery, were made priſoners of war. The Auſtrians found 150 pieces of cannon, with a large quantity of ammunition and proviſions in this place and in Schweinfurt, which was evacuated by General Lefebvre. Theſe ſtores were the produce of the contributions levied by the French in the ſurrounding country. The raiſing of theſe contributions, joined to the vexations and outrages exerciſed upon them by the Republicans, had irritated the inhabitants of Franconia to ſuch a degree, that they armed on all ſides during the retreat of the French, ſtopped ſeveral of their convoys, plundered their military cheſts, and either maſſacred or took priſoners all the ſtragglers.

Jourdan, after his defeat at Würtzburg, retired to Hamelbourg, and continued his retreat towards the upper Lahn, acroſs the country of Fulda and Weteravia. He was cloſely purſued by the Archduke, who in order to compel him to abandon the banks of the Mein entirely, detached General Meerfeld on the 5th with ten ſquadrons of light cavalry, deſtined to form a junction, with the garriſons of Manheim and Mayence, and by theſe means

means to bring 15,000 men upon the rear of the enemy. The Prince in the mean time ſent a ſtrong van guard, under the orders of General Kray, to take poſſeſſion of all the avenues of the foreſt of Speſſart. [*Note* 18.] That General finding them occupied by a body of 2,000 French attacked them vigorouſly, and drove them, after a briſk cannonade, from their advantageous poſition, killed 400 men, and took 600 priſoners. The reſt were purſued by the Auſtrian cavalry as far as the Town of Aſchaffembourg, and diſperſed on the other ſide of the Mein. The town of Aſchaffembourg, which General Kray took poſſeſſion of, was of importance to the Auſtrians, its bridge over the Mein, being the only one between Frankfort and Würzburg.

The Archduke deſerves the higheſt praiſe for the ability he diſplayed in getting the ſtart of Jourdan, ſo as to arrive before him at Nuremberg, Würtzburg and Aſchaffembourg. This able manœuvre completely ſeparated Jourdan from Moreau, detached him by force from the Mein, and put it out of his power to maintain his ground between that river and the Lahn.

The Archduke arrived on the 7th and paſſed the 8th at Aſchaffembourg. Having learned that the French had evacuated Frankfort the preceding night in conſequence of the movement which has been juſt mentioned, he puſhed forward his van guard to the Nidda. On the 9th he marched to Dettingen, and on the 10th to Windecken, his advanced guard occupying the important poſt of Friedberg. He was joined here by 10,000 men of the garriſon of Mayence, who had taken poſſeſſion of the Fort of Kœnigſtein, which had on the 8th been abandoned by the French.

General Jourdan, it has been already obſerved, had retired through Fulda, directing his march towards the Heſſian town of Hanau. His deſign was to take poſſeſſion of the ſtrong poſt of Bergen, where he flattered himſelf he might be able to make a ſtand againſt the Auſtrians when joined by the troops, which had been blocking up Manheim and Mayence. With this intention he marched to Aſchaffembourg, but finding that place already in the hands of the Auſtrians, he was obliged to change the direction of his march. He then turned to the right and advanced to the upper Lahn and Weſtlaer, where he arrived on the 9th,

and

and employed himſelf in re-aſſembling the broken remains of his army. Ever ſince his defeat at Würtzburg, it had been in the moſt undiſciplined, and completely diſorganized ſtate. His retreat had been made with a confuſion and diſorder not to be deſcribed. The different corps of the French army having no regular ſupply of proviſions, nor any ſettled points of retreat, had no longer waited for the orders of their Generals. They had fled in different parties, plundering and laying waſte the countries through which they paſſed. A great part of the infantry had thrown away their arms and were without ſhoes. Conſtantly harraſſed by the Auſtrians and the Peaſants who had riſen upon them, Jourdan's army was ſtruck with terror and deſpondency; it preſented leſs the appearance of a retreat than of a tumultuous flight. The want of ſubſiſtence, exceſſive fatigue and deſertion, diminiſhed it as much as the ſword of the enemy, and the loſs which it experienced in its retreat from the Naab to the Lhan, was generally eſtimated at upwards of 20,000 men.

The Archduke went and encamped at Friedberg on the 12th, having left a large body of reſerve at Windecken. The ſame day he ſent

his right wing under General Kray againſt Weſtlaer, which the French abandoned at his approach, and took a poſition on the heights, which commanded that town.

In the mean time the left wing of the Prince's army advanced under the orders of General Hotze towards Weilburg, but were unable to diſlodge the enemy from thence. On the 14th His Royal Highneſs began his march, and prepared to attack the center of the French, at Limbourg and Dietz; whilſt General Kray came upon the rear of their left through Weſtlaer, and Major General Mylius kept in check their right wing which extended to Naſſau.

Prince Charles having been re-inforced by the corps of reſerve left at Windecken, on the 16th attacked the front of the enemy, which a part of the garriſon of Mayence, under the order of General Neu, ſucceeded in turning near Kirchberg. The French, threatened at all points, did not attempt to defend them, and retired behind the Lahn, abandoning the towns of Dietz and Limburg to the Imperialiſts. Their chaſſeurs however maintained their ground in the ſuburbs of the latter

latter place; and night coming on prevented their being driven from them.

The Archduke aſſembled his whole army on the 17th, between Limburg and Dietz, intending to make a vigorous and general attack. But General Jourdan, although re-inforced by a part of the army of the North, and by the diviſion of General Marceau which had blocked up Mayence, did not dare to hazard a battle; the great diſorder and depreſſion which ſtill reigned in his army leaving him but little hope of ſucceſs. Giving up all idea of defending his poſition on the Lahn, notwithſtanding its advantages, he profited by a thick fog which laſted the whole morning, to conceal his retreat from the Auſtrians, and to ſteal a few hours march upon them.

All the different corps of his army left the banks of the Lahn on the ſame day. The left and center directing their march towards the Sieg, whilſt the right joined the diviſion which was then blocking up Ehrebreitſtein, and together with that threw itſelf into the works which the French had thrown up before the bridge of Boats at Neuwied.

This

This laſt body was purſued by General Neu, who arrived near Neuwied on the 19th, whilſt the French corps, which retired towards the Sieg, were harraſſed by the Archduke, who directed his march towards Altenkirchen; and by General Kray, who proceeded to Dillembourg and Siegen.

The vanguard of the Archduke, conducted by General Hotze, came up on the 20th, near Hochſteinbach, with the rear guard of the French, commanded by Marceau General of a diviſion; defeated it, and took a great number of priſoners: amongſt them was General Marceau himſelf, who being mortally wounded by a carabine ſhot, died the next day at Altenkirchen. This General, ſcarcely twenty-ſeven years of age, was one of the moſt enterpriſing and ſkilful of the republican Officers. His death was much regretted by the whole French army. His adjutant General was killed in the ſame action, and two of his aid-de-camp's were taken priſoners.

It might have been expected that the French, who had now drawn nearer to Duſſeldorf and Cologne, and were certain of an eaſy retreat, would

would have endeavoured to defend the famous poſt of Ukerath, ſo often taken and re-taken, during this campaign. But the ſame reaſons which had detered them from attempting to maintain the ſtill better poſition on the Lahn, baniſhed all thoughts of making a ſtand in that of Ukerath: they did not even remain there one ſingle day. Two diviſions of their army paſſed the Rhine at Cologne; and the main body ſought for ſafety in the entrenched camp, before Duſſeldorf, leaving only a few light troops on the banks of the Sieg.

Thus ended the retreat of General Jourdan, a retreat of more than one hundred leagues, in which he loſt near one half of his army, and was driven in twenty five days, from the frontiers of Bohemia, to the walls of Duſſeldorf.

This retreat formed a ſtrong contraſt with that of General Wartenſleben, who diſputed every foot of ground with ſcarcely 25,000, againſt 50,000 men, who never ſuffered any conſiderable part of his army, to be either cut off or endangered; and who employed near two months, in retiring from the Sieg to the Naab.

A compariſon drawn between theſe two retreats, ſeems to confirm the opinion, that if the French are endowed with the qualities which lead to victory, they are not, in the ſame degree, poſſeſſed of thoſe which are requiſite to ſupport a defeat; and that the latter qualifications are eminently poſſeſſed by the Auſtrians. This campaign of Jourdan's proved, that if the valour of the ſoldiers, and the boldneſs of their Generals, are ſufficient to render an army victorious, the only hope of ſafety, in caſe of a defeat, muſt be placed in the paſſive obedience of the troops, in the regular ſubordination of the officers, in the ability of the Generals, and in the ſolid organization of all its Parts. It was to the want of all theſe circumſtances that Jourdan owed the rapid abandonment of his conqueſts, and the deſtruction of his army. Two great defeats would not have occaſioned a loſs equal to that which he ſuſtained by the want of diſcipline among his ſoldiers, by the ſpirit of independance among his Generals, and of diſobedience among his ſubaltern officers. The great irregularity in the diſtribution of proviſions, and the extreme diſorder

diſorder which reigned in the interior government of his army, were more fatal to him than the ſword of the Auſtrians. They produced diſobedience and diſcouragement among the ſoldiery, cauſed a conſiderable deſertion, and obliged the different corps to follow their own diſcretion, in directing their retreat to whatever places could provide them the ſubſiſtance which they were then ſo much in want of. A total diſunion in the motions and poſitions of the whole army, was the conſequence which rendered it impoſſible to oppoſe a victorious, active, and well regulated force. The exceſſive contributions, extortions, and outrages exerciſed upon the inhabitants of the conquered countries, excited in them the moſt violent animoſity, which ſhewed itſelf evidently, from the very beginning of the French diſaſters. The diſorder of their retreat, the plunder and violence by which it was marked, gave the Franconian Peaſants, at the ſame time, new cauſes of reſentment, and a favourable opportunity of revenging themſelves. The bad military and political conduct of the French, occaſioned the loſs, not only of their

conqueſts, but likewiſe of the Partizans they had in Germany. When conquerors they were deteſted; when conquered, they were deſpiſed.

His Royal Highneſs judging that Beurnonville, who had juſt ſucceeded Jourdan in the command of the army of the Sambre and Meuſe, could not recommence offenſive meaſures for a long time, with an army totally diſorganized, and which, if it may be ſo expreſſed, had loſt all its powers of action; thought he had done nothing, as long as there remained any thing to be done. He had delivered the north of Germany from its enemies, but the ſouth was ſtill in their hands; and the Prince determined not to loſe a moment in wreſting it from them. He left 40,000 men for the defence of the lower Rhine, under the orders of Lieutenant General Werneck, who puſhed forward his advanced poſts on the Sieg, and fixed his head quarters at Ukerath.

His Royal Highneſs again began his march towards the Meyn, the 22nd of September, paſſed that river on the 25th, and having made all the arrangements neceſſary for the ſafety of Ehrebreitſtein

breitſtein and Mayence, he bent his courſe towards the upper Rhine, with about 15,000 men, to ſecond the operations of Mr. de Latour, and to oblige Moreau likewiſe to repaſs the Rhine.

CHAP. V.

Poſition of the armies of Generals Latour and Moreau, on the 15th of Auguſt—Battle of Ober Kamlach —Paſſage of the Danube and Lech, by the French. Defeat of Mr. De Latour at Friedberg—Battles of St. Gaſt, Ingolſtadt, and Munich—Armiſtice concluded between the French Republic and the Elector Palatine—Moreau quits his poſition on the Iſer. —His rear guard and that of General Deſaix are routed—Moreau determines to retreat.

WE left General Moreau's army on the confines of Souabia and Bavaria. I have not yet given an account of the events which took place in theſe two countries ſince the 15th of Auguſt, when the Archduke ſeparated himſelf from Mr.

De Latour at Donauwert. As the Prince and that General ceaſed from that time to have any immediate conection with one another, I thought that an uninterrupted relation of the operations of the Archduke, would be more diſtinct as well as more intereſting. I ſhall now recall the attention of my readers to Suabia and Bavaria, and give an account of events not leſs important, and in the final reſult no leſs fortunate than thoſe which I have juſt been deſcribing.

It may be remembered, that before he left Donauwert, Prince Charles had ordered the bridge of that town over the Danube to be burnt down, after having paſſed with all his troops to the right bank of the river. The Archduke having ſet out from Donauwert on the 15th to commence his operations againſt Jourdan, had, as is above-mentioned, left the command of the Auſtrian troops which remained in Bavaria to General Latour. In order to prevent the French from penetrating into it, Mr. Latour had taken a defenſive ſituation behind the river Lech. His army occupied three principal points, Rain, Fridberg and Landſberg. His advanced poſts were beyond the Lech, covering the town of Augſbourg.

Two

Two other ſmall detached corps, under the orders of Generals Frölich and Wolf, were at Wangen and Kempten, protecting the left of the army of Latour, and keeping up his communication with the Tyrol.

The French army was at the ſame period partly on the left, and partly on the right bank of the Danube, between the rivers Iller and Lech. Such was the poſition of the armies of Latour and Moreau on the 15th of Auguſt. No action of any importance had taken place between the two armies ſince the affair of the 11th, except that of the 14th at Ober Kamlach. The army of the Prince of Condé had particularly diſtinguiſhed itſelf on that occaſion, 2,200 of the *Infanterie Noble* having attacked and driven from their poſition 5,000 Republicans. This ſucceſs had been purchaſed with the loſs of 500 gentlemen.

General Moreau learning that Prince Charles had concentrated his forces at Donauwert, reſolved to march likewiſe with the reſt of his army along the right bank of the Danube. It paſſed that river on the 17th at Dettingen, Hœchſtedt, and Laningen. By this movement Moreau realized the plan which had been formed by the Archduke to drive him with his

his whole force to the right bank of the Rhine. Although he had left a ſmall corps at Donauwert to keep up his correſpondence with Jourdan, Moreau was ſo ill informed of the motions of the Archduke, that on the 21ſt of Auguſt, (ſix days after the departure of the latter) he believed him ſtill at Rain, as appeared by his letter to the Directory.

When he at laſt was informed of the Archduke's movement, he determined, as that Prince had expected, to take advantage of the weakneſs of Mr. La Tour, perſuaded that he could purſue no plan as likely to diſengage his colleague, as to enter Bavaria, and to make himſelf maſter of Munich. He loſt no time in carrying this diverſion into effect, flattering himſelf that it would oblige the Archduke to renounce his projects againſt General Jourdan, and to return immediately.

On the 22d Moreau puſhed forwards his advanced poſts as far as the Lech and drove thoſe of the enemy to the right bank of the river. He reconnoitred the different fords on the 23d, and repaired the bridges which the Auſtrians had deſtroyed in their retreat. Theſe preparatory diſpoſitions being made, he undertook the paſſage of the Lech on the 24th at three different places.

The

The right wing croſſed it the firſt, under the orders of General Ferino, oppoſite to Hauſtetten, at a ford which the Auſtrians had neglected to guard. The French of courſe found there no reſiſtance. The only obſtacle they had to ſurmount was the rapidity of the current, by which their firſt platoons that threw themſelves into the river were carried away. A great many men were drowned, amongſt whom was the Adjutant General Houel. This column having nevertheleſs ſucceeded in effecting the paſſage of the river out of ſight of the enemy, advanced againſt Kuffing and the heights of Othmaringen, from whence it threatened the left wing of the Auſtrians, and by this feint favoured the paſſage of the center column.

This laſt, commanded by General St. Cyr, forded the Lech on the right and left of Lechhauſen, under the protection of artillery and muſquetry. It forced this village, and as ſoon as the cannon where brought over the river, it attacked in front the poſition of Friedberg, whilſt General Ferino took it in flank and got poſſeſſion behind it, of the great road to Munich. The Imperial corps which defended Fridberg, being attacked on many points at the ſame time was not able to

defend

defend them; it was ſoon obliged to retreat, leaving in the hands of the French (according to General Moreau's report) 1,500 men, and 16 pieces of cannon.

The left wing of the French was alſo ſucceſsful in forcing the paſſage of the river oppoſite to Langenwied, and the Auſtrians entirely driven from their poſition, took up another between the Lech and the Iſer. This expedition could not fail to have coſt the French a conſiderable number of men either killed or drowned.

The paſſage of the Lech opened to the republicans, the entrance into Bavaria. They found themſelves in an abundant country; and got poſſeſſion of conſiderable magazines, which the Auſtrians had not time to ſave. They flattered themſelves that this ſucceſs would determine the Archduke to deſiſt from his enterpriſe againſt Jourdan. Moreau had no doubt of this, and indeed expreſſed theſe expectations to the Executive Directory, by a letter on the 25th. In this however he was miſtaken. As it has been before obſerved, the Archduke contented himſelf with ſending on the 25th to Mr. de Nauendorf,

endof, with 10,000 men, to cover Ratiſbon, and to ſupport Mr. de la Tour. This reinforcement put the latter General in condition to prevent the enemy from penetrating beyond the Iſer; and thus rendered of no effect the diverſion which Moreau endeavoured to make in favour of General Jourdan.

After the paſſage of the Lech, the French gained ground for four days ſucceſſively on the Auſtrians, who took a freſh poſition between the Iſer and the Amper. General Latour poſted himſelf behind the firſt of theſe rivers, oppoſite to Munich, which the advanced guard of the French entered on the 30th of Auguſt. He ſtationed another corps at Freyſingen; whilſt General Mercantin went to occupy Landſhut, where he communicated with ſome light troops which covered Ratiſbon. The approach to this city was beſides defended by the troops which the Archduke had left at Ingolſtadt, a fortified town, where there is a bridge over the Danube.

Whilſt Mr. de la Tour took this poſition, before which Moreau found the termination of his progreſs, the latter poſted his right at Dachau, his center at Paffenhoffen, and his left at Bom-

bach. This poſition was no leſs ſingular than dangerous; his left was liable to be attacked with advantage by the Auſtrian corps, which was in poſſeſſion of Ingolſtadt; and his center could not advance againſt Ratiſbon, without being expoſed to be taken in flank, by the corps which was at Landſhut. To improve his ſituation, by ſecuring his left, Moreau reſolved to diſlodge the Auſtrians from the *Tete de Pont*, at Ingoldſtadt.

But whilſt he was endeavouring to quit the dangerous ſituation in which he had placed himſelf, the Generals Nauendorf and Mercantin determined to take advantage of it. On the 1ſt of September, at break of day, one part of the left wing of the French having advanced againſt Ingoldſtadt, the other part of it was attacked with great vigour by the Auſtrians, was entirely routed, and purſued by them as far as Langenbrücke, and the Chapel of St. Gaſt. This attack forced the French to renounce that which they meditated againſt Ingoldſtadt, and to return to make head againſt General Nauendorf. He had completely defeated the corps which had been oppoſed to him, and had advanced ſeveral leagues;

leagues; but the main body and corps de Reſerve of the French coming up, ſtopped the progreſs of the Auſtrians, whoſe cavalry being entangled in a moraſs ſuffered conſiderably. After ſome fruitleſs attempts to diſlodge the enemy from their principal poſition, the Auſtrians returned to that which they held before the action. During this engagement the French had made an unſucceſsful attack on General Latour, oppoſite to Munich. Theſe affairs coſt both ſides ſome hundred men; both claimed the advantage, which was in fact nearly balanced. It belonged however rather to the Imperialiſts, ſince they diſconcerted the plans of the enemy againſt the *Tete de Pont* of Ingolſtadt, the garriſon of which defeated the ſmall French corps that was left before it. In Moreau's report to the directory of the tranſactions of this day, he again obſerves, *that the army of the Sambre and the Meuſe, would ſoon reſume offenſive operations.*

Moreau having failed in his project againſt Ingolſtadt, determined to diſlodge the Auſtrians from Freyſingen, and to drive them on that point beyond the Iſer. In this attempt he was

more fortunate. General St. Cyr, on the 3d got poſſeſſion of Freyſingen, as well as of the bridge of that city.

From this day to the 10th the armies of Moreau and La Tour preſerved nearly the ſame poſition. Between theſe two periods there were ſeveral affairs of advanced poſts, ſome of which were pretty warm, and in one of which, the Republican General Lambert was killed. I abſtain from giving a detail account of thoſe actions, as they produced no material alteration in the ſituation of the armies.

I muſt not obſerve the ſame ſilence reſpecting a tranſaction which took place in the interval. The Elector Palatine had quitted Munich a few days before the French got poſſeſſion of that city. That Prince had, before his departure, appointed a commiſſion authorized to treat with the conquerors, and to negociate with them a ſuſpenſion of arms. As ſoon as Moreau entered Bavaria, theſe commiſſioners ſent deputies to prevail on him not to treat their country as that of an enemy, offering to provide by contributions whatever might be neceſſary for the maintenance of the French army.

After

After many days of negociation they obtained from General Moreau, and from Hauſſman, the commiſſioner of the Republic, a ſuſpenſion of arms, of which the principal conditions were: that the Elector Palatine ſhould withdraw all the troops which he had with the imperial army into Bavaria; that he ſhould give the French Republic ten millions of French livres, payable at different periods, of which the moſt diſtant ſhould be four months from that time; that he ſhould deliver to the French 3,300 ſaddle and draft horſes; 200,000 quintals of grain; 100,000 ſacks of oats; 200,000 quintals of hay; 100,000 pair of ſhoes; 10,000 pair of boots; 30,000 ells of cloth; and 20 pictures, which the French ſhould be at liberty to ſelect from the galleries of Duſſeldorf and Munich. Hauſſman and Moreau took every poſſible ſecurity for the payment of theſe demands in every event, and it was at this price that they *condeſcended* to grant the Elector Palatine a neutrality for all his dominions in Bavaria, Franconia, and Weſtphalia. They exacted from that Prince beſides, that he ſhould immediately ſent to Paris deputies charged to conclude a ſeparate peace with the Republic. Theſe were the advantages which

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ſhe reaped from the invaſion of Bavaria. It detached from the Germanic confederacy one of its moſt powerful members, [*Note.* 19.] and took away ſome thouſands of men from the Emperor's army, whilſt to that of the Republic it produced money, ſubſiſtence, and a very conſiderable addition of military ſtores and reſources. Theſe advantages were no doubt great, but the acquiſition of them coſt the French dear; it brought along with it the diſaſters which they experienced during the remainder of the campaign; and the loſs of all their conqueſts in Germany was the ſequel and effect of the momentary ſubjugation of Bavaria. By advancing into that country, Moreau ſeparated, and as it were, inſulated himſelf from Jourdan, loſt the means of acting in concert with him, as likewiſe the poſſibility of affording him any ready aſſiſtance. By tranſporting all his force to the right bank of the Danube, Moreau enabled the Archduke to conceal his movements from him, and gave that Prince time to come up with Jourdan, and to drive him beyond the Mein.

As ſoon as he was apprized of the meaſures taken by the Archduke yielding to the tempt-

temptation of an eaſy conqueſt, he too readily perſuaded himſelf that the invaſion of Bavaria would recall to it the 20,000 men who had advanced againſt Jourdan. Being during the ſpace of fifteen days as ill informed of the Auſtrian movements, as of the ſitaution of the army of the Sambre and Meuſe, Moreau never new with certainty the number of men that Prince Charles had taken with him, nor of thoſe which he had ſent back. He continued nevertheleſs to advance in Bavaria, ſtill confident that it was the only means by which he could ſave his colleague. Hence it reſulted that the Archduke was enabled to puſh General Jourdan to the utmoſt, and to drive him beyond the Rhine; and that Moreau finding himſelf ſoon reduced to his own force alone, had no part left but that of a retreat, which was become perilous in proportion as it had been delayed.

The light troops diſpatched by the Archduke, after the battle of Würtzbourg, on the left flank and rear of Moreau's army, were ſo vigilant and ſo well diſtributed, that they cut off that General from all communication with Jourdan. Several couriers ſent both by theſe Generals and by the

directory were intercepted, and Moreau was during three weeks very imperfectly informed of the ſtate of affairs in Franconia. Whether that General, as he wrote to the directory, wiſhed to have ſome account of the Archduke, or whether he was at laſt ſenſible of the neceſſity of advancing againſt that Prince, in order to ſuccour Jourdan effectually, on the 10th of September he made a large corps of cavalry, drawn from his left wing croſs the Danube. Moreau, willing to put himſelf in a ſituation to ſupport or follow this column, quitted on the 11h his poſition on the Iſer, but whilſt executing this manœuvre, he was attacked near Munich, by the Prince of Furſtenberg and General Frölich, who defeated his rear guard, of which they killed or took priſoners more than 2,000 men.

The diviſion which had paſſed the Danube, under the orders of General Deſaix, puſhed forwards to the town of Aichſtedt, on which it levied a contribution of 300,000 florins (£30,000 ſterling.) The march of this column again threw Franconia into alarms, from which ſhe was but juſt recovering. It was ſuppoſed that Moreau's whole

whole army was going to paſs the Danube; that this General intended to occupy the road from Ratiſbon to Frankfort, and that after having got poſſeſſion of Nuremburg and Würtzburg, he would march with all his forces againſt the Archduke's rear, to ſeize his magazines, his convoys, and his poſts of communication; and that that Prince would ſoon find himſelf encloſed between the armies of Jourdan and Moreau.

To put himſelf in condition to prevent theſe deſigns, or to render them abortive, Mr. La Tour began inſtantly to purſue Moreau, who directed his courſe towards Neuburg. At the ſame inſtant General Nauendorf paſſed the Danube below that town, in order to meet the French corps which had croſſed that river at Donauwert. The march of Mr. de Nauendorf, together with the accounts that were received from France and from General Jourdan, determined Moreau immediately to recall General Deſaix to the right bank of the Danube; but before the latter could execute the order, he was overtaken on the 14th by General Nauendorf, who completely defeated his rear guard, killed a great many of his men, and took 1,000 priſoners.

From this moment Moreau thought of nothing but retreating towards the Rhine, through Suabia. Whether from an ignorance of the ſtate of affairs in Franconia, whether purſuant to his firſt plan, or in conſequence of orders from the directory, he had continued for a fortnight in the ſame poſition. By remaining ſo long in Bavaria, where he had kept in check a part of the Auſtrian forces, he had hoped to give Jourdan time to rally his army, and flattered himſelf that his colleague when he had received re-inforcements, might be able to ſtop the Archduke, and reſume the offenſive. The contrary however had happened. The ſucceſſive defeats of Jourdan, and the diſperſion of his army, no longer allowed Moreau to expect any great efforts from that quarter. The army of La Tour was beſides in this interval a good deal augmented. It had received all the re-inforcements that had been ſent from Bohemia and Auſtria. The extraordinary levies which had been made in theſe two countries, and the military enthuſiaſm which had been diſplayed at Vienna as well as in all the hereditary dominions, might in a very ſhort time double the Auſtrian force in Bavaria.

Moreau

Moreau was likewiſe aware that detachments from the Archduke's army were then marching to Suabia, and might get poſſeſſion of the paſſes, by which he communicated with that country and with France. Under thoſe circumſtances he perceived, that without expoſing his army to inevitable deſtruction, he could no longer defer his retreat, which already preſented many dangers and difficulties. He therefore determined on it, and had then no other object, but to effect it with as much ſteadineſs and method, as there had been diſorder and precipitation in that of Jourdan.

CHAP. VI.

Moreau repaſſes the Lech—Battle of Iſny—The Fort of Kehl is taken by the Auſtrians, and re-taken by the French—Moreau continues to retreat—Mr. De Nauendorf prevents his entrance into the Dutchy of Würtemberg—The Peaſants of Suabia arm againſt the French—Affair of advanced guards at Schuſſenried—Moreau ſends a part of his baggage and troops through Switzerland—Defeat of the Auſtrians at Biberach—The French force the paſs of the valley of Hell and arrive at Freybourg.

AFTER the affair of the 14th, Moreau drew together the different corps of his army, contracted his line, and retired behind the river Lech; but finding himſelf too much preſſed by Generals La Tour and Nauendorf, who followed him very cloſe, on the 17th he made a movement forward, repulſed the advanced poſts of the Auſtrians, and again extended his line to Landſberg, Friedberg, and Rain.

On

On the ſame day General Frölich made himſelf maſter of Immenſtadt and Kempten. On the 19th he diſlodged the Republicans from Jſny, after an engagement in which they were defeated with the loſs of 500 men. By the capture of this laſt place, Mr. de Frölich outflanked the right wing of Moreau, whoſe left was at the ſame time turned by General Nauendorf, who had advanced in force to Nordlingen. The latter on the 20th obtained poſſeſſion of Donauwert, and likewiſe of the poſition of Shellenberg. [*Note* 20.] From thence he puſhed on parties towards Ulm, Dillingen and Gemund, which formed a junction at Canſtadt on the Neker, with ſome detachments of a corps commanded by Major General Petrarch.

This corps had been formed by part of the garriſons of Phillipſbourg and Manheim, and by the ten ſquadrons of light cavalry, which the Archduke had detached under General Meerfeld after the battle of Würtzbourg. Soon after this junction, General Petrarch had marched into the Margraviate of Baden, had ſucceſſively beaten and driven from Bruchſal, Durlach, Carlſruhe, and Raſtadt, ſeveral ſmall bodies of the enemy, who occupied the valley of the Rhine. Theſe detachments

ments after their defeat having thrown themſelves into the Fort of Kehl, Mr. de Petrarch was ordered to follow them, and to attempt a *Coup de Main* on that important poſt, the capture of which would have cut off Moreau's principal communication with France, and have multiplied the difficulties of his retreat. The French had covered that fort by conſiderable intrenchments, but which were at that time neither in a finiſhed ſtate, nor ſufficiently provided with artillery.

Mr. de Petrarch, on the 17th of September, cauſed an attack to be made on the fort of Kehl by two battalions, who carried it by ſtorm, killed 1200 men, took 800 priſoners, and forced the remainder to retreat beyond the Rhine. But one of the two ſtaff officers who conducted the attack having been killed in the action, and the other taken priſoner, the inferior officers, deprived of their leaders, ſupplied their place with but little intelligence and activity. With a degree of negligence ſcarcely credible, they omitted the obvious precaution of immediately breaking down the bridge of Kehl; and ſuffered the ſoldiers to ramble in diſorder about the town and fort. Mean while a reinforcement of 3,000 men, who

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at the beginning of the action had marched from Straſburgh, paſſed over the bridge, attacked and eaſily routed the Auſtrians, who ſuppoſing the engagement at an end, were entirely off their guard. They were, in a very ſhort time, driven from the fort of Kehl, and from all the entrenchments, with the loſs of 400 men. Thus did a few moments of improvidence and diſorder rob them of the whole fruit of their victory, and deprive them of an invaluable poſt, which afterwards coſt ſo much blood and expence. Few examples can be produced, which have more ſtrikingly proved the abſolute neceſſity of unremitting attention and vigilance in war, or more clearly ſhewn the fatal conſequences which may reſult from one moment of miſtake, or of forgetfulneſs. The fault committed at Kehl by the officer on whom the command devolved by the loſs of his ſuperiors, coſt the Emperor in the ſequel many thouſands of his beſt ſoldiers, and occaſioned the expence of many millions.

Mr. de Petrarch having rallied the two defeated battalions, and ſupported them by ſome freſh troops, made a new but unſucceſsful attempt on the fort of Kehl. Leaving then ſome troops to

blockade

blockade it, he retired to Bichoffsheim, a ſmall town about fifteen miles diſtant from it. From thence he ſent a detachment to take poſſeſſion of the valley of Kintzig, as well as of the defile of Kniebis; and marched with the remainder of his troops towards Stutgard and Canſtadt, where his advanced guard arrived on the 24th. By this diſpoſition, and by theſe movements, Mr. de Petrarch made himſelf maſter of one of the five principal paſſes of Suabia, placed himſelf in the rear of Moreau, deprived him of all direct communication with Straſburgh, carried off the magazines formed by the Freneh in the Dutchy of Würtemberg, and intercepted their convoys and their couriers. Having opened an immediate communication with Mr. de Nauendorf, he ſtraitened the front of Moreau's retreat, and obliged him to make it through the ſouthern part of Suabia.

Preſſed on his rear by Mr. de Petrarch, and turned on both flanks by Generals Nauendorf and Frölich, Moreau was obliged to re-commence his retreat. On the 20th he repaſſed the Lech at Augſbourg and Rain, marched up the Danube in cloſe columns, and arrived on the 22d at Weiſſen-

Weiſſenhauſen. His plan was to retire acroſs the dutchy of Würtembergh, and the country of Baden, through Ulm, Stutgard, Canſtadt and Kehl. To this end he had ſent forward the Commiſſaries of proviſions, the army bakers, and a part of the baggage. The whole of this was fallen in with, and captured on the 22nd on the road from Ulm to Stutgard, by an Auſtrian detachment from the latter town.

The march of the commiſſaries department towards Stutgard, and its orders to have in readineſs in that town, as well as at Canſtadt, bread and proviſions neceſſary for four diviſions of Moreau's army, proving beyond a doubt that General's intention to paſs the Danube at Ulm, with a view to retire through the dutchy of Würtembergh, General Nauendorf left Nordlingen in haſte, to endeavour to be at Ulm before the French, and arrived in the neighbourhood of that town on the 23d. in the morning. Some hours afterwards, a ſtrong column of the French army came out of Ulm, but found the Auſtrians poſted on the heights, which command the road from that town to Stutgard. They did not attempt to force the paſſage, and the

day paſſed without any engagement taking place. The next day General Nauendorf attacked the French, and drove them back to the gates of the town. Seeing themſelves thus prevented, and not doubting that the Auſtrians occupied in force all the paſſes of the dutchy of Würtenbergh, the French gave up their intention of taking that route. On the 26th they left Ulm, leaving there a part of their pontoons, and conſiderable magazines. They continued to aſcend the left bank of the Danube as far as Erbach, where they paſſed that river on the ſame day, the 26th, and from thence directed their march towards Biberach and Schuſſenried. With a view to anticipate or ſtop them on the new route which they were going to take, General Petrarch marched from Orb to Villingen, leaving a ſmall corps under Colonel d'Aſpre, to occupy the mountain of Kniebis, as well as the valleys of the two rivers of the Renchen and the Murg, between which that mountain is ſituated.

In the mean time a column ſent by Moreau to re-open the communication with Kehl, through the valley of Kenzing, was repulſed and forced to fall back on Fribourg.

This General having, as has been juſt mentioned, paſſed the Danube on the 26th, and marched towards Biberach, and Schuſſenried, was followed by Mr. de la Tour, who advanced on the 27th. to the Jller, and on the 28th to the Rottam. On the 29th. his advanced guard drove the French from Biberach, and purſued them as far as Groth, from which it was unable to diſlodge them. The army of Mr. de la Tour was at that time divided into four corps: that at the right, under the immediate orders of that General in perſon occupied Biberach; the ſecond commanded by General Mercantin, was behind Schuſſenried. General Klinglin (who before the revolution had been a General in the French ſervice) was with the third corps at Wolfech. The fourth was with General Frölich in the neighbourhood of Wangen. At the ſame time the two corps of Nauendorf and Petrarch, which were both out of the line, moved, the firſt to Heckingen, and the ſecond towards Rothweil and Villingen. The object of theſe movements was to bring theſe two corps nearer each other, and to make them co-operate with more concert and effect. Mr. de

Meerfeeld commanded the advanced guard of Mr. de Petrarch's corps.

It is obvious from this view of the poſition of the different corps of the Auſtrian army, that the principal paſſes of Suabia were ſhut againſt Moreau, and that the only ones remaining open to him where thoſe of the principality of Furſtenberg, and of the foreſt towns. He might not be free from uneaſineſs even with reſpect to the latter opening, in conſequence of General Frölich's march towards the Lake of Conſtance.

To all theſe difficulties which oppoſed Moreau's retreat, were added other embarraſſments equally preſſing. The exceſſive contributions raiſed by the French, and the depredations and outrages committed by them on the inhabitants of Suabia, had irritated the latter to the higheſt degree. They ſupported with impatience the preſence and the yoke of theſe greedy and tyrannical conquerors. They had ſcarcely experienced ſome reverſes and began their retreat, when the hatred in which they were held broke out openly. The Peaſants every where armed themſelves, maſſacred or took priſoners the ſmaller detachments of the French, ſtopped their ſick

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and wounded, pillaged their magazines, and retook a part of thoſe ſpoils of which they had themſelves been plundered. The Auſtrian Generals taking advantage of the diſpoſition of the natives, pointed out to them the moſt eligible places for aſſembling, put at their head officers of experience, and poſted their new auxiliaries on the mountains, in the woods, and in the defiles, through which the enemy were obliged to paſs.

Menaced in every point at the ſame time by the Imperialiſts and the armed Peaſants, and having in addition to ſurmount thoſe obſtacles which aroſe from the nature of the country, Moreau found himſelf in the moſt critical ſituation. To eſcape from Suabia, called for more courage, and for greater efforts than had been required to enable him to penetrate into it. It was incumbent on him to fight in order to retire; his ſafety could reſult only from a victory.

Surrounded by a multitude of ſmall corps ſcattered over a great number of points, he was ſenſible that inſtead of facing them all at once, his ſituation demanded the adoption of a contrary diſpoſition, and that he ought to march in a maſs and in very cloſe order. He judged rightly that

that by concentraing his army, he would be enabled to attack with ſuperior force and to break through ſome point or other of the circle which was forming round him.

It not being poſſible for him, without great danger, to retire in the face of the principal corps under the orders of Mr. de la Tour, which preſſed very cloſely upon him, Moreau was under the neceſſity of removing that hoſtile corps to a greater diſtance, in order to gain ſomewhat more ſpace and greater facility of moving.

In the morning of the 30th, whilſt the van guards of Generals La Tour and Mercantin were marching towards Schuſſenried they were vigorouſly attacked by three diviſions of the French army. Theſe van guards fell back on the main body which followed them, and which ſtopped the progreſs of the Republicans. They were repulſed with loſs, and the Imperialiſts kept their poſition. This affair coſt the latter 600 men, of whom a great number belonged to the Prince of Condé's army. His troops formed the van guard of General Mercantin, and had to ſuſtain the whole ſhock of the Republicans. They exhibited proofs of the greateſt bravery, and the young Duke d'Enghien

hien, who commanded them, ſhewed himſelf by his capacity and courage, the worthy deſcendent of the great Condé.

Moreau, having ſucceeded but imperfectly in his plans againſt Mr. de la Tour, haſtened to take advantage of the only route which remained entirely in his power. In order to get rid of his ſick, his wounded, and of all that train of equipage ſo embarraſſing to a retreating army, and by the Romans ſo properly called *impedimenta*, he ſent into Switzerland, by the way of Schaffhauſen, a great part of his heavy baggage, accompanied by a conſiderable number of ſoldiers. On their entrance into the territory of Switzerland, they were diſarmed by the troops, which the cantons had aſſembled on their frontiers, and ſent into France acroſs the cantons of Zurich and Soleure. Moreau by this means diſengaged himſelf from whatſoever could moſt incommode and incumber his retreat; and kept with him only thoſe troops, which were the beſt calculated for action. After the engagement of the 30th, Mr. de la Tour advanced as far as Groth, and Steinhauſen; preſenting his front to Moreau, who was poſted between Schuffenried, and a ſmall lake called the Feder See. The ſituation of the latter General grew every

day

day worſe, and his retreat became more and more difficult. The corps of Mr. de Petrarch poſted between the ſources of the Neker and the Danube, inceſſantly harraſſed his rear. He had no longer any direct communication with France, and could entertain no hopes of receiving from thence any ſuccour. Reduced to his own forces, he could only look for ſafety to the courage of his troops, to ſome ſucceſsful manœuvre, or to the fault of his enemies.

The corps of Mr. de la Tour being the moſt numerous, the neareſt, and conſequently the moſt to be feared, Moreau reſolved to make a new effort againſt it. He judged, that Mr. de Nauendorf having ſeparated himſelf from Mr. de la Tour, the right of the latter would be unprotected, and might be attacked with advantage. He made his diſpoſitions in conſequence with great ability; and they were executed with ſecrecy, promptitude, and ſucceſs.

In the night of the firſt of October, he made the left wing of his army croſs the Danube, at Riedlingen. It re-croſſed that river at Munderkingen, and at day-break fell upon the right of the Auſtrian army, which was poſted between the Danube and the Feder See. Major General Koſpoth, who commanded this right wing, not having been properly

perly vigilant on that point, was ſurpriſed and completely beaten. Nearly two battalions were cut off; and the reſt ſought for ſafety in flight. As ſoon as Moreau was informed of the ſucceſs of his left wing, he attacked the whole front of Mr. de la Tour's line, but more feebly on the left, than at the other points.

That army was then divided into five principal corps, commanded by Generals Koſpoth and de la Tour, the Princes of Furſtenberg and Condé, and by General Mercantin, who was on the left of the whole. Mr. de Koſpoth being routed, retired through Biberach. The corps of Mr. de la Tour being vigouroufly attacked by the French, and finding itſelf uncovered by the movement of Mr. de Koſpoth, imitated it, falling back from the right, and retiring towards Ochſenhauſen. The Prince of Furſtenberg likewiſe changed his front in the ſame manner; ſo that theſe three corps, as well as the reſerve artillery and the baggage, formed in cloſe order behind the ſmall army of the Prince of Condé. The latter, far from imitating the example of Generals Koſpoth, la Tour, and Furſtenberg, remained firm in his poſition. He found himſelf

alone oppoſed to the French, whoſe whole efforts there became directed againſt him.

In this ſituation, at once honourable and dangerous, the Prince of Condé diſplayed the talents of a moſt able General, and his army the moſt determined intrepidity. It ſhewed no heſitation in devoting itſelf for the glory of its commander, and the ſafety of the Imperial army. The Prince took a poſition before Schweinhauſen, ſo judiciouſly choſen and which was ſo valiantly defended by his troops, that he kept in check the Republican army, engaged it even with advantage, and gave time to the other Auſtrian columns to ſave their baggage and their cannon, and to take a poſition behind the Rothambach. Mr. de Mercantin, who commanded the left, having then retired to Mulhauſen, the ſituation of the Prince of Condé's corps became ſtill more dangerous.

The Prince, preſſed hard by the Republicans, charged them three times with his cavalry, led by the Duke d'Enghien, who took from them one piece of cannon; and who again diſtinguiſhed himſelf as well by his valour, as by the adroitneſs of his manœuvres. After an action which

laſted

laſted many hours, the Imperial army having taken a ſecure poſition, the Prince of Condé alſo ordered a retreat. The loſs of the Auſtrians on this day, was about 4,000 men and 12 pieces of cannon; that of the Republicans was conſiderably leſs. General La Tour ſpoke in the higheſt terms of the Prince of Condé and of his troops, to which he confeſſed he owed the ſafety of his army. The official accounts publiſhed at Vienna and at London, made a no leſs favourable report of the Prince on Condé's conduct.

On the 3d. Mr. La Tour took a poſition at Monſchroden, Erlenhauſen, and Laupheim. The victory which Moreau had gained at Biberach having given him more liberty in his motions, he took advantage of it on the 5th to re-commence his retreat, and to make ſure of the means by which it might be ſucceſsfully effected. Mr. La Tour being weakened by his defeat, and diſabled for ſome days from an active purſuit of Moreau, the latter left only the center of his army before that of Mr. La Tour. He ordered one diviſion to open the entrance into the foreſt towns; and on the 6th paſſed the Danube with the reſt of his army, between Sigmaringen and Ried-

lingen. The intent of the laſt movement was to cover the main body from Generals Nauendorf and Petrarſch, and alſo to force the paſſage of the black foreſt.

By theſe diſpoſitions, the center of the French army, to which the artillery and all the baggage were entruſted, was covered on its right by the corps which was marching toward the foreſt towns; and on its left, by the two diviſions which had paſſed the Danube. [*Note* 21.] Thus did the French army retreat in three parts, in paralled lines, the right and left opening the march and protecting that of the center, which on its ſide kept in check General La Tour, and prevented him from reinforcing the Generals Nauendorf and Petrarſch. It was in this regular and well arranged order of retreat that Moreau directed his courſe towards the mountains of Suabia, and prepared to force their defiles.

On the 7th he marched towards Stockach, where he arrived on the 8th. He had the night before ordered General Deſaix to take poſſeſſion of Engen, who on the next day attacked the advanced guard of General Petrarſch, and diſlodged it from Duttlingen. On the 1ſt General Deſaix having

having formed a junction with the two divisions which had passed the Danube, made a fresh attack on General Petrarsch, defeated him, and drove him from Schweyningen, as well as from the towns of Rothweil and Villingen, two very important posts, without the possession of which the French could not possibly penetrate the defiles of the black Forest.

General la Tour, after some days of inaction, occasioned by his defeat at Biberach, now resumed the pursuit of the enemy. He marched on the 7th. to Buchau, on the 8th. to Ostrach, and on the 9th. to Mœskirchen, whilst General Moreau established his head quarters at Engen. On the 10th, Mr. de Nauendorf made an attempt to recover Rothweil. In the beginning of the action he had the advantage; but it terminated in favour of the French, who vigorously repulsed him.

Whatever advantage the latter derived from possessing the post of Rothweil, it by no means decided the success of their retreat; and they had as yet only surmounted a part of the difficulties which attended it. The greatest impediments to it still remained. It was absolutely necessary that the French should force their way, either through the valley

valley of Kintzig, to get to Kehl, or through the valley of Hell, to make good their retreat to Fribourg. Moreau had not a moment to loſe to ſucceed in one or other of theſe attempts. The entrance into theſe vallies were guarded by Auſtrian corps, and by armed peaſants, whoſe number increaſed daily: there was every reaſon to apprehend that he would not ſucceed in forcing his way, if the Archduke Charles, who was rapidly advancing, and was already at Offenburg, ſhould have time to join the troops which occupied the defiles that we are now ſpeaking of. [*Note* 22.]

The center of the French army, which its two wings had hitherto preceded, and which had marched in a parallel line behind them, in its turn advanced to force the paſſage of the valley of Hell. Having formed a cloſe column, it attacked on the 10th. Colonel d'Apre, who defended the entrance of the valley. The inferiority of his forces did not admit of his maintaining himſelf. He was driven from poſt to poſt, and wounded in one of the actions that took place. The French at length ſucceeded in paſſing this terrible defile. [*Note* 23.] They arrived on the 13th. at Fribourg, from whence they drove the Auſtrians; and advanced beyond this city,

city, the poſſeſſion of which ſecured and compleated their retreat. [*Note* 24.]

Whilſt the center of the republican army was advancing to overpower by its maſs the ſmall corps which defended the valley of Hell, the two wings had formed a junction, that they might be in condition to check the Generals Nauendorf and Petrarch. They paſſed in their turn the valley of Hell, on the 14th, 15th, and 16th; whilſt the equipage and ammunition waggons, which Moreau had with him, defiled by the foreſt towns under the protection of the right wing.

Mr. de la Tour had followed the enemy on the 10th to Engen and Stockach, flattering himſelf that he ſhould be enabled to cut a part of them off, whilſt they were endeavouring to force the entrance into the black foreſt; an attempt which it was ſuppoſed it would be extremely difficult to execute. But theſe narrow paſſes too feebly guarded, having been penetrated and traverſed by the French, with little loſs and great expedition: Mr. de la Tour gave up a purſuit from that time uſeleſs, which had now taken him up a month, and which had been conducted either in ſo unfortunate or ſo unſkilful a manner. He

marched

marched to the right towards the valley of Kintzig, to form a junction with the Archduke Charles, a junction, which became neceſſary from the union of the whole French army, near Fribourg. The Generals Nauendorf and Petrarch had alſo marched, on the 14th. in order to join the Prince, the one to Eltzach, the other to Kintzig. On the 15th. the corps of the Prince of Condé, and General Frölich, were the only ones which continued the purſuit of the enemy into the defiles of the black Foreſt. [*Note* 25.]

The day after his arrival at Fribourg, Moreau cauſed Valdkirch to be occupied, and placed his advanced poſts on the heights, which bound the right bank of the little river Eltz. A detachment of his army drove the light troops of the Archduke from old Briſach, and threw a bridge of boats over the Rhine, between that town and new Briſach.

CHAP-

CHAP. VII.

Moreau endeavours to maintain himſelf in Briſgaw—March of the Archduke againſt Fribourg—Poſition of the oppoſed armies—Battles of the 17th, 18th, and 19th of October—Moreau retreats and takes the formidable poſition of Schliengen—He is forced to abandon it, and to re-paſs the Rhine at Huningen.

MOREAU having luckily eſcaped all the dangers which attended his retreat, having without any conſiderable loſs conducted his whole army over the mountains of Suabia, having by the poſſeſſion of the whole valley of the Rhine, as well as of the two bridges of Huningen and Briſach, a ſafe and perfect communication with France, might have thought (as it ſhould ſeem) that he had done enough in ſaving his army, and have been inclined to retire with it beyond the Rhine. But whether this General had received contrary orders from the directory, or that he was elated by his ſucceſsful retreat, inſtead of retiring into Alſace, he pro-

poſed to maintain himſelf in Briſgau, and to attack his enemy inſtead of giving way to them. Accuſtomed from the beginning of the campaign to ſucceſſes which he had no right to expect, and which he owed very often to the errors of the Generals who were oppoſed to him, he truſted that fortune would continue faithful to him, and hoped to crown his retreat with a victory. He wiſhed to defeat the Archduke, and to relieve the fort of Kehl from its blockade. With this intention he ventured on the 18th into the valley of Kintzig, and marched to meet Prince Charles.

The latter had advanced from the upper Rhine in hopes, (if poſſible) of getting poſſeſſion of Kehl, before Moreau had forced his way through Suabia. He had detached General Hotze into Alſace, merely to engage the attention of the troops which the French had in that province, and to prevent their ſending any conſiderable force to ſuccour Kehl. This diverſion did not meet with the deſired ſucceſs. In vain did General Hotze overrun the Palatinate and Alſace, and levy contributions even at the gates of Straſbourg. The French ſhut up in their ſtrong places, and knowing that that General could undertake nothing againſt them

them, took care not to weaken Kehl, to enable themſelves to oppoſe this momentary invaſion.

The good ſtate of defence in which this fort then was, as well as Moreau's ſucceſsful retreat and ſubſequent movements, obliged the Archduke to renounce for the preſent his intended attack upon it, which he contented himſelf with blockading with a ſmall corps. He marched towards Fribourg, and arrived on the 16th at Molberg, where he took the command of Mr. de la Tour's army, which had been joined by the corps of Nauendorf and Petrarch.

Before the reader is preſented with the detail of the battles which took place between the 17th and the 27th. of October, and which decided the iſſue of this campaign, it is material that he ſhould be made acquainted with the poſitions reſpectively occupied by the two armies at the firſt of thoſe periods. They had at that time ceaſed to be divided into ſeveral corps, at a diſtance from, and independent of one another. On both ſides they occupied a line, almoſt all the points of which were connected with each other, and thus enabled to receive mutual ſupport.

The line formed by the Auſtrian army had its right againſt the Rhine; extended itſelf along the front of the river Eltz; croſſed the mountains of Simonſwald, and terminated on the left at the entrance of the vallies of St. Peter and St Meger's, where the Prince of Condé and General Frölich were poſted. Theſe two corps had not an immediate communication with the reſt of the army.

The right of the French occupied the mouth of the vallies juſt mentioned. From thence their line paſſed by Simonſwald, Valdkirch, Emendingen, in front of the Eltz, and of Kintzingen, near the Rhine, to which their left extended.

It was in this poſition that the Imperial and Republican armies diſputed the poſſeſſion of the Briſgaw. On the 17th and particularly on the 18th, there were very ſmart actions between the advanced guards, which were favourable to the Auſtrians. On the latter day, the Duke of Enhien, who commanded the Prince of Condé's advanced Guard, defeated the right of the French, from whom he took the formidable poſts of Hohlgraben, St. Meger's and St. Peter. On the ſame day General Frölich alſo made himſelf maſter

of

of ſome important points in the valley of Hell.

Theſe actions were only the preludes to a general engagement, for which the Archduke had made the following diſpoſitions. The right of his army, commanded by Mr. de la Tour, was to attack the ſmall town of Kintzingen: General Wartenſleben, with the center, was ordered to carry the heights behind the village of Malmertingen: General Petrarch, at the head of the left wing, was directed to advance on the road from Keimbach to Emendingen; Whilſt General Meerfeld, with one brigade, was to penetrate the woods which were on the left, and Prince Frederic of Orange was to endeavour, with another brigade, to gain the commanding parts of the mountains, in order to turn the right of the French. Theſe laſt were to be attacked at the ſame time at Waldkirch, by General Nauendorf; and in the vallies of St. Peter's and of Hell, by General Frölich and the Prince of Condé.

On the 19th, in the morning, all theſe columns put themſelves in motion towards the points of their deſtination: but the badneſs of the roads, as well as other difficulties occaſioned by the nature

ture of the ground, very much retarded their march. They could not commence the attack till mid-day. General La Tour experienced the greateſt reſiſtance in that on Kintzingen. He was even ſeveral times repulſed with loſs: but Prince Charles having put himſelf at the head of the grenadiers, they attacked the French with an irreſiſtible fury, and drove them from the village. The left and centre having alſo met with great oppoſition, it was not without conſiderable difficulty that General Meerfeld made himſelf maſter of the woods above Keimbach. The enemy profiting from the advantage of their poſition, defended themſelves ſtep by ſtep, and were not driven from it, till the Prince of Orange, after a moſt laborious march through a country that ſeemed impenetrable appeared on their right. This manœuvre quickly followed by a vigorous attack, decided the victory. The French abandoned Emendingen, and croſſed the Eltz at Deningen, where they deſtroyed the bridge.

General Nauendorf was not leſs ſucceſsful. At the moment that he put himſelf in march he was briſkly attacked by a conſiderable corps of the enemy, commanded by General Moreau in perſon.

Mr.

Mr. de Nauendorf not only rendered fruitleſs all his efforts, but vigorouſly repulſed him, drove him from Valdkirch, and made himſelf maſter of the bridge at this town over the Eltz. By a ready and able manœuvre, this General turned three of the enemy's battalions, one of which laid down their arms, and the other two were broken and diſperſed in the woods.

The Prince of Condé alſo and General Frölich gained ground on the corps which were oppoſed to them in the vallies of Hell and of St. Peter.

It appeared from the account that Moreau ſent of this action, in which he ſuffered a conſiderable loſs, that he had wiſhed to avoid an engagement in the poſition which he then occupied. He had ſent orders to the advanced guards of his center and his left to fall back behind the Eltz, in caſe they were attacked; but General Beaupuy who had been charged to ſee this order executed, having been killed in the beginning of the action, the French waited for the enemy before the Eltz, and engaged in a poſition which was very unfavourable to them.

General

General Moreau took a new one behind the Eltz, in the night of the 19th. His right reſted againſt the mountains, and his left on ſome moraſſes behind the village of Verſletten. This laſt diſpoſition had for its object, to guard the mouth of the defile of Theningen.

In the morning of the 20th, the Archduke puſhed his advanced guard acroſs the Eltz, oppoſite to Emendingen, and gave orders to General La Tour to paſs this river at Deningen, whilſt General Nauendorf ſhould advance in the plain towards Fribourg. Mr. de la Tour having been under the neceſſity of repairing the bridge at Deningen, under the fire of the enemy's artillery, loſt many men and a good deal of time. It was already night before he was in condition to paſs the river. This delay prevented the Archduke from making a general attack on the enemy, as he had intended. The Prince of Furſtenberg however diſlodged them in the courſe of the day from the village of Rügel, the poſſeſſion of which opened to the Auſtrians the road to Old Briſach.

The advanced guards of each army paſſed the night of the 20th within half cannon ſhot of each other.

other. The Archduke prepared to execute at break of day, the attack which he had been prevented from making the day before. But Moreau did not think proper to wait for it, and retreated during the night, after having ſent a conſiderable detachment acroſs the Rhine at New Briſach, and deſtroyed the bridge there.

Such was the reſult of Moreau's efforts to maintain himſelf in the Briſgau. All he gained by them was a delay of ſix days, during which he loſt 2,000 men taken priſoners, and a like number killed and wounded. The loſs of the Auſtrians was not the fourth of it. To the great regret of the whole army General Wartenſleben had his arm broke on the 19th by a grape ſhot.

The Archduke entered Fribourg on the 21ſt, where he was joined by the corps of the Prince of Condé, and of General Frölich, which aſſiſted him in driving the rear guard of the enemy out of that town. The Auſtrians followed the French whom they ſuppoſed to be in full retreat towards Upper Alſace; but whether Moreau wiſhed to gain time that he might prevent the Imperialiſts from attempting any other enterpriſe before the end of the campaign, or whether he wiſhed ſtill

to endeavour to maintain himſelf on the right bank of the Rhine, he halted at Schliengen (twelve miles from Huningen) in a very ſtrong poſition.

His right wing was placed on the neighbouring heights of the villages of Kandern and Sutzenkirchen. Beginning at theſe two points his line extended along that chain of hills which terminates the valley of the Rhine, fifteen miles from Baſle, and paſſed by Ober and Nieder Eckenheim, Liel, Schliengen, and Steinſtadt. His left was poſted above the latter village, beneath which ran the Rhine. The center occupied the high grounds of the villages of Liel and Schliengen. The whole front of the line was protected by a ſmall river which takes its courſe in the mountains near Kandern, and runs by Ober and Nieder Eckenhiem, Liel, and Schliengen to Steinſtadt, where it falls into the Rhine. The French had beſides poſted a large body of infantry in front of their center on a very lofty point between the villages of Schliengen and Feldberg. I ſhould add to this detail of the poſition taken by Moreau, that the high grounds on the left bank of this river, completely command thoſe of the right bank. This circumſtance gave the French a great advantage in defend-

ing

ing the approach of their line. It was in this formidable poſition that Moreau hoped once more to check the Auſtrians, and in which the latter did not heſitate to attack him.

The enterpriſe was oppoſed by ſo many almoſt inſurmountable obſtacles, that it required the talents of the Archduke, and the enthuſiaſm with which his valour had inſpired the troops, to be able to overcome them. The Prince did not think fit to endeavour to turn round the heights occupied by the right wing of the French. The ſeaſon and the bad condition of the roads rendered this meaſure tedious, and doubtful in its event. An attack by open force, in ſpite of its dangers, was more ſuitable to circumſtances, and above all, to the enterpriſing character of the Archduke. He reſolved whatever it might coſt, to diſlodge the enemy from the heights of Kandern, Fuerbach, Sutzenkirchen, Ober and Nieder Eckenheim. The attack was diſpoſed in the following manner:—The army was divided into four principal columns. That on the right was formed by the corps of the Prince of Condé, its van guard being under the orders of the Duke d'Enghien. The ſecond commanded by the Prince of Furſtemberg, conſiſted

of nine battalions and twenty-ſix ſquadrons; the third, of eleven battalions and two regiments of cavalry, was conducted by General Latour; and the fourth column, compoſed of the whole van guard of the army, was headed by General Nauendorf.

The two firſt columns were ordered not to attempt a ſerious attack, the ground being too much againſt them, but merely to keep in check the left wing of the enemy, ſo as to prevent them from ſending reinforcements to their right. The real attack was to be made by the two columns on the left, which were to advance againſt the right of the enemy, and endeavour to turn it.

The corps of the Prince of Condé having been drawn together at Neuburg, puſhed forward to Steinſtadt, and although it had received no orders to drive the French from that village, the troops were ſo animated with a deſire of ſignalizing themſelves, that they made an attack with fixed bayonets, took poſſeſſion of the place, and maintained themſelves in it the whole day, though conſtantly under the fire of the enemy.

The

The Prince of Furſtemberg formed his column at Mulheim, and poſted himſelf on the heights oppoſite Schliengen, which he defended with ſucceſs

The corps of General Latour was divided into two Columns. That on the right attacked the French in the vineyards which they occupied between Feldberg and Schliengen, whilſt the left diſlodged them from Eckenhein and puſhed forward the attack to the mountains beyond the hollow way. The enemy defended themſelves with great obſtinacy, but were driven at length from the vineyards, and from a part of the woods which lie between Nieder Eckenheim, and Feurbach.

General Nauendorf left the environs of Feldberg, and reached the points he was to force, after a long and difficult march. He divided his corps into ſeveral ſmall columns, which made ſeparate attacks on the villages of Sutzenkirchen, Fuerbach, and Kandern. After a ſevere conflict the French yielded in all theſe points, and Mr. de Nauendorf found the communication opened between himſelf and Mr. de la Tour, through the means of an intermediate corps commanded by General Meerfeeld. A violent ſtorm, and afterwards night coming

ing on put an end to the action, and to the efforts of the Auſtrians.

As the poſts which they had taken poſſeſſion of commanded the flanks of thoſe ſtill occupied by the French, the Archduke prepared to attack them the day after, on the heights of Tannenkirchen, where the right wing of the enemy had retired and had taken a poſition *en potence*, no leſs formidable than that from which they had juſt been driven.

General Moreau foreſeeing that if he was compelled to abandon this laſt poſt, the Auſtrians might place themſelves between him and the bridge of Huningen, or drive him back upon the Rhine, determined to re-commence his retreat, and to continue it till he reached the other bank of the river. He began his march during the night, and encamped on the 25th at Atlingen. The day after, his army paſſed the Rhine at Huningen, almoſt in the preſence of the Auſtrians, who did not endeavour to diſturb theſe laſt moments of its retreat. The French Army was protected by a ſtrong rear guard under the orders of Generals Abbattuci and la Boiſſiere.

It was thus that General Moreau, after having remained four months in Germany, after having con-

conquered Suabia and Bavaria, and threatened Auſtria, was obliged to paſs the Rhine in order to protect the frontiers of France. No one can deny that he made a moſt able retreat. His ſucceſſes from the 24th of June (the period at which he paſſed the Rhine at Kehl) till his entrance into Bavara, reſulting almoſt neceſſarily from the great ſuperiority of his forces, were not deciſive of his military talents. But his retreat has left no room to doubt of his abilities, and ranks him amongſt diſtinguiſhed Generals. Indeed every one muſt acknowledge that he conducted his army with infinite ſkill in the midſt of the Auſtrian corps which ſurrounded him, and that he choſe well his opportunities to attack and defeat them one after another. The movement which he made againſt Mr. de la Tour was well combined, and it was to the complete ſucceſs of this manœuvre that he owed that of his retreat, which was judicious and methodical. He ſaved his ſick, his wounded, his artillery and his baggage.

However able the conduct of General Moreau may have been, profeſſionally ſpeaking, it preſents however many errors, which have been partly

partly pointed out in the courſe of this work. Even his retreat is not altogether free from blame. By remaining ſtationary during eight days in a bad poſition, full of defiles occupied by the enemy, he ran the riſk of being either completely routed, or finding himſelf in want of military ſtores. If it did not ſo turn out, Moreau had no merit in it: it muſt be attributed to the faults committed by the Auſtrian Generals, and particularly by Mr. de la Tour. The French army owed its ſafety to the two following cauſes.

Firſt, To the great diſtance there was between the corps of Frölich, Condé, Latour, Nauendorf and Petrarch, which prevented them from having a quick and eaſy communication, and deprived the different Generals of the power of combining their motions or attacks with preciſion and ſecurity. By forming an immenſe circle round Moreau, they enabled him to bear with his whole force againſt any point of the circumference, which he found it neceſſary to break through: which that General did not fail to do, as often as circumſtances required it.

Secondly,

Secondly. To the diverſion made by General Hotze in Alſace, which proved of the utmoſt utility to Moreau. This incurſion had two objects: firſt to induce the French to draw off a part of the troops ſtationed in Straſbourg and Kehl; and ſecondly to hinder them from making any attempt on the lower Rhine, by compelling them to detach a part of the army of the Sambre and Meuſe for the protection of Alſace, and the Dutchy of Deux Ponts. The firſt of theſe two objects was not attained, and the ſecond was but imperfectly executed. If inſtead of ſending General Hotze with 9,000 men into Alſace, he had been ordered to join Mr. de Petrarch without delay, it would have enabled that General to act more effectually againſt the French, inſtead of being obliged to confine himſelf to ſlight attacks, on account of the ſmall number of his troops. Having every advantage which the nature of the country could afford, and being moreover ſeconded by the inhabitants, Mr. de Petrarch might have checked Moreau in the defiles of Suabia, or even have prevented him from penetrating into that province. Theſe

9,000 men, poſted in the valley of Hell, would have rendered it inattackable. What would have become of Moreau, had he not been able to force this paſſage, and arrive at Fribourg? All entrance into Switzerland was ſhut againſt him. Had he attempted to violate the neutrality of its territory, 25,000 men aſſembled by the different cantons in that of Schaffauſen might have oppoſed his entrance into their country, and have placed him between themſelves and the Auſtrians. In this caſe, his only reſource would have been to paſs through the foreſt towns; defiling through which, an army impeded by equipage, ſtores, and artillery, might have been deſtroyed, or at leaſt have loſt its rear guard. The end of this campaign might have been very different.

After Moreau's return into Alſace, the reſpective armies were again ſeparated by the Rhine almoſt the whole length of its courſe, from Baſle to Cologne. Henceforward this campaign, which ought ſeemingly to have been put an end to by the ſeaſon, no longer excited that lively degree of intereſt, which two numerous armies, oppoſed

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to each other in a vaſt and open country, naturally inſpire. Great battles, and thoſe deciſive movements, which produce the acquiſition, or the loſs of a great tract of country, were no longer to be expected. Military curioſity had no other object, than the ſieges carried on againſt the heads of the bridges at Kehl and Huningen, as well as ſome unimportant events which took place on the lower Rhine, and which I am about to relate.

CHAP. VIII.

Diſpoſition of the armies of the Archduke and Moreau, after the latter had re-entered France—Operations of General Werneck on the lower Rhine—Bournonville ſucceeds Jourdan in the command of his army of the Sambre and Meuſe—Condition of that army—Operations of Generals Hotze and Neu, on the left bank of the Rhine—Paſſage of that river by the Auſtrians on the 21ſt—Affair on the Sieg the ſame day—Battle of Kreutznach—General Hotze retires into the intrenched camp before Manheim—He is attacked in it without ſucceſs—Neutrality of Neuwied agreed upon—Armiſtice concluded on the lower Rhine.

PRINCE Charles, after having driven the army of the Rhine and Moſelle into Alſace, thought of nothing but to wreſt from them the two places ſtill in the hands of the French on the right bank of the Rhine, viz. the heads of the bridges of Kehl and Huningen. He ordered them to be inveſted at the

the end of October, and made every neceſſary preparation for theſe enterprizes. He entruſted the direction of the attack to be made on the head of the bridge of Huningen, as well as the command of the left wing of his army to the Prince of Wurtemberg, and marched himſelf with the reſt of his forces to Offembourg. He fixed his head quarters in this town that he might perſonally be able to direct the operations of the ſiege of Kehl. The Prince ordered the right wing of his army under General Staray towards Raſtadt and Manheim, in order to unite it to the troops which occupied the latter place, and to ſecure a powerful ſupport to its entrenched camp in caſe of an attack.

On the other ſide, General Moreau diſpoſed his army nearly in a manner ſimilar. He left his right wing under the orders of General Ferino, in the environs of Huningen, to defend the head of the bridge, marched the center of his army towards Straſbourg, and eſtabliſhed his head quarters near that town, in the village of Illkirch. He gave the command of his left to General Deſaix, who marched towards Landau, in order to oppoſe General Hotze, and compel

compel him to retire into the fort of the Rhine, before the Town of Manheim.

Having now informed the reader of the poſitions taken by the armies of Prince Charles and General Moreau for the remainder of the campaign, as well as for their winter quarters, I ſhall recall his attention for the laſt time to the lower Rhine.

It may be remembered that the Archduke having forced Jourdan's army to croſs the Rhine and the Sieg, left General Werneck on the 22d of September with about 40,000 men, to keep the French in check on the lower Rhine. This General, well worthy by his military talents of the confidence repoſed in him by the Archduke, placed his advanced poſts on the Sieg, and his head quarters at Uckerath. His operations could only be defenſive, and his ſole aim was to prevent the French from taking the field again. To attain this he had two objects to fulfil, firſt to confine the enemy between Duſſeldorf and the Sieg, and ſecondly to block up the head of the bridge at Neuwied as cloſely as poſſible.

The campaigns of 1795 and 1796 having furniſhed many examples of the facility with which an army ſuperior

perior in number could force the paſſage of the Sieg and the Lahn, General Werneck endeavoured to find in the nature of the country, and the works of art, the means of obviating the defects of ſeveral points of his poſition. In order to improve and concenter the defence of the Lahn, he contrived to unite by combined entrenchments the towns of Montebauer and Limbourg to the fortreſs of Ehrebreitſtein. Foreſeeing beſides a poſſibility that the enemy might force theſe entrenchments and the paſſage of the Lahn, Mr. de Werneck cauſed the Town of Friedberg to be fortified, that he might add a ſecond line of defence to that of Frankfort.

The reader may remember, that at the end of his retreat Jourdan was deprived of the command of the army, the remains of which he was bringing back. The complaints made by this General againſt the plan of the campaign which he had been obliged to follow, againſt the want of means in which he had been left, and againſt the bad conduct of the civil commiſſaries attached to his army; all theſe, but ſtill more, the misfortunes which he had experienced, diſſatisfied the directory, of whom Jourdan had been till then

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the favourite. Inſtead of an increaſe of authority which he demanded as neceſſary to reſtore order to his army, he was ſtripped of his command, which was beſtowed on General Beurnonville, already known by his campaign of Treves in 1792, and by his impriſonment in Moravia. Scarcely had the latter returned into France, than he was ſent, in compenſation for his long captivity, to take the command of the army of the North in Holland. He brought a part of it to the aſſiſtance of Jourdan in the end of September, and ſucceeded a few days after to the command of the army of the Sambre and Meuſe.

This change of commanders did not accelerate the reſtoration of good order throughout the army. On the contrary it appeared that Jourdan in ſpite of his misfortunes ſtill retained many partiſans in it in all its different claſſes. Several Generals and Subaltern officers wiſhed to ſhare his diſgrace, and deſertion which was already very conſiderable became more prevalent than before. Theſe circumſtances did not ſecond the wiſhes of the directory, and the efforts of Beurnonville, to reſtore to the army that conſiſtence which it had loſt. The buſineſs indeed was leſs to reform than to new model it altogether.

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The elements of it were either diſſolved or relaxed; in no longer retained either union or ſpirit. The Generals were diſcontented, the Officers diſheartened, and the ſoldiers were without confidence and ſubordination. This army was in want of horſes, artillery, clothes, arms, and proviſions. It was deficient in thoſe various military means, without which, an army, whatever be the number of its ſoldiers, cannot under take an active war, without experiencing embarraſſments. This however was what the French Government expected from it, wiſhing the army to recommence offenſive operations as ſoon as poſſible, that whilſt there was yet time, a powerful diverſion might be made in favour of Moreau. Notwithſtanding the orders of the Directory, and his own exertions, General Beurnonville could not put the army of the Sambre and Meuſe in a condition to act effectually. In vain did he caſhier officers, break commiſſaries, diſmiſs contractors, and ſhoot ſome ſoldiers: his army was not rendered by this more fit to be employed, and theſe internal arrangements conſumed the

time, during which it was ſtill poſſible to undertake ſome enterpriſe.

To the abovementioned cauſes, which prevented Beurnonville from recommencing offenſive operations, was added the neceſſity of defending his own poſition. General Hotze, as I have before related, paſſed the Rhine at Manheim, on the 2nd of October, with about 9,000 men, and ſent a part of his forces into Alſace, to attract the attention of the enemy, to deſtroy their lines, and to levy contributions. Another diviſion of the ſame corps marched to the right, and puſhed parties into the Palatinate, and the Nahegau, as far as Kaiſerſlautern and Baumholder.

This unexpected irruption alarmed the French corps which were in front of the Nahe, and in the Hundſruck; and they marched towards the Dutchy of Deux Ponts, to protect it from the incurſions of the enemy. General Neu, governor of Mayence, taking advantage of the weakneſs of the French corps which blocked up that place, drove it back, after ſeveral briſk engagements, behind the Nahe; and took poſſeſſion of the town of Bingen, as well as of ſome important points on that river.

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As the motions of General Neu, combined with thoſe of General Hotze, rendered it poſſible for them to attempt ſomething more important; Beurnonville haſtened to march a large part of his army towards the Hundſruck. He thus weakened himſelf greatly on the right bank of the Rhine, deprived himſelf of the power of undertaking any thing in that quarter, and gave General Werneck an opportunity of making ſome attempt.

This General wiſhing to profit by the removal of a part of Beurnonville's army, as well as to favour by a diverſion the operations of Generals Hotze and Neu, aſſembled ſome boats, and cauſed ſeveral ſmall detachments to croſs the Rhine on the 21ſt of October, both above and below Coblentz. His aim was to ſpread alarm along the left bank of the Rhine, by making debarkations on ſeveral points, and more eſpecially to break the bridge of boats at Neuwied, in order to cut off the troops which defended the head of that bridge. [*Note* 26.] General Kray, to whom this expedition was entruſted, ſucceeded in the latter object, and effected the deſtruction of the bridge, which was already much

damaged by the ſwell of the Rhine, and by trees and all ſorts of lumber brought down with it. Theſe different detachments had ſeveral ſmart actions, but as their numbers were too ſmall to enable them to make any advance into the country, they repaſſed the Rhine with the loſs of about 300 men, after having been on the point of getting poſſeſſion of the town of Coblentz.

Beurnonville, anxious to ſignalize himſelf by the news of ſome brilliant exploit, ſent an account of this affair, full of bombaſt and falſehood. After having exalted the talents of his Generals, and eſpecially his own, he deſcribed the tremendous attack made by the Auſtrians; the *irreſiſtible courage of his ſoldiers both on land and on the water*; *the inconceivable fire kept up by his artillery*; and concluded by ſtating, that *all the Auſtrians had been killed, drowned, or taken priſoners.* The number of the latter amounting by his account to 1,000. [*Note* 27.]

On the ſame day, the 21ſt, a very ſevere engagement took place on the Sieg between the advanced guards oppoſed to each other, in which the French were worſted, and ſuffered much.

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The two diviſions of the army of the Sambre and Meuſe ſent into the Hundſruck and upon the Nahe, reſtored ſuperiority to the French in that part of the ſeat of war. On the 26th. they attacked the Auſtrians poſted on the right bank of the Nahe, with their right at Bingen, and their left near Kreutznach. Notwithſtanding the inequality of ſtrength, the Imperialiſts defended themſelves with ſucceſs, and ſtood their ground. The French renewed the attack on the 27th, and the reſiſtance made by the Auſtrians was no leſs vigorous than that of the preceding day; but their left, over which the enemy had the advantage of ground, having been turned, they were compelled to retire upon the Selz, after having loſt about 300 men. The loſs of the Republicans was not inferior. They left beſides, 200 priſoners in the hands of the Auſtrians.

The Executive Directory conſtrued this advantage into a great victory, in order to compenſate for the news of Moreau's defeat, and of his retreat beyond the Rhine, which happened at the ſame period. This ſucceſs was however of very little importance, either with reſpect to the iſſue of the battle, or the extent of Country which

which it put the French in poſſeſſion of. The ſituation of the Hundſruck, and of that part of the Palatinate, which lies between the Moſelle and the Rhine is ſuch as to make it difficult to defend it againſt a ſuperior force. Theſe two countries belong almoſt neceſſarily to the moſt numerous; and eſpecially, as I have before obſerved, to the poſſeſſors of the places on the Sarre, Moſelle, and in Alſace. Of this the preſent war had added its teſtimony to that of all the preceding ones.

Theſe countries, as well as the dutchy of Deux Ponts, are indebted to their ſituation, for the misfortune of having been occupied and laid waſte, one after the other, by the contending armies. They have experienced more cruelly than any other country the dreadful ſcourge of war. They are ruined for a great number of years. [*Note* 28.]

Three days after the advantage gained by the French, in the neighbourhood of Kreutznach, they retired again upon the Nahe; their aim in diſlodging the Auſtrians from the banks of that river, having been merely to cover the march of a diviſion of the army of the Sambre and Meuſe, which was directing itſelf towards Kaiſerſlautern, in order to drive from thence the light troops of General Hotze. After

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his retreat acroſs the Rhine, Moreau likewiſe ordered a diviſion to march towards Landau and the Palatinate. At the approach of theſe two diviſions, General Hotze, too weak to oppoſe them, and having beſides no great intereſt in doing ſo, retired into the entrenched camp before Manheim. The French followed and attacked him without ſucceſs, on the 7th of November. In ſpite of all their exertions, he remained maſter of the poſt he had taken poſſeſſion of, the right of which was covered by Frankkenthal, and the left by a little river called the Rhebach. I have given, in the beginning of this work, a deſcription of this entrenched camp, known by the name of the Fort of the Rhine. After this action, the poſition of the Auſtrian and French armies from Manheim to Duſſeldorf, preſenting nothing to either, which was at once neceſſary and eaſy to acquire, both ſides remained in a ſtate of inaction, which the rigour of the ſeaſon and want of repoſe almoſt forced upon them. Although General Beurnonville had drawn together, in the firſt days of November, two large bodies of troops near Andernach and Cologne, and had made apparently great preparations for an impending attack, yet he

contented

contented himſelf with mere appearances. General Werneck, on his ſide, was juſt as inactive, and made no ſerious attempt upon the head of the bridge at Neuwied. Nothing happened but a few ſkirmiſhes and cannonades, which had no other effect but to coſt the lives of ſome men on both ſides.

This reciprocal inaction, it was believed, was occaſioned, or at leaſt would ſoon be followed, by a ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities upon the lower Rhine This belief was confirmed by the Auſtrian and French Generals having at Neuwied ſeveral conferences; the firſt effect of which was an agreement that neither party ſhould occupy that place, and that it ſhould be conſidered as neutral. [*Note* 29.] Theſe conferences being renewed in the months of November and December, terminated in a more important agreement. The Auſtrian General Kray, and the Republican General Kleber, concluded, on the 6th of December, a ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities between the two armies on the Lower Rhine. The conditions were, that the Auſtrians ſhould retire behind the Sieg, and the French behind the Wüpper; that the latter ſhould evacuate the head of the bridge at Neuwied, carrying their cannon,

cannon, and leave only a piquet guard of 25 men; that the Auſtrians were to have a ſimilar guard in the town, and that no poſt ſhould be occupied by a greater number of men; that upon the left bank of the Rhine, the river Nahe ſhould be the line of ſeparation between the two armies; that upon giving ten days previous warning, they ſhould mutually be at liberty to re-commence hoſtilites, and to re-occupy the poſts which they had held before the ſuſpenſion.

On the 10th, the French withdrew their troops and their artillery from the head of the bridge at Neuwied, and on both ſides the armies went into winter quarters. It therefore occaſioned much ſurpriſe, when a proclamation of the Auſtrian commander at Frankfort declared that he was ordered to contradict the report of a ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities on the lower Rhine; that, ſuch a meaſure was directly contrary to the Emperor's ſentiments and intentions; and that the latter movements of the troops on the lower Rhine had been owing to nothing but the nature of the war in that country at that ſeaſon of the year. It was difficult to reconcile this diſavowal of the armiſtice with its real

execution. The contradiction can only be explained by ſuppoſing that the Generals Kray and Kleber had tacitly concluded a convention ſubject to the condition of its being ratified at Vienna and at Paris; and that it was to be carried into effect proviſionally. This ſuppoſition becomes the moſt probable from the circumſtance, that this ſuſpenſion was not officially publiſhed by the two Generals who concluded it. By ſome it was ſuppoſed that it had diſpleaſed the Archduke, but it is not to be believed that General Kray would have ventured upon ſuch a meaſure, without being previouſly authoriſed to it by that Prince. Others imagined, and with more appearance of reaſon, that the Archduke cauſed the report of a ſuſpenſion of arms to be denied, and prevented its being officially publiſhed, in order that his troops, which at that time were beſieging Kehl with no leſs conſtancy than hardſhip, might not envy the repoſe enjoyed by the army on the lower Rhine.

General Beurnonville who was ſent back to the army of the north about the end of December, it was ſaid, at that time was deprived of the command of the army of Sambre and Meuſe, as a puniſhment for

for having allowed it to remain in a ſtate of repoſe, and for having conſented to the ſuſpenſion of arms. It was very ſingular to ſee this ſuſpenſion diſavowed by the higher powers on both ſides, and yet carried ſtrictly into execution. The fact is, that it reſulted leſs from the wiſh of the parties than from the rigour of the ſeaſon, and the nature of the country which the reſpective armies occupied. All the country upon the right bank of the Rhine from Mayence to Duſſeldorf is exceedingly mountainous, much covered with foreſts, and interſected by a great number of little rivers, or rather torrents which overflow the vallies during winter. There are very few roads, and thoſe are almoſt unpaſſable during the bad ſeaſon. When it arrives, an army has hardly the poſſibility of acting in ſuch a country and therefore it was very natural for the Generals on both ſides to wiſh to ſave their ſoldiers from unneceſſary fatigues, and to agree upon a ſtate of inaction, to which they were in truth compelled by irreſiſtable circumſtances.

Whether the ſuſpenſion was really agreed to or not, its conditions were nevertheleſs exactly ob-

ſerved. They gave equally repoſe to both parties, but were more advantageous to the French, ſince they ſecured to them the preſervation of the head of the bridge at Neuwied, in the poſſeſſion of which they were to be re-eſtabliſhed on the re-com mencement of hoſtilities. Thus ended the cam paign upon the lower Rhine. I now proceed to give an account of the ſieges of Kehl and of the head of the bridge at Huningen.

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CHAP. IX.

Deſcription of the fort and entrenched camp of Kehl—Siege of that place—Its ſurrender by capitulation—Siege of the head of the bridge at Huningen—Reduction of that place, and end of the campaign.

AS the ſiege of Kehl attracted the attention of Europe for above two months, and was remarkable for its length, and for the expence of blood and treaſure on both ſides, before I give a detail of its progreſs, I ſhall ſay a few words on its local and military ſituation. [*Note* 30.]

This celebrated fort, ſo often taken and retaken in the different wars between France and the Empire or the Houſe of Auſtria, is ſituated upon the right bank of the Rhine, oppoſite to the town or rather to the Citadel of Straſbourg. Before the war, it communicated with it by a bridge built upon piles, and divided into two parts by an iſland. This bridge formed the principal communication between France and Germany; it was broken down on both ſides at the commencement of the war.

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At this period the fortifications of Kehl, once the bulwark of Germany, were almoſt entirely deſtroyed. Some time afterwards, in order to prevent the Imperialiſts from re-inſtating the works, the French bombarded the fort and even the town of Kehl, at the extremity of which it is ſituated. This bombardment demoliſhed almoſt all the buildings that were within the circumference of the fort, as well as a great part of the town. This however did not prevent the Auſtrians from throwing up ſome works of earth, to ſecure this point from a *Coup de main*, and to be enabled to command with their fire the iſlands which lay between the two banks. It was in this condition that I found that fort at the end of the year 1795.

The reader recollects the manner in which the French took this fort at the beginning of this campaign. From the time that they got poſſeſſion of it, knowing its importance they haſtened to fortify it, and ſkillfully employed all the means of defence which its ſituation affords. To render this fort more difficult of attack and of approach, they covered it by an intrenched camp, the right of which was flanked by an elbow of the river, and by an iſland in it. Its left extended to the fort itſelf. The front, which

was

was a good deal more advanced than the wings, was covered by a ſtrong dike, armed with redoubts, and provided with a good ditch. It concealed the intrenched camp, and thus ſecured it from the fire of cannon. They increaſed the difficulties of approach by cuts made in the Kintzig and the Schutter, ſmall rivers which fall into the Rhine near Kehl.

The retrograde march of Moreau, as well as the capture of Kehl by General Petrarch, who (as already ſeen) loſt it again on the ſame day, made the French redouble their labour and exertions to compleat the ſtate of defence of the fort, and of the intrenched camp. They ſupplied it with a numerous artillery, and to render the communication with Straſburg more ready and more ſure, they conſtructed two bridges, one of boats and the other a flying one.

The fort of Kehl was in this formidable ſtate of defence, when the Archduke determined to make himſelf maſter of it. This enterpriſe preſented great difficulties, required long labours and immence preparations. One ſees by the detail which I have entered upon, that it was not an ordinary ſiege; that the buſineſs was leſs to take a fort than a form-

formidable camp; and that it was one army that was beſieging another. The time that was neceſſary to bring together the troops, the workmen, the artillery, and the magazines, retarded the opening of the ſiege. More than half the month of November was employed in making lines of circumvallation, as well as other works preparatory to opening the trenches. The Archduke, that he might be nearer to ſuperintend and to animate the labours of the ſiege, took up his head quarters at Offenburg, about ten miles from Kehl. Mr. de la Tour, who commanded the beſieging troops, took up his at Wildſtedt, five miles diſtant from the place which was uſeleſsly ſummoned on the 11th of November.

In the night of the 21ſt of the ſame month, the trenches were opened on the right bank of the Kintzig. It was not there however that the Auſtrians propoſed to make their principal Efforts. Their works on this point had no other object but to eſtabliſh a croſs fire againſt the fort and the intrenched camp, in order to favour the approach from the village of Kehl, and to cover the right flank of the real attack. In the ſame night, (viz. the 21ſt) General Moreau cauſed the garriſon to be

be reinforced with a ſtrong corps of infantry drawn from Straſburg. On the 22d, at break of day, theſe troops, commanded by General Deſaix, made a vigorous ſortie, attacked with fixed bayonets the left of the line of contravallation, and got poſſeſſion in an inſtant of the village of Sundheim, as well as of three redoubts of which they ſpiked the cannons.

Encouraged by ſuch rapid ſucceſs, the French attacked the other redoubts of the firſt line; and advanced at the ſame time againſt the ſecond. They were leſs fortunate in this laſt enterprife. Prince Frederic of Orange, who was poſted with a body of troops behind a dike, which joined the redoubts on the left of the firſt and ſecond line, reſiſted in this poſition all the efforts of the enemy. After an engagement as bloody as it was obſtinate, and in which this young prince gave the ſtrongeſt proofs of bravery and talents, he prevented the French from penetrating any further. They experienced no leſs reſiſtance in their attack on the other redoubts of the firſt line. Although ſurrounded and left to themſelves for ſome time, they were defended with a courage equal to the fury of the aſſailants. In vain did the French grenadiers ſeveral times leap into the ditch, and endeavour to

ſcale the paliſades and mount the parapet. They were conſtantly repulſed, and filled the ditches with their dead.

The long defence made by theſe redoubts, and the firmneſs of the Prince of Orange, gave time to General La Tour to collect the corps of reſerve, and to bring them into action. He retook the village of Sundheim, and maintained himſelf there, notwithſtanding a freſh attempt made upon it by the French. The latter were ſoon after attacked at the ſame time by the Prince of Orange, and the Generals La Tour and Stader, who diſlodged them from the redoubts which they had taken, and forced them at laſt to retire within their own lines.

This action, one of the beſt diſputed during the campaign, as well as one of the moſt bloody, conſidering the numbers that were engaged, and the ſpace in which it was fought, coſt the Auſtrians 1,300 men, and the French more than 2,000. Four Generals of the latter were wounded, amongſt whom was the Commander in Chief. On both ſides prodigies of valour were performed. The Auſtrian regiments of Stuart and Staray particularly diſtinguiſhed themſelves. The Prince of Orange gained very great credit; and the Archduke gave

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freſh proofs of talents, and of that cool courage, for which he is remarkable. A ſortie ſo vigorouſly made at the firſt moment of opening the trenches, marked the importance which the French attached to the fort of Kehl, and ſhewed what ſacrifices they were diſpoſed to make to retain poſſeſſion of it.

On the following days the Auſtrians continued their labours, which the bad weather rendered ſlow and difficult. In order to interrupt them, the French made a freſh ſortie in the night of the 27th, in which they were inſtantly repulſed with loſs. In the night of the 28th the beſiegers began their approaches on the right bank of the Schutter; and joined them to one part of the parallel already formed between that river and the Kintzig. From the 28th, the batteries of this firſt parallel, as well as thoſe of the redoubts which flanked it on the right and left, began to play on the French entrenchments.

On the 5th of December, the Archduke himſelf at the head of one battalion of grenadiers, took the moſt advanced *fleche* on the right of the enemy. Advantage was taken of this to extend to this point the parallel of the left, all the batteries of which

began to play the ſame day, and the fire from which was encreaſed on the 11th by ſome new batteries erected on the ſame point.

The Auſtrians were not ſo fortunate in an attack which they made on the 11th on the firſt line of the advanced works which covered the right flank of the entrenched camp. They attacked it with bravery, and carried it; but the French having returned to the charge with ſuperior force, they drove back the Auſtrians into their own entrenchments. The latter renewed the attack the day following; had at firſt the ſame ſucceſs, and in the end the ſame diſadvantage. In the evening they made two more attempts, the iſſue of which was preciſely the ſame. They loſt a great many men in theſe actions, in which both ſides ſhewed the greateſt obſtinacy. The unlucky iſſue of theſe attacks, which failed only becauſe the beſiegers could not maintain themſelves in the works after they had carried them, on account of the terrible fire of grape-ſhot and muſquetry to which they were expoſed, determined the Archduke to renounce for the preſent all attemps to carry them by force, and to confine himſelf to the operations of art:—The approaches were therefore continued; and a ſecond parallel was conſtructed,

ſtructed, but with incredible labour. The thaw which happened at this time having filled the trenches with water, and rendered almoſt impracticable the removal of the heavy artillery from one parallel to the other. Thoſe obſtacles produced new delays in the formation of the ſiege, which had been ſucceſſively retarded by the cold, by ſnow, by rains, and by the overflowings of the rivers Kentzig and Schutter. The enemy beſides defended every inch of ground. The beſieged and the troops which guarded the trenches were frequently engaged in actions, ſometimes very warm; which joined to an almoſt inceſſant cannonade and bombardment, coſt the lives of a great number of men. Still more periſhed from diſeaſes occaſioned by the nature of the ſoil, and from the ſeaſon. From theſe the beſiegers ſuffered ſtill more than the beſieged. The former as well as the latter were confined within their works, and without any protection from the ſeverities of the weather. The Auſtrians had no local means of cannonading and bombarding the French, which the latter did not equally poſſeſs againſt their adverſaries. The French had beſides the immenſe advantage of being relieved and aſſiſted at pleaſure by troops drawn

drawn from Straſbourg, where 30,000 men might be eaſily quartered.

But neither the fatigues nor the dangers attending theſe operations ſhook the conſtancy of the Auſtrian troops, nor the determination of the Archduke. He never ceaſed during the whole courſe of this memorable ſiege, to animate the men by his exhortations, to encourage them by his example, and to ſupport them by the confidence with which he had inſpired them. The ſoldiers endured patiently thoſe ſufferings which the Archduke ſhared with them; the Prince's laſt triumphs were to them a certain pledge of the ſucceſs of this enterpriſe.

On the night of the 19th, the Auſtrians made a ſucceſsful attack on one of the advanced works of the fort. They carried an entrenchment thrown up near the poſt houſe of Kehl, made 200 priſoners, and took 4 pieces of cannon and 2 howitzers.

The fort, as well as the entrenched camp of Kehl, driving their principal means of reſiſtance from their communication with Straſbourg, the length of their defence neceſſarily depended on the preſervation of the bridges. The French had neglected nothing to ſtrengthen and ſecure theſe bridges from the effects of bombs and of cannon.

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They had directed their conſtruction, and the diſpoſition of the entrenched camp accordingly. It was ſo ſituate, that the Auſtrians could not fire directly againſt the bridges, which were beſides protected by batteries raiſed in many iſlands, which the French had occupied ſince their treaty with the Margrave of Bade.

The moſt certain means then of expediting the reduction of Kehl being to deſtroy the bridges, the Archduke would not omit any means to effect it. He cauſed ſeveral ſtrong fire ſhips to he built in the river Kintzig, which being launched in the Rhine, and ſent down the current, might break the bridges either by their weight or their exploſion.

On the 22d, at night, the Auſtrians launched one of theſe fire ſhips. To draw off the attention of the enemy, they redoubled the fire from the cannon and mortars, and at the ſame time attacked the advanced piquets of the enemy. But the French, who had expected that the beſiegers would make uſe of theſe fire ſhips, were prepared to prevent their effects. They had conſtructed an *eſtacade* above the bridges, which ſtopped the machine. It was immediately ſeized by the French pontonniers, who had the good fortune

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to prevent the explosion by removing the match. Other machines of a similar nature, launched a few days afterwards, shared the same fate as the former. The Austrians succeeded no better against the enemies entrenchments. They were repulsed several times; and lost a great many men; but far short of 1500, which was the number at which the French estimated their loss in this affair.

The obstinacy with which the French defended their works rendered the acquisition of them more slow and bloody; but did not prevent the Austrians from completing the batteries of the second parallel, and from making the approaches of the third. These having at length been pushed to within 200 paces of the outward works of the left, and of the right of the center of the entrenched camp, the Archduke determined to make the assault on these two points. The Prince's aim, in wishing to make himself master of them, was to be enabled to draw a third parallel across the enemy's entrenchments from the Rhine to the Schutter.

The Archduke made in consequence the following disposition: four battalions under the conduct of Prince Frederic of Orange, were to attack the right: Major General Zopf, who had also four

four battalions under his command, was to aſſault the works on the left, and one in particular called the Suabian Redoubt.

This plan was carried into execution on the 1ſt of January in the evening. The Prince of Orange advanced with his uſual intrepidity againſt the enemy's works, attacked them with fixed bayonets, and carried them. Not ſatisfied with this firſt ſucceſs, he continued to puſh the French, took from them many other works, and purſued them even into their camp. The latter having rallied, and being reinforced by the corps de reſerve, commanded by General Le Courbe, made head in force againſt the Prince of Orange. This circumſtance, joined to the extreme darkneſs of the night, as well as to the ſort of confuſion which it neceſſarily occaſions, did not admit of the Prince's maintaining himſelf in the moſt advanced works which he had taken. He determined therefore to abandon them, after having ſpiked 15 pieces of cannon which he could not bring away; and took poſt in the front of the firſt works which he had been ordered to attack. In this poſition he maintained himſelf, notwithſtanding all the efforts of the enemy; and

thus covered the workmen, who were forming behind him the projected parallel.

Whilſt the Prince of Orange was thus getting poſſeſſion of the works, which flanked the right of the center of the entrenched camp, thoſe which flanked its left were attacked with the ſame ſucceſs by General Zopf. The principal one was, as has been before obſerved, the Suabian redoubt. This work, ſituated on the left flank of the dike which covered the entrenched camp, was of conſiderable extent, having a ditch, demi-baſtions, ſtrong paliſades, and a double row of *troups de loup*.

General Zopf attacked it gallantly; and notwithſtanding its formidable ſtate of defence, drove the French from it, killed a great number of them, and purſued them into their entrenched camp. He then returned to poſt himſelf before the redoubt he had taken; and began a briſk cannonade with the ſame pieces of artillery which he had ſeized from the enemy. In the mean time the workmen completed the communication of this redoubt with the head of the ſap directed againſt it, and united it by a parallel with the village of Kehl. The ſucceſſes of the Prince of Orange and of General Zopf againſt the

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right and left of the dike having forced the French to abandon it, the Auſtrians immediately raiſed a *banquette* on its ſcarp, to be enabled to lodge themſelves under cover.

At break of day, the beſiegers perceived that many points of which they had got poſſeſſion were enfiladed by the batteries of the entrenched camp. It was however of ſo much importance to preſerve them, that they maintained themſelves there in ſpite of the tremendous fire to which they were expoſed. They joined theſe works, by a parallel, to thoſe which had been taken by the Prince of Orange. The actions of which I have juſt given an account were very bloody. The French eſtimated the loſs of the Auſtrians at 2,000 men, and their own at ſcarcely the half of that number. I have reaſon to believe that it was preciſely the reverſe.

The capture of the Suabian redoubt and of the dike deprived the French of a ſafe communication between the right and the left wing of the entrenched camp: but as this was very near (as I have already obſerved) to the fort of Kehl, it was very much protected by its fire. This circumſtance forced the beſiegers to ſuſpend the attack on the two wings, till they had eſtabliſhed ſome batteries, which might

batter two conſiderable works, raiſed behind the right of the center, break their paliſades, and ſilence their artillery.

Theſe batteries were finiſhed and ready to play on the morning of the 6th of January. The Archduke had determined that an aſſault ſhould be made on the above-mentioned works on the ſame day; but fortunately he was not obliged to have recourſe to this deſtructive meaſure. The French, ſeeing that if they were forced in this point, they ſhould have no means of ſafety but in croſſing the Rhine on a flying bridge, did not think it prudent to remain any longer in this perilous ſituation. They evacuated therefore all the works of the right wing in the night of the 5th.

This retreat having conſiderably diminiſhed the enemy's front, the operations from that time became more direct and more concentrated. The beſiegers found themſelves ſo circumſtanced as to be able to play on the bridges; and they conſtructed batteries to deſtroy them. The Archduke, impatient to terminate a ſiege ſo tedious, ſo expenſive, and ſo fatiguing for the troops, was unwilling to loſe a moment in taking from the French the entrenchments which they were ſtill in poſſeſſion of. In the

the night of the 6th he ordered the left wing of the entrenched camp to be ſtormed. The Auſtrians were completely ſucceſsful, and drove the French from their camp into the fort. But this happened at the moment when the French were relieving their troops on ſervice. The guards that were relieved and relieving united on the glacis of the fort, and returned to the charge againſt the Auſtrains. The combat was extremely obſtinate. Notwithſtanding the favourble circumſtance which had doubled their forces, the French were not able to recover their entrenched camp, and were forced to retreat into the covered-way of the fort. The beſiegers haſtened to lodge themſelves in the works which they had taken, and joined them by a parallel to the head of the town of Kehl.

The French having thus ſucceſſively loſt the numerous and formidable works which ſupported the fort of Kehl, could no longer hope to preſerve it. They were on the point of loſing their communication with Straſburg, except by boats, as their bridges could not fail of being ſhortly deſtroyed by the batteries raiſed againſt them. They therefore came to a determination to capitulate. General Defaix had a conference with the Archduke on the

the 9th. and ſettled with him a capitulation; in conſequence of which the French abandoned the fort of Kehl the day following, and withdrew entirely beyond the river, taking with them their arms, their baggage and artillery.

Thus, after the trenches had been open ſeven weeks, the Imperialiſts recovered poſſeſſion of an important poſt, which had been taken from them in a few hours. Hiſtory will certainly record this ſiege of Kehl as one of the moſt remarkable events of this war. The French made a very brilliant defence, which did great honour to their engineer officers, who on this occaſion gave a freſh proof of their ſuperiority, already known, over thoſe of other nations. If one may be permitted to ſay, that the Auſtrians did not ſhew ſo great talents for attack, as the French did for defence, it is but juſt to recollect the obſtacles of every deſcription which they had to overcome, and the immenſe works which they were obliged to make, notwithſtanding the froſt, the ſnow, the rains, and the thaws. The conſtancy and the determination with which they ſupported the dangers, the fatigues and the tedioufneſs of the ſiege, are above all praiſe. The Archduke diſ-

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covered throughout, that firmneſs, that reſolution, and military obſtinacy, which almoſt always in the end procures ſucceſs; and which ſo often gave it to the great Frederic.

This ſiege coſt on both ſides, immenſe ſums, and what is more to be regretted, the lives of a vaſt number of men. The loſs of the Auſtrians has generally been eſtimated at 10,000 men; and this calculation, though exaggerated, is not very far from the truth.

This ſevere loſs of men was the more felt by the Auſtrians, inaſmuch as it fell principally on the flower of their infantry. The loſs of the French was little leſs, and chiefly affected alſo their beſt troops. Whatever importance they attached to the poſſeſſion of the fort of Kehl, the obſtinacy with which they defended it proceeded leſs from the hope of preſerving it, than from that of weakening for the reſt of the campaign, the victorious Army of the Archduke, and of preventing that Prince from undertaking any other enterpriſe beyond the Rhine, or from going to ſeek new triumphs in Italy.

It was from the ſame motives, and alſo to prevent the Auſtrians from uniting all their forces againſt

againſt Kehl, that the French perſiſted in maintaining themſelves in the *tete de pont* at Huningen. They had conſtructed it while their armies were ſtill in Germany. It was ſupported and flanked by a conſiderable horn-work, raiſed on an iſland of the Rhine, called Shuſter Inſel. It was beſides, as well as this horn-work, protected by the fire of the fortreſs of Huningen, and by that of many batteries erected on the left bank of the Rhine. [*Note* 36.]

After Moreau had repaſſed the Rhine, at the end of October, the Archduke left a body of troops to blockade the *tete de pont* of Huningen. It was inveſted early in November, by the Prince of Furſtenberg, who commanded the left wing of the Imperial Army. That Prince cauſed the neceſſary works to be raiſed to ſupport the inveſtment, and mounted ſome batteries on the points which commanded the head of the bridge. As it was neither ſo well fortified or ſo advantageouſly ſituated as that of Kehl, it was not ſuppoſed that it would make ſo long a reſiſtance, and that the French would, for the ſake of defending it, expoſe the town of Huningen to deſtruction. However, whether they determined to

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engage on this point the attention of a part of the Auſtrian force, or whether the latter, relying too much on the advantages they poſſeſſed againſt this place had not employed ſufficient means to reduce it, its defence was protracted to a much longer time than had been expected.

The Auſtrians, after having in vain ſummoned the French to evacuate the *tete de pont*, began to cannonade and bombard it, as well as the Shuſter Inſel and the town of Huningen. From the commanding ſituation of their batteries, and the judicious direction of their fire, they were enabled to break the bridge which joins the two banks. This ſucceſs inſulating the *tete de pont*, made it liable to fall very ſoon into the hands of the Auſtrians; but in ſpite of the continued fire of the latter, the French contrived to repair the bridge and re-eſtabliſh the communication between the iſland, the town, and the *tete de pont* of Huningen.

The Prince of Furſtemberg, diſappointed in the hope that the reduction of the place muſt follow the breaking of the bridge, determined to attempt to take it by force. On the 30th of November, he ordered an aſſault on the enemy's entrenchments. His troops got poſſeſſion of the half moon of the

horn-work; but the French having been re-inforced, re-took it after a bloody engagement. It coſt the Auſtrians 800 men, and not fewer to the French. They loſt amongſt others General Abbatucci, to whom they owed the ſucceſs of this day. [*Note* 32.]

After this fruitleſs attempt, the Prince of Furſtemberg judging with reaſon that the fate of the *tete de pont* at Huningen depended on the iſſue of the ſiege of Kehl, and that the reduction of the latter place muſt draw after it that of the former, contented himſelf with cannonading and bombarding it. His batteries ſeveral times ſet fire to the town of Huningen, ſome part of which was burnt, and which was abandoned by almoſt all its inhabitants. In order to deſtroy the works of the Auſtrians, and to interrupt their workmen, the French made many ſorties, in which they had generally the diſadvantage. Some of the actions occaſioned by theſe ſorties, took place on the territory of Baſle, which almoſt touched (if one may ſay ſo) the *tete de pont*. From this vicinity, it was very difficult for the Imperialiſts or the French to refrain, during an action, from ſeizing thoſe advantages on the territory of Baſle, which it might preſent to them; and it was not eaſy for the Swiſs to prevent it.

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The French already diſſatisfied by the arming of the Swiſs in the canton of Schaffhauſen during the retreat of Moreau, complained that they had ſuffered their territory to be violated by the Auſtrians. Barthelemy, the envoy of the Republic, made ſome bitter repreſentations on this ſubject to the deputies of the cantons aſſembled at Baſle. The latter, frightened by his menaces, haſtened to pay attention to his complaints; and broke two officers of Baſle, who were accuſed of colluſion with the Imperialiſts, or at leaſt with not having taken care that the neutrality of the Swiſs territory ſhould be reſpected. This ſeverity ſcarcely ſatisfied the French, and diſpoſed the Imperialiſts to complain in their turn. The Archduke and Prince of Furſtenberg ordered lively remonſtrances to be made to the cantons, and formally called upon them to ſecure the inviolability of their territory. Theſe reſpective applications only produced the effect of throwing the cantons into great embarraſſments; but did not prevent either of the parties from entering the Swiſs territory, whenever it was convenient to them, with a view either to attack or defence.

The month of December paſſed without being marked by any thing important; the Auſtrians contenting themſelves with finiſhing their approaches regularly, without making any attack by force. Immediately after the reduction of Kehl, the Archduke ſent to the Prince of Furſtenberg the heavy artillery which he had made uſe of at the ſiege of that place. Its arrival enabled the Prince to attack with ſufficient vigour the *tete de pont* and the works which defended it. The French finding themſelves a good deal ſtraitened, and unable to make any long reſiſtance, determined to abandon the right bank of the Rhine, on which it was no great object to them to remain after the fall of Kehl. They capituladed on the 2d of February, and on the 5th, re-croſſed the Rhine with their arms and baggage. On the ſame day the Auſtrians took poſſeſſion of the *tete de pont*, as well as of the Shuſter Inſel. It was ſpecified in the capitulation, that the Imperialiſts ſhould not fire on the town of Huningen, and that on the other hand the French ſhould not fire from the town on the Auſtrian poſts, oppoſite to it. They agreed in general, that things ſhould be replaced on the right bank of the Rhine in the ſame condition as they had

had been before the paſſage of that river by the French.

The reduction of the *tete de pont* of Huningen, put an end to the campaign in Germany. I think it right to cloſe the recital of it with ſome reflections and general obſervations, which may enable the reader to form a judgement on this campaign. This ſhall be the ſubject of the laſt chapter.

CHAP. X.

THE plan adopted by the French in the campaign which I have been deſcribing in the preceding chapters, was in every reſpect ſimilar to that, from which they had two years before reaped ſuch important ſucceſs. This plan, which was practicable only with a great ſuperiority of force, conſiſted during each of theſe campaigns in making the greateſt efforts againſt the right and left wing of the enemy, with a view to outflank their center, and to reduce them to the neceſſity of abandoning, or of

of ſuffering it to be ſurrounded. As the French had in the year 1794 employed the greater part of their forces upon the Sambre, and in Weſt Flanders, to induce the allies to quit the center, in which point they were ſtrong, and to draw them to their wings, where they where weak; ſo having formed in 1796 the reſolution to invade Germany, they made no attempt to attack in front the towns of Manheim and Mayence, but proceeded to effect a paſſage over the Rhine at a diſtance from thoſe places; and inſtead of comſuming their time, and waſting their ſtrength in the ſiege of them, advanced rapidly into Suabia and Weſtphalia. They wiſhed to become maſters of Ehrebreitſtein, Mayence, Manheim, and Phillipſbourg, by the ſame method by which they had recovered in the year 1794 the the towns of Valenciennes, Condé, Landrecies, and Queſnoy, and to gain, by a ſingle manœuvre, that which would in former times have been the reſult of two or three ſucceſsful campaigns.

Every perſon, who may have taken the pains to compare the preſent war with thoſe which have taken place for a century paſt, muſt have remarked, that the French have by no means confined themſelf to the ancient courſe of military operations, and

and that they have added a ſyſtem of tactics, more vaſt in its object and in its means. The revolution which has changed every thing amongſt the French, has influenced the compoſition and the ſpirit of their armies, as well as the conceptions of thoſe perſons, who have been charged with the direction of them. The reſult has been a new military ſyſtem formed on a calculation of the relative ſtate of Europe and of France: a ſyſtem, engendered by the ſpirit of conqueſt, diverted ſolely to that end, and intended to make the ſuperiority of numbers ultimately triumphant. It would require a ſeparate treatiſe, to unfold completely this ſyſtem, and to ſhew in what reſpects it departs from thoſe principles, which have hitherto been looked upon as fundamentals in the theory of war. [*Note* 33.] The limits of the preſent work confines its author to the pointing out the moſt ſtriking application, which the French have made of this ſyſtem, by forbearing to undertake any ſiege, and by venturing to leave fortified places at great diſtance behind them. They foreſaw, that by carrying the war to a diſtance from thoſe towns, they ſhould by force detach their enemies from them; and judged, that if they could obtain, and keep poſſeſſion of the countries ſituated beyond

beyond theſe fortreſſes, they would in the end fall into their hands perfectly undamaged, and without having coſt them either blood or money. They propoſed to acquire the fortified places by making themſelves maſters of the ſurrounding countries; as formerly theſe countries were ſecured by getting poſſeſſion of the fortified places. Theſe had hitherto been the means of conqueſt; they now meant to make them its reſult. This method by which the French acquired ſo great a number of fortified towns in 1794, met not with the ſame ſucceſs in 1796; but their failure did not ariſe from the ſtrong places, which they left behind them; and as theſe had not impeded the progreſs of Jourdan, neither were they the cauſes of his firſt diſaſters. If that General had been victorious at Amberg, or at Wurtzbourg, the fortreſſes of Ehrebreitſtein, Mayence, Manheim, and Phillipſbourg would no doubt have ultimately fallen, as Luxembourg did in 1795.

The elements of the Auſtrian army having undergone no alterations, and its diſtinctive qualities being the ſtabilitiy of forms, and the uniformity of organization, the regulators of it have made no change in their theory, nor its Generals in their practice. By perſiſting in theſe two reſpects in their

their ancient military ſyſtem, whilſt their enemies adopted one more advantageous, they no doubt contributed much to the ſucceſs of the French. One might be inclined even to look upon this as the principal cauſe of it, if that were not ſufficiently diſcovered in the looſe texture of the coalition, in the treachery of ſome of its members, in the weakneſs of the Germanic confederation, [*Note* 34.] in the Emperor's pecuniary embarraſſments, and in the obſtacles and diſadvantages of every kind, againſt which he has been conſtantly obliged to ſtruggle. Theſe conſiderations lead us rather to praiſe than to depreciate the Auſtrian army; and when we reflect that it was the firſt, and that it is now the laſt to bear the weight of this war, when we recall to our recollection all that it has loſt in men, and in territory, we are induced to admire its perſeverance, and to be ſatisfied that without its ſolid compoſition and unſhaken conſtancy, the whole continent of Europe perhaps might by this time have been compelled to ſubmit to the arms, or the principles of the French. It muſt be at leaſt admitted that the Auſtrian army is the ſtrongeſt barrier which has been oppoſed to the torrent of the Re-

publican troops, and that it has alone reſcued Germany during the year 1796.

No perſon has contributed more to the ſalvation of that vaſt country; no perſon has ſtronger claims to the gratitude of its inhabitants, and to the admiration of poſterity, than the Archduke Charles. Obliged for a long time to ſtruggle with an inferior force againſt an enemy brave, ably conducted, and emboldened with victory, he has been deficient in no one of thoſe qualities, which the exigence of his ſituation and circumſtances peculiarly demanded. He has ſhewn himſelf courageous, ſkilful, patient. He has fruſtrated the hopes of France, and ſurpaſſed thoſe of Germany.

This prince found himſelf at the opening of the campaign at the head of a formidable army, though one leſs numerous than that of his enemies. He might then flatter himſelf that he ſhould make amends for this inequality of means by a ſuperiority of talents and activity. He had then no doubt formed ſome project for the advancement of his brother's intereſt, and the promotion of his own glory. At the moment when he was on the point of putting them into execution, 30,000 of his beſt troops were taken from him

him and ſent into Italy. The Archduke made no complaint of the great reduction, which his army by this means experienced, and ſtill leſs did he think of endeavouring to prevent the meaſure by his credit and his natural influence with the Emperor. Finding himſelf incapable of undertaking any offenſive enterprize, and reduced to the neceſſity even of a defenſive ſyſtem extremely difficult to maintain, this young Prince ſhewed neither diſguſt nor deſpondency. He exerted himſelf to compenſate the loſs of thoſe troops which had been taken from him, by making the beſt uſe of thoſe which remained with him. He went to ſeek for victory on the banks of the Lahn and the Sieg; and when an invaſion, the ſucceſs of which the French had hoped for, only by effecting it at a diſtance from that Prince, opened to them Germany, and allowed them to diſplay in that country their numerous battalions, the Archduke ceaſed not for an inſtant to oppoſe to them a firm and methodical reſiſtance. He always could diſcern when it was proper to engage or avoid an action and diſtinguiſh thoſe poſts of which it was expedient to diſpute every inch with obſtinacy, from thoſe whoſe importance would not have repaid the value of his

ſoldiers blood. He effected his retreat, loſing as little ground, and gaining as much time as poſſible.

As ſoon as his approach to the hereditary dominions had ſufficiently increaſed his force, and in the ſame proportion diminiſhed that of the French, he then began to entertain the confident hope of delivering Germany, he then executed with reſolution plans formed with wiſdom. He diſplayed againſt Jourdan the courage and enterprizing ſpirit of his character, which had been long fettered by a defenſive ſyſtem. He defeated that General, purſued him without reſpite, outſtripped him by his celerity, circumvented him by his manœuvres, and compelled him to fly beyond the Rhine.

Having accompliſhed the defeat of one of the Republican armies, he haſtened to direct againſt the other his fortune and his talents. He fixed the former and gave new ſplendor to the latter. He baffled by ſuperior ability the General oppoſed to him, rendered uſeleſs the courage of his ſoldiers, and relieved Germany from their preſence. In two months the Archduke paſſed from the frontiers of Bohemia to the walls of Duſſeldorf, from that town to Baſle, and from Baſle to Offembourg, always fighting and always victorious. Not-ſatisfied

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with being ſo by halves, he reſolved that the end of the campaign ſhould afford a complete reparation for the diſaſters of its commencement, and allowed no reſpite to his enemies, till he had wreſted from them the only remains of their firſt triumphs. Scarce had he accompliſhed this, when inſtead of indulging a well-merited repoſe, he liſtened only to the intereſts of his country; and not heſitating to change the command of a victorious army for that of another which new nothing of war but defeats, he flew to meet new dangers in Italy.

The Archduke no doubt as well as every other Prince, who at his time of life has had the command of large armies, has of courſe liſtened to the counſels of experience. It is well known that he has profited by thoſe of Lieut. General Bellegarde, [*Note.* 35.] and of the Colonel of the ſtaff Schmidt. To the talents of theſe two officers, and more particularly of the former, we moſt readily pay due homage. They are no doubt worthy of that confidence, which the Emperor and the Archduke have repoſed in them. They deſerve praiſe for having made ſo good an uſe of that confidence, and are entitled to the grateful acknowledgements of Germany. They have probably

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contributed much to the Archduke's ſucceſs, and by their experience have ſupplied his deficiency in that reſpect. But the qualities which that Prince may moſt juſtly claim as perſonally his own, are his great courage equalled only by his modeſty; his coolneſs, and quickneſs of perception in the heat of battle; that energy which makes him forget the weakneſs of his conſtitution, and to ſupport the greateſt fatigues; and finally that impartial juſtice with which he rewards with one hand and puniſhes with the other. He has found the means to give to his Generals, and to the officers of his army, an activity before unknown to them, and to which may be attributed the latter ſucceſſes of the Auſtrian Army. He has re-animated diſcipline, not by increaſing its ſeverity, but by inſpiring every one with the love of their duty, the deſire of praiſe, and the fear of reprehenſion. [*Note* 36.] He has found the means of compelling the Generals of his army to ſhew more zeal and more obedience in executing Mr. de Bellgarde's plans, than the Emperor was able to obtain from them in 1794 in favour of the celebrated General Mack. He knew how to raiſe his authority above the abuſes, the pretentions, and the intrigues, which beſiege the

head

head quarters of an army no leſs than a court, and to force every particular intereſt to act in uniſon with the intereſt of the whole. Theſe are the qualities and the facts which characteriſe the Archduke Charles, and of which hiſtory will not be unmindful. The conduct of this Prince, at once prudent and ſplendid, has beyond contradiction had a greater influence than any other circumſtance on the iſſue of this campaign.

That iſſue replaced the oppoſed armies in nearly the ſame poſition, which they occupied before the rupture of the armiſtice. The ſlight changes which reſulted finally from the campaign, were in favour of the French. They acquired a *tete de pont* at Neuwied, as well as a part of the palatinate, and of the Hundſruck. In the courſe of this work it has been pointed out how little military importance theſe latter countries poſſeſs. The acquiſition of the *tete de pont* at Neuwied, was a more ſubſtantial advantage, but conſiderably diminiſhed by the vicinity of the fortreſs of Ehrebreitſtein. [*Note* 37.]

It is evident that few campaigns have produced a more inſignificant reſult than that of 1796, at leaſt as far as reſpects the gain or loſs of territory, whilſt

whilſt perhaps there have been none, which in the beginning ſeemed likely to produce a more important one. However, though it has not been remarkable for great battles, and has produced no deciſive alteration in the ſituation of the belligerent powers, it will not the leſs occupy the page of Hiſtory. The intereſt which it will inſpire will ariſe leſs from the conſequences, by which it was actually followed, than from thoſe which there was at one time reaſon to apprehend. The Archduke will be praiſed leſs for what he did, than for what he hindered the French from doing; and not ſo much for what he gained, as for what he preſerved. The movements of the adverſe armies during this campaign will furniſh uſeful leſſons to the ſoldier, and a copious fund of reflection to the ſtateſman.

In reflecting on the trifling alteration produced in the relative ſituation of the French and Auſtrians, by four months of battles and military viciſſitudes, it is impoſſible not to feel a lively regret that ſo many thouſand men ſhould have been ſacrificed to the acquiſition of ſome entrenchments, and of ſome ſquare leagues of territory. It is eaſier to deplore the fate of theſe victims of war, than to determine their number with preciſion.

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The reſearches and calculations which he has made allow the author nevertheleſs to offer on this point a probable eſtimate. He has good reaſon to believe that the loſs of the Auſtrians in this campaign in Germany, has been between 25,000 and 30,000 men, and that of the French about 40,000. The diſaſters experienced by Jourdan have been the principal cauſe why the loſs of the latter has ſo far exceeded that of the former. It was otherwiſe, during the reſt of the campaign, on each ſide nearly balanced.

The French, as it has been obſerved in the beginning of this work, had a double object in the invaſion of Germany. The firſt was to penetrate to the heart of the Emperor's Dominions, [*Note* 43.] and the ſecond to maintain their army at the expence of that Prince, and of the different ſtates of the empire. They failed in the firſt of theſe objects, but completely accompliſhed the ſecond, during the four months, which they paſſed beyond the Rhine. They reaped great advantages from the dread, which their ſucceſs and their political deſigns had diffuſed through all the ſtates and courts of the ſecond order in Germany. The greater part of theſe haſtened

with eagerneſs to purchaſe, at a high price, the permiſſion of being no longer enemies of the French. The latter drew immenſe ſums from the Armiſtices which they granted, as well as from the contributions which they impoſed on the hoſtile countries. Their rapid expulſion from Germany prevented them from being paid the whole of what was due, but a very great part they actually received; and during four months the armies of Jourdan and Moreau coſt nothing to the French Republic.

But as much as the latter gained in money, and in military ſtores in Germany, ſhe loſt in her influence and aſcendant over the minds of the inhabitants. A great number of theſe, and principally in the Imperial towns, had been the dupes of thoſe profeſſions of political and moral faith, which the French had diffuſed through Europe. Seduced by theſe philoſophical abſtractions, ſtrangers could not be brought to believe that their practical reſult was not equally admirable. They were ſtill under this infatuation, when the French themſelves were no longer poſſeſſed with it. The former were impoſed on by a brilliant theory. The latter had been undeceived by a cruel experience.

experience. The firſt viewed the revolution through a diſtant perſpective, which occaſioned its defects to vaniſh; the ſecond had ſeen it cloſe in all its natural deformity. Like the fabulous lance which healed the wounds it had inflicted, the French were deſtined to cure thoſe evils which themſelves had cauſed. Their actions could not fail to deſtroy the effect of their writings; and it required only to know them, to be no longer tempted to an imitation of their ſyſtem. The inhabitants of the Netherlands and of Holland had already owed their converſion to the preſence of the French. It produced the ſame effect in Germany. Their military manifeſto proclaimed *war to the caſtle, and peace to the cottage;* it was only in the firſt point that they kept their word. They had promiſed the greateſt reſpect for property, and they ſported with its rights. They had announced that happineſs and liberty would follow their footſteps; and wherever they were directed, they were marked by every exceſs of military deſpotiſm. This trial was not thrown away on the good ſenſe of Germany; and the national habits ſoon prevailed over the French metaphyſics. The philoſophers, and li-

terary men of Germany began to compare more cloſely the principles with their conſequences; and as to the people, they abandoned themſelves at once to the ſentiment naturally ariſing from their new ſituation. Their reſentment broke out and was exerciſed, as ſoon as they had opportunity and power. The vengeance, to which the inhabitants of Weſtphalia, Franconia, and Suabia, gave themſelves up againſt the French, and the terrible repriſals of the latter, have made theſe to be more and more deteſted in the countries they have conquered. It may be reaſonably believed that were they again to attempt to penetrate them, they would find an enemy in every inhabitant.

All that the French have loſt in Germany, upon the ſcore of opinion, the Auſtrians have gained. If they at firſt met with diſaſters, they ſpeedily repaired them by brilliant ſucceſs. If they traverſed Germany by a retrograde march, they have ſince overrun it as conquerors; and it is always the laſt victory which reckons with the people: it is that which leaves the prevailing ſentiment.

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The Archduke Charles has perſonally acquired a great weight of opinion in Germany. He has been the deliverer of that country; he is become its idol. One half of its Inhabitants have been witneſs to his exploits: they have attached themſelves to his perſon, from admiration; and to his cauſe, from the ſacrifices which they have themſelves made for it. Theſe diſpoſitions, and theſe ſentiments will, one day perhaps be uſeful to the houſe of Auſtria.

End of the Campaign of 1796, *in Germany.*

NOTES

FOR THE

CAMPAIGN OF GERMANY.

Note 1. *Page* 6.

THE Elector of Brandenburg and the Duke de Bournonville penetrated into upper Alsace in 1674, and established themselves there in winter quarters. M. de Turenne, who they imagined was at a great distance from them, secretly passed the *Vosges* and came unawares upon the quarters of the Imperial army. After having taken some of them, he marched rapidly to Colmar, where the Elector and the Duke were stationed. He attacked them on the 5th of January, defeated them, and obliged them to return in disorder to Strasburg, where they repassed the Rhine. Thus in a few days M. de Turenne, whose forces did not amount to 30,000 men, drove from Alsace 60,000, who had imagined themselves to be secure. These events were without doubt to be attributed as much to the position which the Imperialists occupied, and which lay between the mountains of the

Vosges

Voſges and the Rhine, as to the ſuperior talents of M. de Turenne. This poſition would be at this time more dangerous, Straſburg belonging at preſent to France. It is in the memory of every one, that at the end of 1793 Marſhal de Wurmſer was not more fortunate in lower Alſace, and that after having reſiſted forty-two ſucceſſive attacks, he was obliged to yield to the French, and was under the neceſſity of repaſſing the Rhine.

Note 2. *Page* 11.

This General had ſerved in the French army firſt as a private, and afterwards as a Serjeant, before the revolution. When that took place, he followed the buſineſs of a Fencing Maſter, and his wife that of a Milliner. He was then appointed an officer of the National Guard, went to the frontiers when the war broke out, and was advanced gradually to the command of an army. It was he, who commanded the French at the battle of Maubeuge, in the month of October 1793. It is known that the Prince of Cobourg and General Jourdan both believed that they had been defeated, and both retreated at the ſame time. We may alſo recollect that Jourdan, quickly informed of the retreat of his enemies, returned to his former poſition, and re-took 40 pieces of cannon which he had left in a wood. Although he repaired his miſtake, Roberſpierre did not forgive him. It coſt him for ſome time the loſs of his command. Few of the Republican Generals have been ſo often defeated as he has been.

Note

Note 3. *Page* 14.

It is in this Imperial City that the ſovereign chamber of the Empire is held.

Note 4. *Page* 18.

This General was in 1789 the firſt of the clerks of the parliament at Rennes, in which his father exerciſed the functions of an advocate. Moreau was named in the beginning of the Revolution, Chief of the National Guard of Rennes. The war being declared, he was ſent with the national volunteers of Brittany to the army *of la Fayette;* he there diſtinguiſhed himſelf on many occaſions, and obtained very ſoon the rank of a General Officer. In 1794 he took the Fortreſs of l'Ecluſe on the ſame day that his father was guillotined in France. This circumſtance concurred with his character, naturally honeſt, to inſpire him with horror for the Jacobins, whoſe principles he never adopted.

Note 5. *Page* 20.

A few days before they reſumed hoſtilities, an Auſtrian officer having been ſent to have a parley with Moreau, this General did not conceal from him that he was informed that 30,000 men would be ſent immediately from the army in Germany to that in Italy. The officer carried this intelligence to the Auſtrian head quarters, where the order for the departure of theſe

30,000 men did not arrive till two days after. This fact which has been tranſmitted to me by one on whoſe veracity I can rely, is a proof that the French are as well ſerved by their ſpies who are near the cabinets, as by thoſe near the armies of their enemies. In general they have had much better intelligence than the allies during this war, becauſe they have better paid for it. This circumſtance has contributed not a little to their ſucceſs. It is well known that theſe means have never been neglected by the greateſt Generals, and that they engaged good ſpies whatever the price of them might be. The Marſhal de Luxembourg gained over the ſecretary of the Prince of Orange, and Prince Eugene ſucceeded in bribing the maſter of the poſt-office at Verſailles, whom he rendered very uſeful to him.

Note 6. *Page* 22.

General Stein, Commander in Chief of the troops of the circle of Suabia, was openly accuſed of having delivered up to the French for a conſiderable ſum of money, the fort of Kehl as well as the poſts of Kniebis and Freydenſtadt. He confirmed theſe ſuſpicions by refuſing under different pretexts to join the Prince de Condé to attack the Republicans before they were well eſtabliſhed at Kehl. He behaved ſtill worſe to the Prince of Condé, for he repreſented his army every where as a band of robbers, and inſerted in the newspapers the moſt unjuſt calumnies of it. However it was more

eaſy

eaſy for him to diſavow than to confirm them, and the Count de Vioſmenil, a General officer of ſuperior merit, obliged him to contradict all the firſt reports againſt the army of Condé; this diſavowal was alſo inſerted in the public papers of Germany.

Note 7. *Page* 24.

This General had been an officer in the Emperor's ſervice in the regiment of Bender, was diſmiſſed from it ſome years ago for miſconduct, and then went into France in hopes of obtaining ſome employment during the Revolution; he was then made an officer, and ſoon after a General. As the regiment of Bender was uſually in garriſon at Fribourg and other towns of the Briſgaw, Ferino was well acquainted with the latter country, and that was probably the reaſon of his being employed in that quarter.

Note 8. *Page* 25.

The Suabians, deſcendants from the ancient Suevi, of whom Tacitus ſpeaks, appear to have much degenerated from the valour of their anceſtors. It is almoſt conſidered as giving abuſive language to any one in Germany to call him Suabian. It is nearly equivalent to calling him coward. The troops from this circle juſtified at Kehl and Freydenſtadt the ironical acceptation given to the word Suabian in Germany. It is no doubt contradicted by many exceptions, and the regiment of

Bender is a very remarkable one. It is compoſed of Suabians, and there certainly exiſts not in the Auſtrian army a regiment of greater bravery, or one in every reſpect more military.

The mountain of Kniebis, the higheſt in Suabia, forms a defile which is one of the principal paſſes of that country. Freydenſtadt is ſituated on a rock two leagues from Kniebis.

Note 9. *Page* 25.

It was near this town that Mr. de Turenne was killed in 1675. Although inferior in force, he had found means to ſtop the progreſs of Mr. De Montecuculli for two months, on the banks of the Renchen and the Kintzig; it was there that theſe two great Generals exhauſted againſt one another, all the reſources and combinations of the art of war.

Note 10. *Page* 29.

It was near this imperial city that the French in 1762 gained a victory over the allies.

Note 11. *Page* 31.

Near this village paſſed the famous lines of Etlingen, which were forced in 1734 by Marſhal de Berwick and the Count de Saxe.

Note

Note 12. *Page* 39.

The author repeats that he pretends not to eſtimate with ſtrict exactneſs, the force of the reſpective armies, ſtill leſs that of their different diviſions. Whoever has been engaged in war knows how much the daily loſſes, re-inforcements, and detachments, occaſion a continual variation in the comparative proportion of two oppoſed armies. He has given only an approximating eſtimate to put the reader in poſſeſſion of ſome reaſonable datum, and to enable him to form a more adequate judgment of the courſe of the military operations.

Note 13. *Page* 42.

This Imperial city has been rendered famous by the different battles which have taken place in its neighbourhood. The Imperialiſts beat the Swedes here in 1634. The great Condé, at that time Duke de Enghien, gained a battle, in which the Commander in Chief of the Imperialiſts Merci, was killed, and General de Glen, who commanded under him, was wounded and taken priſoner. The Marſhal de Grammont, the ſecond in command of the French army, was likewiſe wounded and taken priſoner by the Imperialiſts. The city of Nordlingen was formerly the bulwark of Franconia againſt Bavaria.

Note

Note 14. *Page* 42.

On the 29th of July, General Frölich had ſurrounded and diſarmed the troops of the circle of Suabia, who according to the terms of the armiſtice, could not ſerve any longer againſt the French. The apprehenſions that the latter might force them to join them againſt the Auſtrians, determined the Archduke to take this ſtep.

Note 15. *Page* 43.

Bohemia is ſurrounded by a circle of very high mountains, which form a natural rampart round it. Theſe mountains are leaſt elevated on the ſide of Moravia, and Bohemia is much more acceſſible in this point than at any other. This is a great advantage for the Houſe of Auſtria, ſince it is likewiſe in poſſeſſion of Moravia.

Note 16. *Page* 49.

It is this ſame village of Hochſtedt which has been rendered ſo famous by the two great battles which were fought there at the beginning of the century, in the firſt of which the French were victorious, and in the ſecond defeated.

Note 17. *Page* 57.

It was in this affair that the Engliſh Colonel Craufurd, attached to the Auſtrian army with the charge of ſending to the Britiſh Cabinet reports of the military operations,

was

was ſeverely wounded in the head and made priſoner. The military qualities of this officer, his talents and the judicious perſpicuity of his reports, occaſioned a general regret for his misfortune. It was not leſs felt in the Auſtrian army than in his own country. Prince Charles immediately made the moſt preſſing inſtances for his being ſet at liberty, and ſucceeded in obtaining it from general Jourdan. The Colonel's wound having unfortunately prevented him for a long time from exerciſing his functions with the Auſtrian army, they were ably diſcharged in his abſence by Mr. Robert Craufurd his brother, and for a ſhort time, by Captain Auſtruther. Their reports imitated the exactneſs and preciſion of thoſe of the Colonel.

Note 18. *Page* 65.

This foreſt, one of the moſt conſiderable in Germany, extends from the town of Aſchaffembourg to the angle formed by the Abein between that town and that of Wurtzbourg. It was formerly infeſted by Brigands, and the paſſing through it was as dangerous as difficult. The laſt Biſhop of Wurtzbourg ſome years ago conſtructed in the middle of this foreſt a ſuperb cauſeway, which is become the great road from Frankfort to Vienna. It was during their retreat acroſs this foreſt that the French had the moſt to ſuffer from the arming and the vengeance of the Peaſants. They ſtopped the grand ſtaff of the army, pillaged its cheſts, and forced General

Ernouf

Ernouf, the Chief of it, to ſeek for ſafety in the ſwiftneſs of his horſe.

Note 19. *Page* 86.

The French had likewiſe ſucceeded a month before in detaching from the Coalition the Elector of Saxony. They had concluded with him under the mediation of the King of Pruſſia a treaty of neutrality, in conſequence of which the contingent of that elector amounting to 9,000 men, ſeparated at the end of July from the Auſtrian army, and ſenſibly weakened it.

Note 20. *Page* 93.

This mountain of Shellenberg, famous in all the wars of Bavaria, was fortified by the Swedes in the thirty years war. It was to this mountain that John de Wert retired after the battle of Nordlingen.

Note 21. *Page* 108.

The reader will no doubt have remarked that from the time Moreau began his retreat, his right was of courſe become his left, and his left his right. I have nevertheleſs continued the two firſt denominations, becauſe in his encampments, and frequently even on his march, Moreau was obliged to face the different corps of Mr. de la Tour's army, by which he was purſued.

Note

Note 22. *Page* 110.

Prince Charles it has before been mentioned had marched from the lower Rhine on the 22d of September with about 12,000 men, who where followed at ſome diſtance by 10,000 more. He paſſed the Mein on the 25th, and the Necker on the 30th, after having ſent General Hotze to make a diverſion in Alſace. This General's expedition will be mentioned hereafter. If it has not already been ſo, it is for the ſame reaſon that no account has been given of the march of the Archduke, and of the operations which took place on the lower Rhine after his departure. It has been the wiſh of the Author to deſcribe without interruption Moreau's retreat, under the idea that the chain and connexion of events taken in one view was preferable to a ſucceſſion of dates. Such a chronological ſervitude would have cauſed great confuſion in this hiſtorical ſummary, and would have deprived it of the ſmall degree of intereſt it may otherwiſe poſſeſs. The Archduke having paſſed through Schwetzingen, Durlach, Carlſruhe, Raſtadt, and Offembourg, arrived on the 14th at Mohlberg, and two days after formed a junction with the corps of Nauendorf and Petrarch, which from that time came under his immediate command.

Note 23. *Page* 110.

It is ſituated between the towns of Fribourg and Neuſtadt, is ſix miles long, and in many places not more than ten paces wide; a proverb of the country ſays, that in this paſs one meets with Paradiſe and Hell. There is an Inn in it called the Kingdom of Heaven.

Note 24. *Page* 111.

The town of Fribourg was formerly very ſtrong and the poſſeſſion of it was neceſſary for every army that meant to have their winter quarters in the Briſgau. It was taken and re-taken ſeveral times during the thirty years war. It is particularly known in military annals by the two battles fought in its neighbourhood in 1644, the Imperialiſts being commanded by Merci, and the French by the great Condé. Theſe battles are celebrated for the obſtinacy ſhewn, and the great number of men who loſt their lives on each ſide. The Marſhals de Crequi and Villars both took it, the former in 1677, and the latter in 1713. The French commanded by Louis XV. in perſon, beſieged it in 1744, and took it after thirty-ſeven days of open trenches. The ſiege coſt the French a great number of men. They razed the works of the place, as well as the forts erected on a mountain which commands it.

Note

Note 25 *Page* 112.

The black foreſt ſtretches from ſouth to north, from the four foreſt towns as far as Neunbourg in the Dutchy of Würtenberg. It was anciently, ſtill more extenſive. Ceſar has given a deſcription of it in his commentaries. It conſtituted according to the moſt general opinion a part of that tract of country called by the Romans, *Sylva Hircinia*. Its mountains ſeparate the Dutchy of Würtenberg from the Margraviate of Baden.

General Frölich had ſucceſſively taken poſſeſſion of Bregenz, Lindau, and of Conſtance, which the French had evacuated on the 8th of October; but he had not been able to make himſelf maſter of the capital poſt of Stokach in time to cut off from the French the way of retreating through the foreſt towns.

Note 26, *Page* 139.

It may have been remarked that in the courſe of the campaign the French paſſed the Rhine ſeveral times at Neuwied. An iſland which is ſituated almoſt oppoſite that town, gave them at the ſame time the power of eaſily throwing a bridge over the Rhine, and the means of defending it by batteries erected on the iſland. The advantages which this point offered for paſſing the Rhine,

induced the French to eſtabliſh there a permanent bridge, and to cover it by works, which they cauſed to be conſtructed during the ſummer. This *tete de pont* made them maſters of a fixed paſſage over the Rhine, and gave them a point of ſupport againſt the fortreſs of Ehrebreitſtein, which is only twelve miles from Neuwied.

In 1672, Marſhal Turenne being encamped with 20,000 men between Bonn and Coblentz, threw alſo a bridge of boats over the Rhine at Neuwied, and covered it in the ſame manner with entrenchments. The Elector of Brandenbourg, who was with 30,000 men before Mayence attacked without ſucceſs this *tete de pont* in which Mr. de Turenne had left 3,000 men. The bridge was ſoon afterwards deſtroyed by the ice.

Note 27. *Page* 140.

It was to this ſame General Beurnonville as great a braggart, though far leſs able and fortunate than Buonaparte, that Dumourier confided at the end of 1792 30,000 men, with a commiſſion to attack the Prince of Hohenlohe, who defended the approaches to Treves with 10,000 men. After ſeveral attacks as unſucceſsful as they were ill planed, Beurnonville was obliged to lead back to Metz and Thionville his army reduced to 15,000 men by the ſword of the Auſtrians, and the Pruſſian Dyſentery. He then wrote to the Convention that

that the nature of the ſeaſon and the country had not allowed him to fulfil entirely the commiſſion with which he had been entruſted, but that he had made an enormous ſlaughter of the Auſtrians, and that he had loſt in this expedition, *only the little finger of a ranger*.

Note 28. *Page* 142.

Theſe countries have been ſtill worſe treated in preceding wars. There are ſtill to be found the traces of thoſe horrid ravages which the French committed in 1688 and 1693. Mr. de Louvois, Miniſter of war under Louis XIV. ſent an order to the French Generals to lay waſte the whole palatinate with fire and ſword. Theſe orders were but too cruelly executed; almoſt all the towns of the palatinate were burnt. It will no doubt be recollected that the Elector Palatine reduced to deſpair by the ruin of his country, which he beheld a prey to the flames from the fortreſs where he had taken refuge, wiſhed to fight Marſhal Turenne, and ſent him a challenge which the latter refuſed. All the world likewiſe is acquainted with the manner in which Mr. de Louvois wiſhed to draw from Louis XIV. an order for completing the deſtruction of this beautiful country, and the horror with which that Prince rejected the propoſal.

Note

Note 29. *Page* 144.

The neutrality was ſo much the more advantageous to this town as by the poſition of its *tete de pont*, it found itſelf, if I may ſo ſay, placed between the Auſtrian and French Batteries, and conſequently liable to be reduced to ruins if either of them undertook to maintain themſelves there. It had beſides ſuffered but too much already from the war, having been in 1795 bombarded and half deſtroyed by the French.

This town belongs to the Prince of Neuwied, famous in Germany for his eccentric humour and the ſuit which he has carried on againſt his wife in the Imperial Chamber of Weſtlaer. She ſucceeded in procuring the adminiſtration of his property and his principality to be taken from him on the ground of madneſs. He nevertheleſs many years ago had the wiſdom to grant the town of Neuwied religious and commercial franchiſes which attracted thither a great number of merchants and manufacturers from every country, and of every religion. This town is commercial and regularly built; it is inhabited by a great number of Hernhutes or Moravian Friars.

Note

Note 30. *Page* 149.

This Fort belonged formerly to the town of Straſbourg, and became afterwards a fortreſs of the Empire. Marſhal de Berwick took it in 1733 after ten days open trenches, and cauſed the fortifications to be razed.

Note 31. *Page* 168. *Printed by error note* 36.

In 1733 the French alſo cauſed the *tete de pont* of Huningen to be fortified in ſpite of the remonſtrances of the canton of Baſle, and they kept poſſeſſion of it during the winter 1733-34, although their army had re-entered France.

Note 32. *Page* 170.

This General only twenty-ſix years of age, was like Buonaparte a Corſican by birth, and brought up in the artillery at the beginning of the Revolution. He poſſeſſed, it is ſaid, as much courage and greater talents than Buonaparte. He has been leſs fortunate.

Note 33. *Page* 175.

Some works, and amongſt others, that of Mr. de Guibert on tactics had already pointed out the modifications which it was requiſite to make in the modern military

tary ſyſtem; and the Changes which would reſult from the actual formation of the armies, and above all, from the carrying to perfection every thing that depends on engineering and artillery. The French have realiſed theſe in the preſent war, and have beſides employed ſecondary means before unknown. Such for inſtance are telegraphs and balloons. They have employed the latter with ſome effect on various occaſions, amongſt others, at Maubeuge and Fleurus.

Note 34. *Page* 177.

The ſimple contingent of the Empire was fixed in 1681 at 40,000 men. Conformably to the decrees given by the diet of Ratiſbon during this war, all the members of the Germanic confederation ought to have furniſhed a quintuple contingent, which would have raiſed the army of the Empire to 200,000 men. It has however never amounted to 60,000; the majority of the Princes and ſtates having preferred paying their quota in money. The treaties of neutrality concluded by the moſt powerful members of the Empire, have reduced its army to a ſmall force. It is not at this moment 12,000 men ſtrong.

Note 35. *Page* 181.

This General, a Savoyard by birth, and I believe the youngeſt Lieutenant General in the Auſtrian army, has never

never ceaſed to diſtinguiſh himſelf during the whole courſe of this war. He has conſtantly enjoyed the confidence of the Emperor, and will one day probably be at the head of his army.

Note 36. *Page* 182.

A ſingle trait will enable the reader to form a judgement of the manner in which the Archduke commands and is obeyed. At the affair of the 24th of October that Prince gave orders to the Major of the light horſe of Modena, to attack a redoubt ſituated amongſt ſome vines. That officer charged the French who defended it, but the ground being extremely diſadvantageous for cavalry, he was repulſed and obliged to fall back. The Archduke came up in the interim, and ſeeing what paſſed, ſaid to the Major, "Sir you have miſunderſtood me, I gave you orders to *take* the redoubt." The officer felt the full weight of theſe words, and returned to the charge with all the force given by deſpair. He was killed, but the redoubt was taken.

Note 37. *Page* 183.

This fortreſs is built on a perpendicular rock, at the foot of which runs the Rhine, and oppoſite to which the Moſelle falls into that river. It commands entirely the town and environs of Coblentz. It unites to all the ad-

vantages of its ſituation the impoſſibility of being attacked, except on a very narrow front, and the capability of being defended by a ſmall garriſon. This fortreſs, one of the beſt exiſting, belongs to the Elector of Treves.

Note 38. *Page* 185. *Printed by error note* 43.

The armies of Jourdan and Moreau, had upon their colours, " Vienna or Death."

End of the Notes for the Campaign in Germany.

CAMPAIGN

OF

1796

IN

ITALY.

CAMPAIGN
OF
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CHAP. I.

FROM the beginning of the year 1796, it was well known to perſons beſt informed on the ſubject, that the French had determined to make very great military efforts in Italy. It had been eaſy to foreſee this from the end of the preceding year, ſince they were unwilling to extend to the armies of Italy the truce, which had been agreed upon in Germany, at the cloſe of that year, between the Imperial and Republican armies.

Many political and military conſiderations concurred, to determine the French Government to puſh the war in Italy with more vigour than it had been done the preceding years. The example of the Court of Spain, which had been haſtily induced to make

make peace by the invaſion of its territory, and the loſs of two or three ſtrong places, gave the Directory reaſon to hope, that the ſame conſequences might reſult from the adoption of the ſame plan againſt the King of Sardinia. They flattered themſelves, that by threatening the fortreſſes of Piedmont, and attacking on all ſides, at the ſame time, the territories of this prince, they would ſo far alarm him, that the apprehenſion of loſing his crown would determine him to detach himſelf from the coalition.

To theſe motives were joined others of no leſs importance;—to carry the war into the proper eſtates of the Emperor—to deſtroy his preponderance in Italy—to ſhut up its ports againſt the Engliſh—and above all, to find in a rich and fertile country, money, ſubſiſtence, and reſources of every deſcription.

To carry theſe deſigns into execution with the better chance of ſucceſs, the French Government contrived to diſguiſe them, and in ſo doing had the good fortune to elude the vigilance of its enemies. Well aſſured, that ſnows and the nature of the country would prevent the Auſtrians and Piedmonteſe from attempting any offenſive operations during

during the winter, it was in no hurry to reinforce the French army in Italy, and to repair the loſſes which it had ſuſtained in the campaign of 1795. It even went farther: the want of pay and of ſubſiſtence having, as the reader perhaps recollects, cauſed conſiderable diſcontents among the national volunteers, the French Generals, finding that they could neither reſtore ſubordination amongſt them, nor pay them, gave permiſſion to all who wiſhed it to depart, even winked at the abſence of thoſe who quitted their colours without leave, and thus ſuffered many thouſands of their worſt ſoldiers to return into France. The French Government did not take any great pains, in the firſt inſtance, to reſtore order and diſcipline into the army of Italy. Its weakneſs and ſtate of diſorganization were known to the allies; and they were therefore led to conclude, that it would not be neceſſary to oppoſe againſt it any conſiderable force in the enſuing campaign.

During the months however of January and February, the Directory, under pretence of appeaſing or of preventing diſturbances in the ſouth of France, cauſed about 40,000 of their beſt troops to aſſemble in the provinces of Languedoc, Rouſſillon,

and

and Provence. The greater part of them, having made the campaigns in Spain, had become accuſtomed to a hot climate, and were therefore enabled to reſiſt that of Italy. During the month of April, almoſt the whole of theſe troops arrived by forced marches in the territories of Genoa: and ſoon after the opening of the campaign Buonaparte found himſelf at the head of an army of more than 60,000 men, of which 45,000 were under his immediate orders, the remainder being poſted along the *Col de Tende* and the *Riviere di Genoa*.

The Cabinet of Vienna, anxious to repair the reverſes which Mr. de Vins had experienced towards the end of 1795, had rather augmented the army in Italy; and deceived by the weak condition in which the French army had been ſuffered to remain, ſuppoſed that it would be inferior in numbers to the combined force of the Auſtrians, Neapolitans, and Piedmonteſe.

General Beaulieu was at the head of the Auſtrian army, which the gazettes in general eſtimated at 50 or 60,000 men; but I am certain it did not amount to 35,000 effective; in which was compriſed a corps of about 7,000 Neapolitans.

The Piedmonteſe army, commanded by the Auſtrian

Auſtrian Lieutenant General Colli, was about 20,000 men ſtrong, who defended the Col de Tende, and the other approaches of Piedmont. Beſides theſe, the Duc d'Aouſte was at the head of rather more than 15,000 men in Savoy, where he made head againſt the army of the Alps, under the command of General Kellermann, whoſe force amounted to 25,000 men.

In looking over theſe eſtimates, we ſhall find that the French began this campaign with about 85,000 men, and the allies with about 70,000.

Hoſtilities began early in April. The French at firſt threatened many points at the ſame time, that the allies might be doubtful againſt which they really meant to direct their attack, and that conſequently they might be obliged to divide their forces. They made many feints along the whole extent of the Col de Tende, which obliged the Piedmonteſe to extend their line of defence, that they might be enabled to ſecure all the paſſes that lead into Piedmont. The French ſpread a report, that they meant to get poſſeſſion of Genoa; and contrived to give a colour to it, by advancing to Voltri (only ſix leagues from Genoa) a corps of 10 or 12,000 men, com manded by General Laharpe, who puſhed forward

his advanced guard to St. Pierre d'Arena, a ſuburb of that city.

The moment that intelligence arrived of this movement, M. de Beaulieu ſet out from Alexandria, in the neighbourhood of which he had aſſembled his army, moved rapidly to Novi, took poſt in the front of the defile of Bocchetta, [*Note* 1.] and cauſed a ſtrong detachment to advance to the gates of Genoa, to cover that city, and to keep General Laharpe in awe. Wiſhing to keep up his communication with the Piedmonteſe army, by joining his right to the left of General Colli, M. de Beaulieu divided his army into many corps, which occupied a front of nearly twenty leagues. By ſo doing he weakened his poſition, and gave Buonaparte an opportunity of attacking to advantage his different corps, too much ſeparated to be enabled to afford each other mutual ſupport and aſſiſtance.

The Chiefs of the Genoſe Government, finding their country preſſed by two powerful armies, without means of making their neutrality reſpected, receiving meſſages from either party, ſometimes with aſſurance of protection, ſometimes with menaces, found themſelves in a very embarraſſing ſituation. They could not prevent the territory of the republic from

from becoming the theatre of war, and from providing the oppoſing armies with means of ſubſiſtence. Perfectly aware that at all events they muſt be at the mercy either of the French or the Auſtrians, they endeavoured to keep on good terms with both. They ſtrove to preſerve, as far as it was poſſible, the independence of the Republic. They did every thing that depended on themſelves to maintain it;—collected their troops—ordered the militia within the walls—and ſupplied with artillery the fortification of their city, which can only be defended, and of courſe be properly beſieged, but by a very conſiderable force. [*Note* 2.] The magiſtrates however thought leſs of defending it againſt foreign armies, than of preventing an inſurrection of its inhabitants, the lower claſs of which was as much attached to the French, as the higher order were to the allies.

On the 10th of April, General Beaulieu made a briſk attack on the right of the enemy, drove it from Voltri, and forced General Cervoni, who commanded it, to fall back on the center of the French army, which had taken a poſition on the heights of Savona. The day following, he attacked with no leſs vigour all the advanced poſts of their center, and made himſelf maſter of them, with the

exception only of the redoubt of Montenotte, which was their laſt entrenchment. Fifteen hundred men, commanded by the Republican General Rampon, occupied this redoubt, which was well conſtructed, and advantageouſly ſituated. They reſiſted with no leſs ſucceſs than bravery all the efforts which the Auſtrians made in the courſe of the day to get poſſeſſion of this redoubt. Night prevented the latter from renewing the attempt with more efficacy, and the two armies paſſed the night in ſight of each other.

On the 12th, at break of day, M. de Beaulieu order the attack on the redoubt of Montenotte to be renewed: but he was ſoon obliged to deſiſt from it, in order to defend himſelf againſt the diviſion of General Laharpe, who during the night had turned his left flank. The action became very briſk, and was ſupported with courage on both ſides, when the Auſtrians found themſelves attacked on their right by almoſt the whole French army with Buonaparte at its head. This General had executed the ſame maœuvre on the right which Laharpe had done on the left. General Argenteau, who commanded the right wing of the Auſtrians was partly ſurpriſed, and made a defence as feeble as the attack of the French

French was vigorous. They defeated Mr. d'Argenteau's corps, which was not ſupported by the Piedmonteſe, and put it to the route. The reſt of the Auſtrian army, finding itſelf uncovered and attacked on all ſides by ſuperior numbers, made a long reſiſtance, but at laſt gave way, and was forced to retreat, after having ſuſtained conſiderable loſs. The French official reports made it 3,500 men, of which 2,500 were made priſoners.

After this victory, which muſt have coſt the French very dear, they advanced to Carcara, and eſtabliſhed themſelves on the heights that ſurround the town of Cairo, which the allies had abandoned. M. de Beaulieu, weakened by the loſs which he had ſuſtained at Montenotte, made no attempt to ſtop their progreſs. He continued to fall back, with the intention of approaching the Piedmonteſe army, and of concentrating his forces.

The French did not give him time to attain completely his object. They attacked him again on the 13th, and on the 14th forcedhim to riſque a general action near Monteleſino. Buonaparte followed the ſame plan and executed the ſame manœuvre which had ſucceed ſo well at Montenotte. He directed the greater part of his forces againſt the right wing

of

of the Auſtrians, ſo as to ſeparate it from the Piedmonteſe, with whom it had a feeble communication. This diſpoſition met with the greateſt ſucceſs. The left of the Piedmonteſe, and the right of the Auſtrians, ſtill commanded by M. d'Argenteau, were forced and put to flight. The center of the Auſtrians had then to ſuſtain the attack of almoſt the whole French army. It defended itſelf with the greateſt bravery, attempted even ſeveral times to pierce through the center of the French line, and for a long time kept the victory undecided. Buonaparte, fearing that it might eſcape him, made new diſpoſitions to ſecure it; he reinforced the right of his army, and ordered it to advance in three ſtrong columns againſt the left wing of the Auſtrians, which was ſuſtained by ſome entrenchments thrown up near Dego.

This left wing oppoſed a vigorous reſiſtance to the French; and the fire from the batteries made a conſiderable carnage amongſt them. One of their columns however, led by General Maſſena, ſucceeded in outflanking the left wing of the Auſtrians; the latter, preſſed on all ſides by more than double their number, were at length overpowered and routed. The French remained victorious in every quarter.

If one can give credit to the returns made by Buonaparte, the allies muſt have loſt in this battle 2,500 men killed, 8,000 made priſoners, 22 pieces of cannon, and 15 ſtand of colours. Amongſt the priſoners was Lieutenant General Provera. From the 13th his corps of 1,500 men had been ſurrounded by the left wing of the French army. Unwilling to ſurrender, and unable to rejoin M. de Beaulieu, he entrenched himſelf in a caſtle ſituated on the ſummit of a mountain. The French made ſeveral attemps to force this poſt, but were conſtantly repulſed with conſiderable loſs. Of three of their Generals, Panel, Quenin, and Joubert, the two former were killed, and the latter grievouſly wounded. It was not till the end of the battle of the 14th that M. de Provera, having no longer any hopes of aſſiſtance, ſurrendered himſelf with his whole detachment priſoners of war.

Buonaparte, in obedience to the orders given to the French Generals, never to publiſh the number of their killed, wounded, and priſoners, did not mention in his relation of the victory of Monteleſino, the number of men that it had coſt him. I venture however to ſay poſitively, that it was very conſiderable. Three Generals having been killed or

wounded

wounded in the actions of the 13th and 14th, there can be no doubt but that a proportionable number of officers and soldiers must have shared the same fate. The silence of Buonaparte, as to the loss of his own army, sufficiently warrants us to believe, that he has very much exaggerated that of the allies. This appears to have been by no means so great, from impartial reports; and subsequent events proved, that the latter were more entitled to credit than those of Buonaparte.

In fact, if, according to the letters of this General, as well as of the French Commissaries attached to his army, the allies had in five days lost 15,000 men, of whom more than 10,000 were Austrians, their artillery, their provisions, and camp equipage; if in the battle of the 14th the army of M. de Beaulieu had been diminished one third, would it have been possible that this General could have been in a condition the very night after that action, to attack the French army, to put it to the rout, and to recover the position of Dego, which had been taken from him the day before? This however did actually happen: and we must infer from it, either that M. de Beaulieu's loss in the battle of the 14th was much less then the French pretended it to be,

or

that their own had been likewiſe very conſiderable. Such alſo muſt that have been, which the latter experienced at Dego in the night between the 14th and 15th, where they loſt amongſt others, the three Generals Cauſſe, Dupuis, and Rondeau. They claimed however the victory in this affair, which according to their accounts, coſt the Auſtrians 2,000 men, of whom 1,400 were made priſoners.

Though the battle of Montelezino had ſtill further weakened the points of communication between the Auſtrian and Piedmonteſe armies, they nevertheleſs made no combined movement to approach towards one another, and to contract their line. They thus afforded to Buonaparte the opportunity of placing himſelf between them, and of forcing the Piedmonteſe to act ſeparately; which was the principal object of the plan of the campaign that had been formed by the French.

Buonaparte leaving a conſiderable part of his army to obſerve that of the Auſtrians, to prevent their aſſiſting the Piedmonteſe, or making a diverſion in their favour, marched againſt the latter with the remainder of his forces. He ordered an attack to be made on their entrenched camp on the 16th, and although he did not ſucceed in forcing it,

the fear of being turned induced the Piedmonteſe to abandon it during the night between the 16th and 17th, after having left a garriſon in the town of Ceva.

The Piedmonteſe army took an excellent poſition at the conflux of the rivers Tanaro and Curſaglia, entrenched themſelves there ſtrongly, and for four days reſiſted all the efforts made by the enemy to diſlodge them; but the French having on the 21ſt, croſſed the Tanaro in two places, General Colli not daring to hazard a battle in the poſition which he then held, quitted it during the night following, retiring towards Mondovi, to which place he feared his retreat might be cut off. The French purſuing him cloſely, attacked him at break of day near the village of Vico. The Piedmonteſe were defeated, without making any great reſiſtance. They continued to retreat, and the French entered Mondovi the ſame evening. The reports of the latter ſtated the loſs ſuſtained by the Piedmonteſe at 1,800 men killed, amongſt whom was one General, 8 pieces of cannon, 15 ammunition waggons, 11 ſtand of colours, and 1,300 men taken, amongſt whom were three Generals. The Republican General Stengel, known by his

defeat at the paſſage of the Roer in 1793, was mortally wounded in this action.

The Piedmonteſe army from that time entirely ſeparated from the Auſtrians and obliged to rely altogether upon itſelf, took a good defenſive poſition behind the river Stura. Its front was covered by the Stura; its right extended to the fortreſs of Coni, and kept up a communication with the corps which defended the paſs of the Col de Tende; its left was ſupported by the town of Cheraſco, ſituated at the conflux of the Stura and the Tanaro. This poſition was the beſt that Mr. de Colli could have taken, under the circumſtances in which he found himſelf. It covered the ſtrongeſt places of Piedmont, and defended the only routes by which the French could penetrate into it, as they were not then maſters of the Milaneſe. The Safety of Piedmont and of Turin, depended on this line of defence being perfectly preſerved. If the French ſucceeded in breaking through it, they would be enabled to penetrate into the flat country, and leaving the ſtrong places behind them, might march to the very gates of Turin, from whence they were not more than ten leagues diſtant. The ſuperiority of their numbers would have enabled them to

maſk thoſe fortreſſes which might have given them any inquietude, and to ſpread themſelves over the plain of Piedmont, which the weak remains of M. de Colli's army would not have dared to diſpute with them.

The reverſes which the allies had experienced at Montenotte, Montelezino, and Vico, and the rapid progreſs of the French, filled the Court of Turin with juſt and ſerious alarms. The King of Sardinia, ſtruck with the imminent danger which threatened him, could hardly flatter himſelf that M. de Colli would be able to reſiſt the efforts of an enemy ſo often victorious, and not having reaſon to rely on General Beaulieu for any powerful ſuccour, did not think it right to expoſe to the chance of a battle his poſſeſſions and his crown. He ſaw no means of preſerving them but by an immediate peace, and loſt no time in demanding one. He ſent Plenipotentiaries to Genoa, charged to propoſe it to the French Commiſſaries; and at the ſame time diſpatched an order to General Colli, to ſolicit a ſuſpenſion of arms from General Buonaparte. After ſome difficulties the latter agreed to it. The principal conditions were, that the French ſhould be put in poſſeſſion of the ſtrong

places

places of Coni, Ceva, and Tortona; that till the latter could be furrendered, the town of Alexandria ſhould be given up to them; that they ſhould remain maſters of all the Country on the right bank of the Tanaro, from the ſource of that river to its embouchure into the Po; that they ſhould be permitted to croſs the latter river below the town of Valence, and that the French troops ſhould be allowed to a free paſſage through all the territories of the King of Sardinia.

This Armiſtice was ſoon afterwards followed by a treaty of peace between this Prince and the French Republic. I ſhall not enter into any detail on the nature, the conditions, and the political conſequences of this treaty. It would be a deviation from my ſubject: I will only conſider this tranſaction with a view to the effects it produced on the reſt of this campaign.

Before I reſume the narrative of it, may I be permitted to hazard ſome reflections on the events which I have juſt been recounting. They have indeed been too remarkable, and their conſequences too important, to admit of our being indifferent as to the true cauſes which led to them. Some have attributed the diſaſters which the allies

ex-

experienced in this campaign to the political errors of the miniſters of the reſpective courts, as well as to the military miſconduct of the Generals; others have ſeen nothing in the triumphs of the French, but the natural effect of the ſuperiority of their forces, of the bravery of their ſoldiers, and the talents of their commanders. The opinions of the beſt informed people, as well as the reports of the moſt impartial, concur in attributing the misfortunes of the allies to a complication of theſe different cauſes.

The Court of Vienna had formally promiſed to raiſe its Italian army to 60,000 men, which however had never amounted to 40,000, including the Neapolitans. From the difficulty in providing ſoldiers, and money to pay them, the Piedmonteſe army was neither never ſo numerous as it ought to have been, according to the mutual engagements that had been entered into between the Courts of Vienna and Turin.

On the one ſide and on the other, intrigues, miſtruſt, and other ſecret cauſes ſtill more unfortunate, conſpired to prevent the Auſtrian and Piedmonteſe armies from being ſo ſtrong in point of number, and from acting with that union and inden-

indentity of views, that were neceſſary to give them a chance of ſucceſs againſt an enemy, marching towards its object with a perfect unity of action and of intereſt.

The Court of Vienna appointed to the command of the Italian army M. de Beaulieu, a General remarkable for his courage, as well as for his good fortune in war. It placed great reliance, and with good reaſon on his zeal and his fidelity. But this General had never yet commanded in Italy, and of courſe could not have a perfect knowledge of the country in which he was about to wage war; a knowledge which the inſufficiency of his forces rendered the more neceſſary. In doing juſtice to the military talents which diſtinguiſh M. de Beaulieu, let me at the ſame time be allowed to obſerve, that he does not poſſeſs all thoſe qualities which ought to be found in a Commander in Chief.

He is particularly deficient in that addreſs and thoſe conciliating manners ſo neceſſary in a General, who unites under his command troops of different nations, or who is obliged to act in concert with them. It appeared that there did not exiſt between him and the Piedmonteſe Generals

that

that harmony and mutual confidence which alone could make amends for the inferiority of their forces, and give a concordance to their operations. Meſſrs. de Beaulieu and Colli, were beſides independent of each other, and were only inſtructed to act in concert, which they did not adhere to ſo ſtrictly as might be wiſhed. The Auſtrians threw the blame of the defeats at Montenotte and Montalezino on the Piedmonteſe Generals, whom they accuſed of not having ſupported General Argenteau as they might have done. The Piedmonteſe on the other hand reproached the Auſtrians with having afforded them no aſſiſtance in the battles of the 16th, the 21ſt, and 22d, pretending that had they received any, they might have maintained themſelves before Ceva and Mondovi. Both accuſed General Argenteau of having omitted or neglected to communicate the orders which he had received, to the Generals under his command; and of having occaſioned both theſe defeats by the bad diſpoſitions which he made, and by the ſlight reſiſtance which he oppoſed to the attacks of the French. One cannot but ſuſpect that theſe imputations were well founded, as this General was ſoon afterwards re-

removed from his command, and even put under arreſt.

It is impoſſible not to applaud the readineſs with which M. de Beaulieu marched to cover Genoa in the beginning of April, and the courage with which he attacked the French corps which threatened this city. But he may be cenſured for having uſeleſsly remained many days at Voltri, and for not having ſuſpected that the deſign of the French was to compel him to quit the heights, on which he had advantageouſly poſted himſelf. In flying to the aſſiſtance of Genoa, M. de Beaulieu ſeparated himſelf from the right of his army. After having accompliſhed his object he ought inſtantly, as it ſeems, to have joined M. d'Argenteau. The city of Genoa had had time to ſecure itſelf from a *coup de main*. The beſt way of defending it would have been, beſides, not to ſuffer himſelf to be beat by the French, and to prevent them from penetrating into Piedmont.

The inaction of M. de Beaulieu gave time to Buonaparte to prepare his movement againſt M. d'Argenteau, to defeat this General twice, and to obtain thoſe firſt ſucceſſes which decided the reſt of the campaign. If M. de Beaulieu had contracted his

line, and collected his army, by drawing nearer to M. d'Argenteau: if, instead of occupying a very extensive front, the Generals Beaulieu and Colli had formed a junction, or at least had taken such positions as would had admitted of their affording each other mutual support: they might have defended all the defiles of the Appentines—have rendered Piedmont impenetrable; and have thus completely disconcerted Buonaparte's plans. If the latter had marched to Genoa to induce the allies to divide their forces, or against Lombardy, in the hope that the Austrians would fly to its defence, he could not have executed either the one or the other of these movements, and particularly the latter, without endangering his flank, and exposing himself to be continually attacked in a very perilous situation. He would have been under the necessity of marching through the flat country; whilst the allies, who were masters of all the heights, might have fallen upon him at such time and in such places as would have been most advantageous to them. If Buonaparte under these circumstances had experienced any reverses, the allies might have been enabled to drive him to the sea coast,

coaſt, and even to cut off his communication with the county of Nice, and with France.

It is impoſſible to deny but that the plan followed by General Buonaparte, was as wiſely conceived as it was ably executed. He ſhewed great ability and promptitude in taking advantage of the ſuperiority of his forces, and of the errors of thoſe who were oppoſed to him. He had but one object, towards which he directed all his movements and applied all his means; this was to break the line of the allies. He ſucceeded in it, by bringing almoſt the whole of his force to bear on the weakeſt part of their line, a ſimple manœuvre, and which can ſcarcely fail of being ſucceſsful, if executed with foreſight, celerity, and vigour.

CHAP. II.

Retreat of the Auſtrians behind the Po—Paſſage of that river by the French—Armiſtice concluded between them and the Duke of Parma—Battle at Lodi—The Freneh enter Milan—Inſurrection of the inhabitants of Lombardy—Paſſage of the French over the Mincio—Retreat of General Beaulieu into the Tyrol—Armiſtice concluded between the French, the King of Naples, and the Pope—The French enter Leghorn—Inſurrection of the inhabitants of Romagna—Siege and deſcription of Mantua.

THE armiſtice concluded between the Piedmonteſe and French armies, was productive of the greateſt advantages to the latter. It delivered the Republicans from one half of their enemies, provided them abundantly with military ſtores and proviſions, and ſecured their poſition in Italy. It afforded them means of acquiring new ſucceſſes at the ſame time that it furniſhed certain points of retreat in caſe of a reverſe of fortune. Elated by

by ſo many victories obtained in ſo ſhort a time, and ſtrengthened by all the new reſources which he had procured, Buonaparte did not delay a moment to take advantage of them. The poſſeſſion of Tortona, with the liberty of paſſing the Po, near Valence, opened a way for him into the Milaneſe, which was become an eaſy conqueſt to an army already victorious and double in number to that oppoſed to it.

The Republican army began its march on the 30th of April, and advanced againſt the Auſtrians. As ſoon as Mr. de Beaulieu had heard of the ſuſpenſion of arms agreed upon between the Piedmonteſe and the French, he had retired to Alexandria, and from thence to Valence, where he croſſed the Po. He then took a poſition behind that river, between thoſe of Teſin and Terdoppio, in order to protect the Milaneſe. Abandoned by the Piedmonteſe, and deprived of the ſupport of their fortified places, he could no longer think of acting on the offenſive. Nothing now remained for him but to exert all his efforts to keep the French as long as poſſible on the other ſide of the Po, and then to make an obſtinate defence of the Milaneſe, in order to give the court of Vienna time to ſend re-

re-inforcements, which the defection of the King of Sardinia rendered indiſpenſably neceſſary. Thinking that the French would take advantage of the liberty of the paſſage ſtipulated in the armiſtice, and that they would endeavour to croſs the Po near Valence or Tortona of which they were maſters, Mr. de Beaulieu poſted himſelf with the greateſt part of his army within the reach of theſe two towns, ſo as to protect the courſe of the river Teſin. He lined only the left bank of the Po with a few troops, as far as Pavia and the mouth of the Teſin.

Buonaparte, foreſeeing all the difficulties which muſt attend the paſſage of ſo rapid a river as the Po in the preſence of the enemy, and knowing that Mr. de Beaulieu had not a ſufficient number of troops to guard the banks of the river along the whole of its courſe, judged that by marching much lower down, he ſhould find ſome point favourable to his paſſage, and weakly defended. By this movement he compelled Mr. de Beaulieu to abandon on a ſudden, almoſt the whole of the Milaneſe, in order to prevent the loſs of his communication with the town of Mantua, and the Tyrol. If on the contrary Buonaparte had attacked

tacked him on the Teſin, Mr. de Beaulieu would have been able to defend ſucceſſively the paſſage of each river, to ſave his magazines, and perhaps to gain ſufficient time for the arrival of ſome reinforcements, which might enable him to ſtand his ground in the Milaneſe. By directing himſelf towards the lower Po, Buonaparte gained beſides the advantage of being farther advanced into Italy, of alarming all the petty ſtates, of levying contributions in the Dutchies of Parma, Placentia, and Modena: and of procuring money, proviſions, and horſes, with which his army was not as yet abundantly ſupplied. In conſequence of this, after having made a feint of attempting a paſſage at Valence, he proceeded on the 8th of May, by a forced march to the neighbourhood of Placentia; and perceiving but a ſmall number of the enemy on the other ſide of the Po, he haſtened to tranſport his van guard to the oppoſite bank, on rafts and flying bridges. Some light troops which he had ſent forward during his march took poſſeſſion of ſome boats loaded with ſick and proviſions.

As ſoon as Mr. de Beaulieu received information of the march of the French towards Placentia

tia and the lower Po, he ſent between 6 and 7,000 men from Pavia to defend the points threatened; but they arrived too late to oppoſe the paſſage of the French, whom they found drawn up on the left bank of the river.

A ſmart ſkirmiſh enſued near Fombio, in which the Neapolitan cavalry loſt many men, but gained much honour. This action was diſadvantageous to the allies, who were compelled to retire upon the Adda. In the night of the 7th, Mr. de Beaulieu ordered another body of 4,000 men from Caſale to ſuccour that which was attacked at Fombio. This corps arrived about two o'clock in the morning at Codogno on the road from Placentia to Cremona, which road it found occupied by the French. The encounter between the two parties produced a fire of muſquetry, the noiſe of which having drawn the Republican General la Harpe to that quarter, he received a ball which killed him on the ſpot. His death was much regretted by the whole army. Although the body of Auſtrians juſt mentioned, had forced the vedettes and driven in the advanced poſts of the French, it found them too powerful to think of attacking them, or remaining long before them. This corps then marched towards

wards Lodi, where General Beaulieu had retired during the ſame night with the reſt of his army.

The victories of the French, and the peace unexpectedly made by the King of Sardinia, had excited the utmoſt alarm throughout all Italy. The retreat of the Auſtrians beyond the Po, left at the mercy of the French all the countries ſituated on the right bank of that river.

The Duke of Parma, whoſe territories they had already entered, ſaw that he had not a moment to loſe in ſecuring them from the Revolutionary Principles and rapacity of the French. He therefore ſolicited a ſuſpenſion of arms, under the mediation of Spain, which was granted him at the price of 2,000,000 of French livres, 1,700 horſes, 2,000 oxen, of an immenſe quantity of proviſions, and of 20 paintings to be choſen by the French. Every ſtep which they advanced into Italy augmented their military reſources: each ſucceſs furniſhed the means of acquiring new ones. Buonaparte was certain of being able henceforwards to pay, equip, and ſubſiſt his army at the expence of his enemies, as well as at that of the neutral powers. In paſſing the Po, he

had overcome the greateſt impediment to the conqueſt of the Milaneſe, the main object in his plan of the campaign.

He left the banks of the Po on the 9th of May, and found himſelf on the 10th with his advanced guard in preſence of General Beaulieu's rear guard, which was poſted in front of Lodi and the river Adda. A briſk cannonade was commenced on both ſides, in conſequence of which the Auſtrians evacuated the town of Lodi, and retired to the other ſide of the river. Major Malcamp (ſon-in-law of General Beaulieu) who commanded this Auſtrian corps, cauſed ſeveral pieces of cannon to be placed at the end of the bridge which enfiladed it, whilſt ſome other pieces placed on the right and left took it by a croſs fire. He would not allow the bridge to be broken down, not imagining that the French would under ſuch circumſtances venture to attack it. Buonaparte had not attempted to force it, becauſe the whole of his army was not yet arrived; but as ſoon as the major part of it had joined him, he aſſembled his General officers, and communicated to them the reſolution he had formed of ſtorming the bridge. The plan was

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unanimouſly diſapproved of by his Generals. Buonaparte obſtinately perſiſting in this raſh deſign, aſſembled a council of grenadiers, to whom he made an animating ſpeech which determined them to undertake the attack. [*Note* 3.] 4,000 grenadiers and carabiniers formed themſelves into a ſolid column, and marched towards the bridge. As ſoon as they arrived at its extremity, they were received by a terrible diſcharge of grape ſhot, which it was impoſſible to withſtand. They fell back with great loſs, returned twice to the charge, and were again forced back by the fire of the Auſtrian cannon, which enfilading the bridge, were diſcharged all at once cloſe upon them as ſoon as they had ſet foot on it. The French had already ſuffered enormouſly, and it might have been expected that they would have abandoned this deſperate undertaking. But Buonaparte perſevering in his reſolution, ordered freſh troops to re-inforce the column engaged in the attack. Six Generals putting themſelves at its head, animated them by their example, inflamed them by their words, and led them back to the charge. Taking advantage of a moment, when the thickneſs of the

ſmoke produced by the inceſſant fire, prevented the Auſtrians from perceiving and making a general diſcharge upon the French; the latter ruſhed upon the bridge, croſſed it with rapidity, and falling impetuouſly upon the troops and cannon which defended its extremity, overthrew the one and made themſelves maſters of the other. The bridge being forced, all the other columns inſtantly paſſed it to ſupport the former. This action equally brilliant and unexpected, diſconcerted the Auſtrians, who abandoned their ground, finding themſelves too weak to defend it, and began their retreat. It was protected by the Neapolitan cavalry, which gained infinite honour on this day. They charged the French infantry ſeveral times, always with courage, and ſometimes with ſucceſs. They ſhewed themſelves, by the good countenance which they preſerved, and the judiciouſneſs of their movements, equal to the beſt veteran troops.

Buonaparte wrote to the directory that the allies had loſt in this action 2,500 men, of which 1,000 were made priſoners, and that he had taken 400 horſes and 20 pieces of cannon. He had the effrontery to pretend that this battle coſt him

him only 400 men; and certainly never did he give a more glaring proof of the falſeneſs of his accounts. The loſs ſuffered by his army on that occaſion was univerſally eſtimated at 4,000 men; and by ſome even greater. The very nature of the engagement rendered it more bloody than any of the preceding actions, and the French themſelves conſidered it as the warmeſt conteſt during the campaign. It was abſolutely impoſſible that they ſhould be otherwiſe than great ſufferers on the bridge of Lodi, where they were thundered upon without intermiſſion by artillery and muſquetry; and if they were three times compelled to fall back, it was undoubtedly in conſequence of the terrible fire to which they were expoſed, and of the great havock which it occaſioned in their ranks.

One cannot however help acknowledging the intrepidity with which the French accompliſhed this perilous undertaking. It was a ſtriking proof with how much indifference the French Generals throw away their ſoldiers lives. By making other diſpoſitions, and by the delay of a few days, Buonaparte might have croſſed the Adda with as little loſs as he ſuſtained at the paſſage of the Po. He would not indeed have had ſuch brilliant things to relate,

but

but he would have preſerved ſome thouſands of his ſoldiers. He would have acquired leſs glory, but he would have ſhewed more real patriotiſm. He forgot that the leading principle of the greateſt Generals, was to ſpare the blood of their ſoldiers; and that they only conſidered thoſe as true victories in which they had but a ſmall loſs to lament. The void created in the French army by the battle of Lodi, was quickly filled up by reinforcements drawn from the army of Kellermann, whoſe preſence in Savoy was rendered unneceſſary by the peace concluded with the King of Sardinia.

As ſoon as Mr. de Beaulieu had found himſelf obliged to retire upon the Adda, he felt the neceſſity of quickly recalling thoſe troops which he had on the Teſin, and at Milan. After having left 1,800 men in the citadel, the Auſtrians evacuated that town on the 10th of May, and the French to the number of 4,000 men, commanded by General Maſſena, entered it on the 11th. On the day following Buonaparte made a triumphal entry into the town, in the midſt of the acclamations of the populace, and eſcorted by a numerous cavalcade of troops, and carriages filled with the principal inhabitants of Milan. He paſſed ſeveral days in that

place

place indulging himſelf in feaſts, balls, and all ſorts of pleaſures. He received there greater honours than the Auſtrian Princes, Governors of the Milaneſe, had ever exacted. He lodged in the palace of the Archduke, who had left it a few days before. After having enjoyed his triumph, and ſhared with the Commiſſaries of the Executive Directory the incenſe offered up by the inhabitants of Milan, they employed themſelves in attending to the intereſt of the Republic. They impoſed a contribution of 20,000,000 of livres (800,000l.) on Lombardy, as the price of that liberty which they came to give them; and granted a ſuſpenſion of arms to the Duke of Modena for the ſum of 10,000,000 of livres (400,000l.) to be paid either in ſpecie or in military ſtores, without forgetting to ſtipulate the gift of twenty valuable paintings.

On the 20th of May Buonaparte addreſſed a proclamation to his army, in which, after having extolled its late exploits, he announced thoſe which he ſtill expected from it. He called for its vengeance againſt the Neapolitans, the deſtroyers of Toulon, and on the inhabitants of Rome, the aſſaſſins of Baſſeville. [*Note* 4.] He made it fear to find a Capua in Lombardy; and in imitation of Annibal,

to

to whom Italian flattery did not ceaſe to compare him, he promiſed to his ſoldiers the conqueſt of Rome, and the ſpoils of Italy.

Anxious to ſee this laſt promiſe realized, ſcarcely had his troops entered Lombardy, than they gave themſelves up to pillage, violence, and every ſpecies of diſorder. Their rapacity, their contempt of religious ceremonies, and above all their licentious conduct towards the women, exaſperated the inhabitants to the higheſt pitch. They could not ſupport ſuch accumulated outrages, and they revenged themſelves like Italians. On the 22d of May a general inſurrection broke out againſt the French. The towns and villages armed themſelves at the ſound of the tocſin. The national cockade was trampled under foot; the trees of liberty were cut down, and all the Republicans found in ſmall parties were maſſacred. It was at Milan, Lodi, Vareze, and Pavia, that the greateſt fury was ſhewn, and that the fiery and vindictive character of the Italians diſplayed itſelf in all its violence. The inhabitants of Pavia, aſſiſted by 5 or 6,000 peaſants, ſurrounded the French garriſon, diſarmed, and took it priſoner. The people of Milan were not ſo fortunate in a ſimilar attempt. The French, more

numerous

numerous than at Pavia, diſperſed the inſurgents, after having killed a vaſt number of them. Buonaparte had already begun his march againſt the Auſtrians, when he heard of this unexpected inſurrection. He returned immediately, and ordered troops to march againſt thoſe places where the inſurgents chiefly aſſembled. He cauſed the village of Binaſco to be burnt, put a hundred of its inhabitants to the ſword, and marched himſelf with a powerful corps againſt the town of Pavia. [*Note* 5.] He found the gates of it ſhut; and having in vain ſummoned the inhabitants to open them, he cauſed them to be beaten down with cannon. The French then ſpread themſelves through the ſtreets, killed every one they met, delivered the garriſon which was priſoner, and pillaged the town. Theſe rigorous puniſhments ſoon quelled the inſurrection. The Commiſſaries and Generals of the French arreſted in all the towns the moſt conſiderable perſons, cauſed a great number of them to be ſhot, diſarmed the inhabitants of Lombardy, and treated it more and more as a conquered country.

After the battle of Lodi, General Beaulieu, too weak to diſpute any longer the poſſeſſion of the Milaneſe, and to ſupport the inſurrection of its

inhabitants, thought of nothing more but of covering Mantua, and of keeping up his communication with Germany. For this purpoſe he took a good poſition on the Mincio, his right extending to the lake of Garda, and his left to Mantua.

Buonaparte made different movements with his troops to induce Mr. de Beaulieu to believe, that he wiſhed to go round the lake of Garda by Salo and Riva, in order to make himſelf maſter of the road to Tyrol. But whilſt he was making theſe feints, he attacked the Auſtrian poſts on the Mincio, on the 30th of May, and effected the paſſage of that river near Borghetto. In the mean time, one column of his army directed its march towards Peſchiera and Caſtelnuovo, with the intention of cutting off Mr. de Beaulieu from the road to Verona and Trente. As the latter movement might have deprived this General of every future means of retreat, he was no longer at liberty to defer it. He was compelled to give up all communication with Mantua, and to leave that place to rely on itſelf. Happily he had had time to ſupply it with proviſions, and to render it capable of making a good defence. He garriſoned the town with 12,000 men, and marched towards the Adige with the remainder

remainder of his army. He paſſed that river, routed a corps of the enemy which was purſuing him, traverſed the ſtates of Venice, and retired into the narrow paſſes of the Tyrol. There he took poſt with about 14,000 men, which was all that remained of his army.

The conduct of Mr. de Beaulieu, after the French had paſſed the Po, deſerves praiſe. Conſtantly attacked and purſued by a victorious army, double in numbers to his own, he ſuſtained ſeveral battles with credit, if not with ſucceſs, and effected his retreat with order and with but little loſs. He rendered Mantua in a ſhort time, capable of making a long defence, and by thoſe means he preſerved a poſſibility to the Auſtrians of returning with advantage into Italy, of which Mantua, in a military point of view, is the capital. In ſpite of all the manœuvres made on his right and left by the French with a view to ſurround, and cut him off from the road to Germany, Mr. de Beaulieu gained the defiles of the Tyrol with his little army, and made excellent diſpoſitions for defence.

The retreat of the Auſtrians into the Trentin, having left Buonaparte maſter of his movements in Italy, he took advantage of it to ſpread his troops

in it, and to raiſe contributions. Knowing that much time would elapſe before the Imperialiſts could aſſemble a new army, he wiſhed in this interval to take advantage of his victories, and to find the means of making freſh conqueſts in thoſe countries which he had already ſubdued. He was deſirous above all to detach the King of Naples from the coalition, and even the Pope, whoſe ſtates were, by the retreat of the Auſtrians, at the mercy of the French. His wiſhes were quickly ſatisfied, and even anticipated. The King of Naples propoſed a ſuſpenſion of arms, to which Buonaparte the more readily agreed, as the diſtance of that Prince's ſtates protected them from the menaces of the French, at leaſt by land, and becauſe by drawing off his troops from the Auſtrian army, the latter would become ſtill weaker. The King of Naples might injure the French, but had nothing to fear from them. The conditions of the armiſtice, therefore, which was concluded on the 4th of June were not grievous to that Prince. They were reduced to a ſtipulation, that his troops ſhould ſeparate from thoſe of the Emperor, which happened ſoon after.

The

The Pope was, with reſpect to the French, in a much more unfavourable poſition, both as to the ſituation of his dominions, his means of reſiſtance, and in every other reſpect. Buonaparte entered the dominions of his Holineſs on the 19th of June, and took poſſeſſion of the towns of Bologna and Ferrara, as well as of fort Urbino. He threatened to make farther advances into the territories of the church, and there was nothing that could prevent him from doing ſo. The Pope, who had not a doubt of the extreme rigour with which the French would exerciſe the rights of conqueſt upon his dominions, and knew how much they deſired to annihilate both his ſpiritual and temporal power, haſtened to avert the impending ſtorm, by offering to conſent to any conditions which might be impoſed upon him. Whatever might have been the inclination of Buonaparte to invade the territories of the church, and whatever was the facility with which he might have done ſo: yet he felt that it would be dangerous to engage himſelf farther on, whilſt he left behind him Mantua, the Caſtle of Milan, and Lombardy, the inhabitants of which might revolt again in his abſence. He eſteemed it therefore more prudent, as well as more convenient to enjoy without

without danger all the ſacrifices, by which the Pope offered to purchaſe his neutrality. This was granted him, on condition that he ſhould pay to France 21,000,000 of French livres (£900,000) and that he ſhould deliver up to the commiſſaries of the Republic 100 paintings, as well as 200 precious manuſcripts; that the French troops ſhould remain in poſſeſſion of the towns of Ferrara and Bologna, [*Note* 6.] and of fort Urbino; that the Citadel of Ancona [*Note* 7.] ſhould be delivered up to them, and that the Pope ſhould recall or ſet at liberty thoſe of his ſubjects, who had been proſcribed or impriſoned, as guilty of ſedition, and revolutionary practices. [*Note*. 8.]

The French found in the towns of Bologna, Ferrara, Modena, and Urbino 200 pieces of heavy artillery, and all the military ſtores of which they were in want, to enable them to beſiege Mantua. Several artiſts were ſent from Paris, who choſe in the abovementioned towns, and in thoſe of Milan, Pavia, Parma, and Placentia, all the moſt precious monuments of the arts, which were to be found, and ſent them to Paris. Thus did the French plunder Italy, as the Romans had formerly plundered Greece.

The

The inhabitants of the Imperial Fiefs, irritated by the vexations and inſolence of the French ſoldiers, took up arms againſt them, killed ſome, and beſieged thoſe who formed the Garriſon of Arquata. Buonaparte ſent a body of troops againſt theſe inſurgents, cauſed a great number of them to be ſhot; and ſeveral villages to be burnt. He loaded this ſmall country with heavy impoſitions, and ſubjected it to all the rigours of military deſpotiſm.

The Directory wiſhed to take advantage of the moment, when its army was without a rival in Italy, to deſtroy in every reſpect the power of its enemies. Indifferent as to the choice of means, and caring little whether they were juſt, provided they were advantageous, it gave a glaring proof how little dependance was to be placed on the treaties which it contracted. Regardleſs of that which had juſt been concluded with the grand Duke of Tuſcany, and regretting ſincerely that it could no longer treat that Prince as an enemy, the Directory ordered Buonaparte to take poſſeſſion of the town of Leghorn. That General conſequently marched his troops into the territory of the Grand Duke, and with a view to conceal their real deſtination ſpread a report that theſe troops were intended to penetrate

trate into the ſouthern parts of the Eccleſiaſtical States. But they ſuddenly turned to the right, and entered Leghorn on the 27th. of June. [*Note* 9.] They drove the Governor, whom they did not find ſufficiently obedient, out of the place, and ſubſtituted themſelves inſtead of the forces of the Grand Duke. That Prince in vain made repreſentations upon the violation of his territory and neutrality. The powerful arguments of the ſtrongeſt, and that ſupreme law the intereſts of the French Republic were oppoſed to him. It did not however reap all the advantages from that expedition, which its chiefs had promiſed themſelves. The Engliſh had been warned of what was preparing againſt them, and their ſhips had time to leave the port, carrying off the greateſt part of the magazines and effects belonging to the Government, and to the merchants of that country. Greatly diſappointed at ſeeing their intended prey eſcape, the French, to make themſelves amends, impoſed a heavy contribution on every thing in that town, which was ſuſpected to be Engliſh property, and ſummoned the inhabitants under the moſt ſevere penalties to denounce whatever they knew to belong to the Engliſh. By this means they did not fail to draw pretty conſiderable

profit

profit from the taking of Leghorn; and they gained beſides their chief object, which was to ſhut the port of that town againſt the fleets, both military and mercantile of the Engliſh.

About the ſame time the French experienced afreſh the juſt conſequences of the rapine and vexations which they exerciſed upon the conquered countries. The inhabitants of a part of Romagna, driven to deſpair by all which they were condemned to give, and to ſuffer, armed themſelves to the number of ſeveral thouſands, fell upon and maſſacred the French detachments employed in laying waſte their country. Buonaparte who did not chuſe to let this inſurrection go unpuniſhed, ſent an additional number of troops, who killed ſeveral hundreds of the unfortunate Peaſants, and burnt the town of Lugo, as well as ſeveral villages [*Note* 10.] Theſe ſanguinary and barbarous executions, although in part juſtified by the rights of war, raiſed a hatred and a deſire of vengeance in all thoſe parts of Italy occupied by the French to the higheſt pitch. A great number of them fell victims in conſequence, and the Italian ſtiletto ſeconded by the climate, and the intemperance of the French concurred as powerfully as the Auſtrian ſword,

to the great conſumption of men in the French army in Italy.

Whilſt Buonaparte was thus exerciſing his empire in that country, poſſeſſing himſelf of its ſpoils, and rendering himſelf an object of fear and hatred, his troops were carrying on the ſieges of Mantua, and of the caſtle of Milan. The latter place ſurrendered on the 29th of June, twelve days after the trenches were opened. The garriſon commanded by General Lami, were made priſoners of war. I have not entered into any details of this ſiege, becauſe it exhibited nothing remarkable, brought on no conſiderable action, and was attended with little blood ſhed on either ſide. [*Note* 11.]

Buonaparte being in want of the artillery neceſſary for carrying on a ſiege, and of the requiſite ſtores, had been compelled to content himſelf after the retreat of Mr. de Beaulieu into the Tyrol, with inveſting the town of Mantua; and he even had not been able to form the blockade but at a great diſtance on account of the peculiar ſituation of the place.

Mantua has ſo much occupied the attention of Europe, has been the aim of ſo many efforts, has

has cauſed ſuch an effuſion of blood, and has ſo long held in ſuſpence the fate of Italy, that thoſe readers who are not well acquainted with the topographical and military ſituation of that town, may not be diſpleaſed to find here a deſcription of it.

This town which boaſts of having been founded by the Etrurians before the Trojan war, is ſituated upon a lake formed by the Mincio, twenty Italian miles in circumference, and two miles broad. It is large, well built, and contains a great number of churches, of which ſome are very richly decorated. At the time when it ſtill belonged to the Dukes of Mantua [*Note* 12.] who reſided there, it reckoned upwards of 50,000 inhabitants; it does not now poſſeſs half that number. It has always been fortified, and its ſituation has made it conſidered in all Italian wars as the moſt important fortreſs in that country. It has ſuſtained ſeveral ſieges, and whenever it has ſurrendered, it has been more in conſequence of a blockade and want of proviſions than of open force, or the regular operations of art. Its chief means of defence conſiſts leſs in its fortifications, than in the difficulties oppoſed to the approach

and attacks of an enemy. The town being entirely ſurrounded by water and marſhes, is only to be arrived at by three bridges or principal cauſeways, which are covered by works raiſed at each of their extremities. It communicates by theſe cauſeways with the ſuburbs of St. George, St. Anthony, and la Favorite, which being capable of defence, muſt be carried by an enemy before he can approach the town. If once the beſiegers make themſelves maſters of theſe ſuburbs, they may eaſily form and maintain the blockade of Mantua, but they are ſcarcely more advanced towards the formation of a regular ſiege, as they can only open the trenches upon the narrow front of the cauſeways which lead into the town. The waters of the lake ſtagnating in ſummer, the place then becomes very unwholeſome, and thoſe of the inhabitants who are in eaſy circumſtances generally leave it at that time. This unwholeſomeneſs is not the leaſt of its means of defence: for it is impoſſible to beſiege it without riſking the total deſtruction of an army by ſickneſs. In almoſt every ſiege this place has ſuſtained, peſtilential fevers have made great ravages, both amongſt the aſſailants and defenders of it.

Theſe

Theſe conſiderations did not deter General Buonaparte, who had been taught by paſt ſucceſſes to be confident of future ones. After having carried ſome out poſts of the town, he opened the trenches before it on the 18th of July. But the difficulties attending the ſiege, the fevers which broke out in his army, and the ſucceſsful ſorties of the garriſon, rendered the progreſs of the French extremely ſlow, and enabled the Count de Canto d'Irles, who commanded in the town, to defend it until relieved.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

A new army aſſembled by the Auſtrians in Italy under the command of Field Marſhal Wurmſer—Operations and firſt ſucceſſes of that General—The ſiege of Mantua raiſed by Buonaparte—Complete defeat of the corps of General Quoſdanovich—Defeat of Mr. de Wurmſer at Caſtiglione—Second defeat—Repaſſing of the Mincio and the Adige, and reentrance of the defiles of Tyrol—New inſurrection againſt the French—Plan formed by the French to unite all their armies in Germany—Battle of Roveredo—Action at Baſſano—Arrival of Marſhal Wurmſer at Mantua—Peace made by the King of Naples with the French Republic—Refuſal by the Pope of the conditions of peace preſcribed by them—Revolt of the inhabitants of the Dutchies of Modena, Bologne, and Ferrara—Origin of the Ciſpadan Republic.

THE defection of the King of Sardinia, and the loſs of the Milaneſe, which reſulted from it, made known to the Court of Vienna when too late the

the inſufficiency of the troops which it had ſent into Italy. As it could not poſſibly acquieſce in leaving ſo valuable a part of its dominions as Lombardy in the hands of the French, it reſolved to make the greateſt efforts for the recovery of that country. All the troops ſtationed in Carinthia and Styria were ſent by forced marches into the Tyrol. The inhabitants of the latter country having ſhewn a diſpoſition to arm themſelves for the defence of it, ſome thouſands of them were equiped and formed into corps of chaſſeurs, a ſort of ſervice to which the Tyrolians are extremely well adapted. As all theſe different reinforcements would not however have made Mr. de Beaulieu's army ſufficiently ſtrong to enable him to renew offenſive operations, the Cabinet of Vienna, attending to the moſt preſſing concern, ſacrificed its plan of a campaign beyond the Rhine, to its perſonal and immediate intereſt in Italy. Field Marſhal Wurmſer, who commanded the Imperial army of the Upper Rhine, received an order to ſet off with more than 30,000 effective men for Italy, and there to replace General Beaulieu. The months of June and July paſſed away before theſe different corps of troops could form a junction, or be ſufficiently recovered from the fatigues of ſo

long

long a march, and put in a ſtate to act. Ten thouſand men out of the 30,000 who had come from the army of the Rhine, were left in the Biſhopric of Inſpruck to obſerve a French corps, which menaced it; and on the 29th of July Marſhal Wurmſer began his march againſt the French, at the head of an army of 47,000 men. He divided it into three principal bodies. That of the right, conſiſting of 17 battalions and 14 ſquadrons, directed its march along the lake of Garda to Salo and Breſcia: that of the left cemmanded by General Mezaros, conſiſting of 5 battalions and 7 ſquadrons, marched by Legnago towards the Po; whilſt Marſhal Wurmſer with 29 battalions, and 14 ſquadrons, commanded by Generals Melas and Davidovich, advanced to the Mincio with the center, to attack in front the enemy's army between Mantua and Peſchiera.

This diſpoſition met at firſt with the greateſt ſucceſs. The column on the right under the orders of General Quoſdanovich, being divided into ſeveral ſmall columns, ſurpriſed and forced the important poſts of Salo and Breſcia, where it made priſoners 2,000 men, three Generals as well as a great number of officers. The next morning this corps advanced on the roads from Breſcia to Mantua,

and

and Verona to take the French on their rear, and to favour the attack made by the center column.

This latter had not been leſs ſucceſsful in what it had undertaken. On the 29th and 30th it forced all the enemy's poſts along the Adige, took 1,500 men as well as 10 pieces of cannon, and drove back the French as far as the Mincio.

Buonaparte being victoriouſly attacked at all points, and threatened with being ſurrounded by the Auſtrian columns, in the night of the 31ſt, precipitately raiſed the ſiege of Mantua, which was ſo far advanced that the approaches were within 100 paces of the covered way. The garriſon attentive to all the movements of the beſiegers made a vigorous ſortie whilſt they were retiring; fell upon their rear guard, took 600 men, and made themſelves maſters of all their artillery, and all the ammunition of the ſiege, conſiſting of 134 cannons and mortars, and 140,000 ſhells or balls. It employed itſelf immediately in deſtroying the works, which had been raiſed either for the purpoſe of the ſiege, or for thoſe of the blockade.—Placed between the two columns of Generals Wurmſer and Quoſdanovich, Buonaparte ſaw the whole danger of his ſituation, and was ſenſible that if he gave theſe two Generals time to

form a junction, and to combine their attacks, it would be almoſt impoſſible for him to make head againſt both of them at once. He then took the only courſe which could ſave his army, and preſerve the Milaneſe. He judged that by concentrating his forces, and advancing rapidly againſt the corps of Mr. de Quoſdanovich, he might defeat him before he could be ſuccoured by Mr. de Wurmſer.

In conſequence of this plan Buonaparte marched on the 30th at night with the greateſt part of his forces again Mr. de Quoſdanovich, whoſe corps was divided, and ſtationed at ſeveral different points, by which he was endeavouring to rejoin Mr. de Wurmſer. Buonaparte cauſed all theſe detachments to be attacked ſucceſſively at Lonado, Montechiaro, Dezenzano, Breſcia and Salo, on the 31ſt of July, the 1ſt, 2d, and 3d of Auguſt. Some of theſe actions were to the advantage of the Auſtrians, but the greater number to that of the French. The moſt obſtinate and moſt bloody of all was that which took place on the 3d before Dezenzano. 4,000 Auſtrians being attacked by 10,000 French, defeated them, and made priſoner a General, and ſome hundreds of men. But the French corps having rallied and having been reinforced by freſh troops,

troops, re-attacked the Auſtrians. The latter made a long and courageous reſiſtance; but being at laſt overpowered by numbers, by heat, and the fatigue occaſioned by a continued march of four days and four nights, were almoſt all killed or made priſoners. The Auſtrian regiment of Klebeck loſt on this occaſion more than 1,000 men, who were deprived of all bodily ſtrength either to defend themſelves, or even to fly. After a ſeries of actions for four days, the different corps of Mr. de Quoſdanovich's columns were entirely defeated, diſperſed, and obliged to make their eſcape as they could into the mountains of the Tyrol. Near one half was killed, or fell into the hands of the French; who purchaſed however theſe advantages by the loſs of a great number of men, and of ſeveral Generals.

Delivered from one part of his enemies, and having no longer any thing to fear for his rear, immediately after the firſt ſucceſſes obtained againſt Mr. de Quoſdanovich, Buonaparte, leaving only a ſmall body of troops completely to drive this General back into the Tyrol, haſtened his return with about 28,000 men to go againſt Marſhal Wurmſer. The latter, after having paſſed the Mincio, was advancing with 18,000 men, to en-

deavour to effect a junction with Mr. de Quoſdanovich. On the 3d of Auguſt Buonaparte met near Caſtiglione the advanced guard of Mr. de Wurmſer, which had gained a ſlight advantage on that day, and had taken 2 or 300 men, and ſome pieces of cannon. He inſtantly attacked with his whole force this advanced guard, compoſed of 3,000 men, commanded by General Lyptay. This brave General oppoſed the firmeſt reſiſtance, diſputing the ground inch by inch, to give time to Mr. de Wurmſer to come to his aſſiſtance. The latter however not arriving, and the French aſſailing General Lyptay on all ſides, he found it impoſſible to hold out any longer, and came forward with his officers to ſurrender themſelves to the French. But at this moment, the latter perceiving at a diſtance the Auſtrian cavalry coming up on a gallop, retreated precipitately to take a freſh poſition againſt the new troops who were coming to attack them, and fell back before General Lyptay, who was advancing towards them to lay down his arms. The main body of Mr. de Wurmſer's army arrived in the interval; but before it could form in order of battle, Buonaparte attacked it with impetuoſity. The Auſtrians did not give way; but fatigued by a long march

made

made during extreme heat, not being formed, and engaging in an unconnected manner, and without any determinate object, againſt an enemy which had the advantage of ground, and whoſe diſpoſitions were before made, all that they could do was to maintain themſelves in the diſadvantageous poſition which they occupied. They had been even on the point of being driven from it, but having fortunately planted 12 pieces of cannon on an eminence which ſupported their left, their fire ſtopped the French, and prevented them from penetrating into the plain which ſeparated the right and the left of the Auſtrians. Buonaparte wrote word that they loſt on this day 20 pieces of cannon and 7,000 men, of whom 4,000 were made priſoners. I can affirm that their whole loſs did not exceed 2,600, and that of the French was at leaſt as great.

The two armies paſſed the night within muſquet ſhot of each other. They were ſo overcome with fatigue, that they made no movement whatever. That which could have had the greateſt phyſical ſtrength to attack the other, would have been ſure of deſtroying it. They paſſed the 4th without coming to blows. The French employed it in putting them-

themſelves in order, and poſting themſelves advantageouſly. The Auſtrians on the other hand made no new diſpoſition, and remained in the bad ſituation in which they had engaged the day before. They contented themſelves with forming the plan of a general attack for the 7th. But Buonaparte did not wait for it, and haſtened to take advantage of the ſuperiority of his force, and the faults of his enemies. On the 5th in the morning he attacked with vigour the whole line of the Auſtrians, whoſe left he had turned, and whoſe rear was threatened by General Serrurier, who was coming from the Po with one diviſion. The Auſtrians fought with their uſual valour, but every advantage was ſo entirely on the ſide of the French, that victory could not eſcape them. If they had ſucceeded in piercing into the plain, all had been over with the Auſtrian army. All the officers who were about Mr. de Wurmſer preſſed him for a long time in vain to give orders for a retreat, which was become indiſpenſable. This brave, but too old commander, could not bring himſelf to decide on it. The Engliſh Colonel Graham had at length the good fortune to determine him to it, and thus to ſave the Auſtrian army from total deſtruction. But the

French

French had already gained ſo many advantages, and the ground was ſo favourable for them, that the retreat could not be made without great diſorder and loſs. It coſt them near 3,000 men in killed wounded and priſoners, 30 pieces of cannon, and a great number of ammunition waggons. The Auſtrians repaſſed the Mincio on the ſame day at Valeggio, and encamped near that town. On the next and the following days they continued their retreat, during which they had to ſuſtain many actions, which coſt them ſome hundreds of men more, as well as ſome pieces of cannon. They did not ſtop till they reached the entrance into the Tyrol, to which Mr. de Wurmſer brought back not much more than half of his army. However, notwithſtanding the diſaſters which this General experienced, he attained his principal object, which was to relieve Mantua. During the five or ſix days that he was in full communication with this city, he had thrown into it conſiderable ſupplies of proviſions and ammunition, recruited the garriſon, and again enabled this place to reſiſt a long blockade.

Thus terminated this expedition, the preparations for, and firſt events of which, ſeemed to promiſe to the Auſtrians the recovery of the Milaneſe. The firſt

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diſpoſitions made by Marſhal Wurmſer were excellent and perfectly executed. The reverſes which followed may be aſcribed principally to two cauſes: 1ſt. To the uſeleſs diverſion which Mr. de Wurmſer cauſed General Mezaros to make, whoſe corps never fired a ſhot. 2d. To his imprudence in advancing with too ſmall a force beyond the Mincio, though he had every reaſon to believe that Mr. de Quoſdanovich had been defeated. If the Marſhal, ſatisfied with having in great part accompliſhed his object by the deliverance of Mantua, had, reſting his left againſt this place, continued behind the Mincio, he might have defended the paſſage of this river, have received all the re-inforcements which he expected, collected the remains of Quoſdanovich's corps, and in a ſhort time have formed a powerful army, and ſuperior in number to that of the French. Then he might have paſſed the Mincio in force, and have advanced beyond that river with advantage, and a probability of ſucceſs.

Buonaparte, with no leſs expedition than judgement, took advantage of the faults and of the ſeparation of the Generals Wurmſer and Quoſdanovich, gained two marches on the former, and fell unexpectedly

expectedly on the corps of the latter, which being too much extended, was eaſily defeated and diſſipated. The French General executed on this occaſion the ſame manœuvre, to which he had before owed, and has owed ſince, ſo much ſucceſs. He was alſo particularly aſſiſted by the preſervation of the fort of Peſchiera, which defends the point of the Lake of Garda, at the ſpot from whence the Mincio iſſues, a fort which the Auſtrians could not get poſſeſſion of, and which a good deal embarraſſed their movements. The accounts from Buonaparte made the loſs of the Auſtrians amount, in this ſhort but memorable expedition, to 70 pieces of cannon, a ſtill greater number of ammunition waggons, 6,000 men killed or wounded, and 15,000 made priſoners. This ſtatement was exagerated, but not ſo much as many others that have been tranſmitted by this General. I have before me a particular account, furniſhed by each regiment to General Wurmſer, and ſent by him to the aulic council of war. The reſult is, that the Auſtrians loſt in theſe eight days of victories and diſaſters, 17,000 men, of whom 391 were officers. The loſs of the French however was not a great deal leſs; it certainly amounted to 10,000 men, of whom 4,000 were made priſoners.

Their army ſuffered alſo cruelly from the heat and the forced marches which it made, and was in little leſs diſorder than that of their enemies.

Buonaparte was in the courſe of this expedition twice in danger of being taken. The officer who commanded the Auſtrian flotilla on the Lake of Garda, having on the 31ſt of July defeated that of the French, diſembarked his troops in the Peninſula of Cermione, and placed them in ambuſcade on the road from Breſcia to Peſchiera. His ſoldiers had orders not to fire, and to ſtop none but ſuch as might ſeem to be of conſequence. In the evening the Generals Buonaparte and Berthier with their ſtaff returning from Breſcia, paſſed along that road, preceded by three Huſſars. The Croats who were in ambuſcade, hearing ſome cavalry arrive at a quick rate, ſprung on the high road and fired on the three Huſſars. Two of them they killed, but the third having been miſſed, he turned his horſe and galloped off crying out, *General, ſave yourſelf:* and the whole party turned about, fled with precipitation, and had the good fortune to eſcape all the ſhots that were fired at them. They returned to Breſcia and took another road, which obliged them to make a tour of ſeveral leagues.

leagues. On another occaſion Buonaparte was within two minutes of being taken by the Auſtrian Huſſars, at Goito. I dont think it neceſſary to enter into any detail to prove the falſeneſs of the marvellous account ſent at this time by the French General to the Directory. He wrote word, that being at Lonado with 1,200 men, at the moment when 4,000 Auſtrians were ſurrounding this town, he ſent them an order to lay down their arms, which they inſtantly obeyed. The improbability of this event makes it unneceſſary to enter into any diſcuſſion about it. It was never heard of in the Auſtrian army.

The remainder of the month of Auguſt paſſed away without any event of importance. It was ſpent by the reſpective armies in recovering from their fatigues and their loſſes. Marſhal Wurmſer was entirely occupied in recruiting the great diminution ſuſtained by his army, which by the end of Auguſt amounted to nearly 50,000 men. Buonaparte alſo received new re-inforcements from the army of Kellerman. He re-conſtructed the works neceſſary for the blockade of Mantua,

and employed himſelf in providing the means to ſecure the accompliſhment of new deſigns.

Emboldened by the continual triumphs of their armies, and determined by the neceſſity of maintaining them at the expence of Europe, the Chiefs of the French Republic conceived at once the project and the hope to unite on the banks of the Danube the three armies of Moreau, Jourdan, and Buonaparte, to invade the dominions of the Houſe of Auſtria, to annihilate its ſupremacy over Germany, and to diſpoſe of the deſtiny and riches of that vaſt country. To realize this project as raſh as it was gigantic, it was neceſſary that Buonaparte ſhould deſtroy the remainder of Wurmſer's army, ſhould force the paſſes of the Tyrol, and march into Bavaria to form a junction with Moreau. More confident, more able, and above all more fortunate than any of the Republican Generals, he haſtened to concur in the execution of this plan. [*Note* 13.]

On the 4th of September he attacked the whole line of the Auſtrians, and was fortunate enough to force it, after a reſiſtance which was pretty vigorous at ſome points, but weak at others.

others. He wrote word that he had taken on this occaſion, 25 pieces of cannon, 50 ammunition waggons, 7 pair of colours, and 6,500 men. He made himſelf maſter of the city of Trent, and of a great part of the Dutchy of that name.

At the ſame time that Buonaparte was intent on penetrating into Germany, Marſhal Wurmſer being made acquainted with his deſign, had formed that of diſconcerting it by a diverſion and a new attempt for the delivery of Mantua. He had calculated that by advancing with a part of his army along the Brenta, and turning the right flank of the French, the latter would not dare to advance into Tyrol from the fear of ſeeing themſelves ſeparated from the troops, who were beſieging Mantua. Mr. de Wurmſer had flattered himſelf that by this manœuvre he ſhould perhaps accompliſh the raiſing the blockade of that place, and that at leaſt he ſhould retain Buonaparte in Italy.

It happened that theſe two Generals commenced their operations on the ſame day, and the departure of Mr. de Wurmſer facilitated greatly the gaining the battle of Roveredo by

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Buonaparte. The latter learnt with aſtoniſhment the march of the Field Marſhal; and as that General had imagined, Buonaparte in ſpite of his laſt advantages, was obliged to ſuſpend his march in Tyrol to follow Mr. de Wurmſer. He came up with his rear guard on the 7th of September at Primolano on the Brenta, defeated it, and took (as he wrote word) 10 pieces of cannon, and 4,000 men. He continued his purſuit the next day, and arrived at Baſſano the moment when Marſhal Wurmſer quitted it. The latter purſued his march with rapidity, evaded three diviſions of the enemy who attempted to ſurround him; defeated one of them at Cerea on the 11th, took 800 priſoners, and arrived at length under the walls of Mantua with about 10,000 men. The French attacked him on the 13th; but he again defeated them, killed a great number of men, and took 1,500 priſoners, with 10 pieces of cannon.

The junction of Mr. de Wurmſer with the garriſon of Mantua augmented its means of reſiſtance in caſe of a ſiege, but diminiſhed in the ſame proportion thoſe which it could oppoſe to a blockade, ſince the number of mouths to feed was conſiderably increaſed. Accordingly, Mr. de Wurmſer thought

leſs

leſs of attacking the enemy than of procuring the greateſt poſſible quantity of proviſions and forage. With this view he made during the month of October ſeveral excurſions in the environs of Mantua. This occaſioned ſeveral engagements with various ſucceſs, of which the only effect was to ſtraiten the Auſtrians more or leſs in their poſition without the works of the place; they were of no importance in any other light.

The unexpected operation executed by Mr. de Wurmſer, and the diſaſters which the French at the ſame time experienced in Germany, obliged Buonaparte to renounce the deſign of penetrating thither. He then led back the greater part of his army round Mantua, after leaving two corps, one in the Trentino, and the other in Frioul, to obſerve, and keep in check the Auſtrians in theſe two countries.

The month of October furniſhed no great military events, but it preſented political occurrences of great conſequence to the ſtate of Italy, and to the further progreſs of the war in that country. Of two armiſtices concluded in the month of June preceding between the French Republic on one ſide, and the Pope and the King of Naples on the other,

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the former was broken, and the ſecond was changed into a treaty of peace. However it made no alteration in the relative ſituation of the Republic and the King of Naples, and was properly ſpeaking only a continuation of the armiſtice. The King of Naples had been induced to conclude it by the ſolicitation of the Court of Spain, and by the fear that if the Engliſh left the Mediterranean, the city of Naples would be expoſed to the inſults of the French fleet. The treaty of peace ſecured him from this; and this was the only advantage which the King of the two Sicilies reaped from that treaty. To the French it was more profitable. They detached from the coalition the moſt powerful Prince in Italy next to the Emperor, and had no longer reaſon to apprehend that the King of Naples, who had for three months been organizing a numerous army, would ſend a large body of troops acroſs the Pope's dominions to make a poweful diverſion in favour of the Auſtrians, in the Dutchies of Ferrara and Modena. [*Note* 14.]

The Pope had taken advantage of the armiſtice which he had concluded with the French to commence negociations for peace. To effect this he made many advances to the French Government; but the latter was little diſpoſed to make peace with a Prince

a prince, from whom it had nothing to fear, and of whom it had reſolved to make a prey. Unwilling however to incur the odium of peremptorily refuſing the propoſitions for peace made by the Pope, the Directory choſe rather to elude them, and cauſed propoſals for peace to be preſented to him, at once ſo burdenſome and ſo humiliating, that notwithſtanding the invaſion of his dominions, the dangers he incurred, and the weakneſs of his means of defence, he could not reſolve to accept them. One is at a loſs which moſt to wonder at, the deſpotiſm, the ignorance, or the folly, which dictated the thirty-three articles propoſed by the French to a prince, who had never declared war againſt them; articles on which he was left no option but that of abſolute aſſent or refuſal. Never did any conqueror reduce his enemies to ſuch extremities. It appears however that his Holineſs, was only determined to a refuſal, by thoſe articles which concerned his eccleſiaſtical juriſdiction; the acceptance of which would have deſtroyed the doctrine of his infallibility, and the baſis of his Spiritual Empire.

The French about the ſame time began to realize their project, which had been long known, of forming republics in Italy.

They had delayed the execution of this plan, merely to gain ſufficient time to reap the fruits of their victories. They had begun by levying exorbitant contributions in the conquered countries, and by completing the ſupply of neceſſaries requiſite for the maintenance of their army. When they had exhauſted all the countries occupied by their troops, and had drawn from them, partly by contributions, partly by the ſale of armiſtices, every thing which they were capable of furniſhing, they proceeded to mature thoſe ſeeds of inſurrection and democracy which they had ſown in Italy. They excited the people to abjure the laws of their country, and to adopt the revolutionary forms of Government. They took care at firſt not to call to independance the inhabitants of Lombardy, over whom they ſtill wiſhed to preſerve the moſt abſolute authority. They began by cauſing a revolt amongſt the ſubjects of the Duke of Modena, whom they did not find ſufficiently dependant on themſelves, notwithſtanding the rigour of the armiſtice which they had granted him. The inhabitants of the town of Reggio were the firſt to ſet an example of inſurrection; this was quickly imitated by ſeveral towns throughout the Dutchy of Modena. The troops of the Duke were driven out, his agents

were

were deprived of their offices, and his government was replaced by a democratic adminiſtration. Its chiefs haſtened to ſolicit the ſupport of the protectors of the liberties of the people, which was immediately granted them; and notwithſtanding the neutrality agreed upon with the Duke, that Prince was declared in a ſhort time after to have loſt the confidence of the French Republic.

The example ſet by the inhabitants of the Dutchy of Modena, and the certainty of being protected by the French, encouraged the towns of Bologna and Ferrara to overturn their governments, and to put themſelves in a ſtate of revolution. No time was loſt by the French in rendering the revolt general, and in drawing from it all the advantages which they had promiſed themſelves. They convinced the inſurgents of the neceſſity of taking up arms if they wiſhed to preſerve their liberty, and pointed out to them how much it was their intereſt to defend thoſe who had enſured it to them. Thus they armed ſeveral thouſands of the inhabitants of the revolted countries, trained them to the military profeſſion, and joined them to their troops. The aim of the French was partly to compenſate by this reinforcement, for the exceſſive diminution which their

army had ſuſtained in battle and through ſickneſs; and to acquire an augmentation of forces to reſiſt the new attack prepared by the Auſtrians. The French calculated that the fear of again falling into the power of their ſovereign, would urge theſe auxiliaries to make the greateſt efforts; who though not yet inured to war, had the great advantage of being proof againſt the climate. The example of the French National Guards, who were become good troops in a ſhort time, led them to ſuppoſe, that the habits of a camp, and a few engagements would have the ſame effect upon thoſe of Italy, and would render them capable of defending in future their own independence.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

The Auſtrians aſſemble a fourth army in the Frioul and Tyrol, under the orders of Lieutenant Generals Alvinzy and Davidovich—Poſition and ſtrength of the French army—March of Mr. d'Alvinzy—Battle of Fonteniva—Succeſs of Mr. Davidovich on the Upper Adige—Battle of Arcole, and retreat of Mr. d'Alvinzy—New ſucceſſes of Mr. Davidovich—He is compelled to retire to Alla—Cauſes of the misfortunes of the Auſtrians—Faults committed by Generals Davidovich and Alvinzy—Able conduct of Buonaparte.

WHILST the French were thus ſpreading confuſion throughout the northern parts of Italy, and were raiſing up new enemies againſt the Auſtrians, the latter were collecting the means of making a third attempt to reſcue Mantua, and to re-conquer the Milaneſe. All the regiments which had ſuffered in the months of Auguſt and September were reinforced; and 25,000 freſh troops were ſent into the Frioul

Frioul and the Tyrol. Theſe different corps found themſelves capable of acting by the end of October, and began to be in motion on the 31ſt of the ſame month, under the orders of Lieutenant General Alvinzy. This General ſet out from Frioul with 30,000 men, traverſed the Treviſano, and directed his courſe towards the town of Baſſano, ſituated upon the river Brenta; at the ſame time that another corps of about 20,000 men, commanded by Lieutenant General Davidovich, left the environs of Botzen, marched along the Adige, and bore upon the town of Trent. The French army was then diſtributed in the following manner: 15,000 men occupied the banks of the Brenta, 10,000 defended the approach to the town of Trent; 25,000 formed or covered the blockade of Mantua, where Marſhal Wurmſer was ſhut up with more than 20,000 men, and 10,000 others, either French or Italians, were diſtributed as garriſons in the towns of Milan, Bologna, Ferrara, and Leghorn.

In recapitulating the numbers of the reſpective forces, it appears that the Auſtrians had nearly 70,000 men, and that the French had 60,000, of which only 50,000 could be brought into action. [*Note* 15.]

On

On the 3d of November, General Alvinzy arrived on the banks of the Brenta, forced the paſſage of that river, and poſted himſelf with 12,000 men at Baſſano. He placed a like number at Fonteniva, under the orders of Lieutenant General Provera, and the reſt of his army was employed either in covering his left, or in forming his communication with Mr. Davidovich.

In the night of the 5th, Buonaparte left Vicenza, where he had re-united the diviſions of his army which occupied Ferrara, Legnago, Verona, and Montebello, and attacked the corps of General Provera on the morning of the 6th. Both ſides fought with the greateſt animoſity, which rendered the combat for a long time doubtful, and at the ſame time exceſſive bloody. 4,000 Auſtrians and an equal number of French, were either killed or wounded. One of the French Generals, called la Nuſſe, was wounded and made priſoner. The Republicans ſucceeded at length in driving back the Auſtrians beyond the Brenta, and in breaking down the bridge at Fonteniva.

Generals Alvinzy and Provera, had drawn nearer to one another, and were preparing to renew

renew the engagement on the 7th, when they perceived that the French had abandoned the field of battle. Bounaparte had been induced to it, on hearing of the reverſes which his troops had ſuſtained in the Trentino. They had been defeated on the 2d and 3d by General Davidovich, who had taken 1,000 priſoners, and had made himſelf maſter of the town of Trent. That General attacked the French again on the 6th and 7th, routed them after a very ſmart action, killed and wounded 2,000, took 1,000 more priſoners, and purſued the reſt as far as Rivoli and la Corona. [*Note* 16.]

General Alvinzy wiſhing to take advantage of the retreat of the French, and of their defeat in the Trentino, ſet out on the 7th from the banks of the Brenta, continued his march the 8th, and took poſſeſſion of the town of Vicenza, which the French had abandoned. On the 9th and 10th he ſtill gained ground, and diſlodged the enemy from Montebello, who retired between that town and Verona. On the 11th, an action of no conſequence took place with the advanced guards. On the 12th, the two armies found themſelves in preſence with each other,

and

and came to action. The French met with ſome ſucceſs at firſt, but they did not maintain it, and the action terminated in favour of the Auſtrians, who compelled their enemies to fall back into the town of Verona. The Republican General Launay was killed in this affair, and two others were wounded. On the 13th, General Alvinzy made ſome movements, in order to draw nearer to Mr. Davidovich, and to enable himſelf to combine his operations with thoſe of that General. In the night of the 13th Buonaparte filed a large column of troops along the Adige, conſtructed a bridge of boats over that river at Ronco, and marched towards Villanova. His project was to ſurprize the rear of the Auſtrian army, and to carry off their baggage and their train of artillery; but he could not ſucceed in this attempt, having been ſtopped during his march by a corps of the enemy entrenched in the village of Arcole, which is ſurounded with moraſſes and canals. This advantageous poſition was well defended by the Auſtrian troops who occupied it, and maintained by them the whole day, againſt the attacks of almoſt the whole French army. In vain did

 their

their Generals put themſelves at the head of their columns, animate them by their words, and draw them on by their example: in vain did General Buonaparte harangue his ſoldiers, remind them of their victory at Lodi, call for the ſame exertions, and promiſe them the ſame ſucceſs: In vain did he lead them ſeveral times himſelf to the attack of the bridge of Arcole: overpowered by a dreadful fire of grape and muſquet ſhot, they were compelled to give up all hopes of carrying the bridge and village of Arcole by ſtorm. They were great ſufferers in theſe imprudent attacks in which five of their Generals were killed or wounded. Whilſt Buonaparte obſtinately perſiſted in re-acting the affair of the bridge of Lodi, and was ſacrificing without advantage to himſelf the blood of his Generals and ſoldiers; a diviſion of his army which he had detached, had croſſed the Adige much lower down. After having made an extenſive circuit, in order to turn the village of Arcole, it attacked that place on a weak point, and made itſelf maſter of the village in the night, where it took 5 pieces of cannon, and 400 men. General Maſſena at the ſame time obtained a ſlight advantage over a ſmall body of Auſtrians.

General

General Alvinzy having advanced with all his forces upon the points menaced, promoted the views of Buonaparte, who wiſhed to draw him towards the lower Adige, in order to prevent his junction with General Davidovich. The approach of the Auſtrians obliged the French to evacuate the village of Arcole in the night of the 14th. In the morning of the 15th, an action was commenced which laſted the whole day, without having any deciſive or even important reſult. It was however of ſome advantage to the French. On the following day the 16th, the Auſtrians attacked the whole line of the French army. They at firſt compelled the center and right wing of the enemy to give ground, but the French having rallied, and the Auſtrians being unexpectedly taken *in flank* by a corps of troops concealed in a wood, and in *the rear* by another column which had turned their left, they were put to the rout, driven from the village of Arcole, and compelled to retire in diſorder to Bonifacio.

In the account given by Buonaparte to the Directory of theſe three engagements, he ſtated that he had made between 4 and 5,000 priſoners, killed and wounded 8,000 men, and taken 18 pieces of cannon. He concluded his letter with

aſſurances that he ſhould be maſter of Mantua within fifteen days. No doubt this eſtimate of the loſs of the Auſtrians was exagerated; their Generals however acknowledged it to have been very conſiderable on theſe three days, and above all on the laſt. But at the ſame time they aſſerted, that that of the French was not inferior, which it is eaſy to believe when we read even in the very letter of General Buonaparte, that it was in reality *a combat a mort:* that 15 of his Generals were killed or wounded, and that there were none who had not their cloaths pierced with bullets. All accounts agree in repreſenting theſe three actions as the moſt bloody in the whole campaign.

The Day after the battle of Arcole, the Auſtrians retired towards Vicenza. They were feebly purſued by the French, who did not follow their victory, either becauſe it had too much weakened them, or on account of the reverſes which they had ſuſtained on their left. With a view partly to deprive them of the fruits of the victory of Arcole, General Davidovich attacked on the 17th the French Troops left on the upper Adige, under the orders of General Vaubois. He defeated them completely, drove them from the entrenched heights of Rivoli, and ſiezed the important poſt of la Chiuſa.

Chiuſa. He purſued the Republicans as far as the heights of Campara, and took from them 11 pieces of cannon, and 2,000 men, amongſt whom were the Generals La Valette, and Fiorella. Mr. Davidovich on the day following, (the 18th) again attacked the French with equal ſucceſs, and although they had been re-inforced during the night, repulſed them as far as Peſchiera, and advanced to Caſtelnuovo.

Theſe two advantages obtained one after the other by Mr. Davidovich, were ſo much the more important as they placed that General on the rear of Buonaparte's army, as well as on that of the troops who blockaded Mantua. Mr. Davidovich was now within a few leagues of that place, and to enable him to arrive there he had neither any river to paſs, nor any conſiderable defile to force. The Auſtrians had not yet been ſo near raiſing the blockade of Mantua, and they had reaſon to hope that they ſhould accompliſh it.

Alarmed at the ſucceſſes of General Davidovich, and foreſeeing the whole extent of thoſe conſequences which might ariſe from them, Buonaparte had no heſitation in renouncing the advantages which might have been derived from the victory of

Arcole.

Arcole. He marched immediately on his left with two diviſions of his army, joined them to that of General Vaubois, and attacked on the 21ſt General Davidovich on the heights of Campara. The latter finding himſelf very inferior in number, did not attempt to make any great reſiſtance, and retreated towards Rivoli, and from thence towards Dolce, Peri, and Alla. A corps of 4,000 men, commanded by General Augereau, had marched from Verona, with the intention of advancing directly againſt Borghetto and Alla, with a view of cutting off the retreat of Davidovich's corps; but it was ſtopped the whole of the 21ſt, and the night following, by a ſmall corps of 800 men, commanded by Colonel Luſignan, who kept it in check till Mr. Davidovich had arrived at Alla with the whole artillery and baggage. Buonaparte nevertheleſs wrote word that he had taken in this affair 1,500 men, with two trains of pontoons, beſides baggage. The author is enabled from the moſt authentic information to aſſert that he did not take near ſo great a number of men, and to affirm with equal confidence that, which Buonaparte took care not to publiſh, which is, that between the 4th and the

21ſt

21ſt of November the corps of Mr. Davidovich alone took 22 pieces of cannon, and more than 4,000 men, and that he did not loſe in the ſame ſpace of time more than 1,800 men, and 3 pieces of cannon.

In looking for the cauſes which produced the failure of this expedition, we perceive that we muſt again attribute the diſaſters of the Auſtrians to the diviſion of their forces, and to the too great extent of their front of attack. It is probable that if after the battle of Baſſano Mr. d'Alvinzy had drawn nearer to Mr. Davidovich, theſe two Generals united, and ſuperior in numbers to the French, would have been enabled to repulſe them beyond the Adige, and afterwards beyond the Mincio. This fault is after all not the only cauſe of the iſſue of this enterpriſe. The beſt informed officers of the Auſtrian army in Italy attribute it principally to two things. Firſt, to the inaction in which General Davidovich remained from the 9th to the 17th of November; an inaction, which cannot be juſtified, and which permitted Buonaparte to direct almoſt his whole force againſt Mr. d'Alvinzy. Secondly, to the refuſal of the latter General to form a junction by a forced march in the night with Mr. Davidovich

who

who was already on the other ſide of the Adige near Rivoli; a junction, which would without doubt have overthrown the few obſtacles which exiſted from thence to Mantua. The conduct of Generals Davidovich and Alvinzy on this occaſion, which ſeems to have ariſen rather from want of inclination than of capacity, was ſo much the more unſkilful, if it was not culpable, as their firſt ſucceſſes had removed the principal difficulties; and as being ſuperior in force, they no longer wanted any thing but ſome degree of mutual underſtanding, and ſome activity to deliver Mantua, an object for which the Emperor had entruſted them with near 50,000, and employed all his military reſources.

Buonaparte during the fifteen days which this expedition laſted; acted as he had invariably done from the commencement of the campaign. He exerted himſelf conſtantly to prevent the two corps of his enemy from forming a junction; advanced like lightning ſometimes againſt the one, ſometimes againſt the other, always attacking their weakeſt point, and puſhing his ſucceſſes as far, and with as much vivacity as poſſible. In this manner although he had upon the whole fewer men than the Auſtrian Generals, he found himſelf when oppoſed

to

to either of them ſeparately, equal and ſometimes even ſuperior in number. The frequency of his attacks, and the bravery of his troops ſecured the ſucceſs of this manœuvre, and gave him the victory. We muſt likewiſe add that the Auſtrians were, as it appears, as ill informed of Buonaparte's movements, as he was well informed of their's; or that if they were not ignorant of them, they neglected to take advantage of thoſe moments, in which for the purpoſe of advancing in maſs at one ſingle point, he left others unprotected.

CHAP. V.

Poſition of Peri re-taken and again loſt by Mr. Davidovich—Sorties of the garriſon of Mantua—Inaction and poſition of the reſpective armies—Miſſion of General Clarke—Exhauſted ſtate of Lombardy—New burdens impoſed by the French—Diſcontent excited in conſequence—Ciſpadan Convention—Preparations for war made by the Pope—New ſorties of Marſhal Wurmſer—The French take poſſeſſion of the Venetian citadel of Bergamo.

GENERAL Alvinzy having made ſome movements to draw nearer to the city of Verona, the French who had reaſon to apprehend being taken in flank by that General, did not dare to run the riſque of maintaining themſelves in the poſition of Peri. They quitted it on the 22d of November, and on the ſame day Mr. Davidovich took poſſeſſion of it a ſecond time with his advanced guard; he did not however keep it long, and was forced to abandon it three days afterwards, Mr. d'Alvinzy not having

continued to advance, and the French having taken meaſures to ſecure themſelves from that General.

Whilſt Generals Davidovich and Alvinzy yielded to the talents and fortune of Buonaparte, Marſhal Wurmſer made ſeveral ſorties from Mantua to make a diverſion in their favour, as well as to procure ſubſiſtence and forage. He made an attack with almoſt his whole force on the 19th and 23d of Nov. on *St. Antoine*, and *la Favorite*, drove in the enemy's picquets and had the good fortune to introduce into Mantua a conſiderable quantity of proviſions. Theſe enabled him to prolong ſtill further his defence.

The ſucceſſes of Mr. Davidovich between the 4th and 17th of November, having in ſome degree made amends for the diſaſters which Mr. d'Alvinzy had experienced during the ſame interval; and their army being ſtill in ſpite of its loſſes more numerous than that of the French, it was ſuppoſed that theſe Generals would quickly recommence offenſive operations. But whether they propoſed waiting for new reinforcements, whether they knew that the laſt ſorties of Marſhal Wurmſer ſecured for a long time ſtill to come the ſubſiſtence of Mantua, or whether they were reſtrained by ſuperior orders, they under-

took nothing during the month of November. The bad ſeaſon came on, and obliged them to paſs likewiſe the month of December in complete inaction, and in the ſame poſition which they occupied at the end of the preceding month. Their armies formed a ſemi-circle from the Lake of Garda as far as Monceleze beyond the Piavego, occupying Arco, Alla, Baſſano, Vicenza, and Padua. The head quarters of Mr. d'Alvinzy were at Baſſano, and thoſe of Mr. Davidovich at Alla.

The French army was as completely inactive, and remained ſo for as long a time as the Auſtrians and for the ſame reaſons. The line which it occupied extended from the Lake of Garda to Legnago, paſſing through Rivoli, Verona and Montebello. The ſpace compriſed between the Auſtrian and French armies was occupied by their advanced guards.

General Alvinzy after having fixed the poſition, and the cantonments of his army, went at the end of November to Alla to concert meaſures there with Mr. Davidovich, and to make arrangements relative to the future ſubſiſtence and diſpoſition of his army. At the ſame time Buonaparte ſet off for Milan, with a view of meeting in that place

General

General Clarke, whom the executive directory were ſending to Vienna with propoſals of a ſeparate peace. The ſtay which the latter made at Milan, and the reciprocal inactivity in which the two armies remained during this interval occaſioned it to be pretty generally believed that General Clarke had made known the object of his miſſion to Generals Buonaparte and Alvinzy, and had engaged them to ſuſpend proviſionally all hoſtilities till the iſſue of his negociation. The tranquillity which the armies enjoyed was more owing in reality to the rigor of the ſeaſon, the impoſſibility of acting in the mountains of Tyrol, and to the expectation of re-inforcements on both ſides. With reſpect to General Clarke's miſſion, it proved in the ſequel, as ſhort as it was ineffectual, the Court of Vienna having rejected the propoſals, and even refuſed to admit the preſence of that Iriſh negotiator.

Buonaparte was detained at Milan till the middle of December, as well by a ſore in his leg, as by affairs relative to the ſubſiſtence of his army. It was in want of many articles of cloathing and equipment. The adminiſtrators of proviſions likewiſe knew not in what manner to ſupply the

the conſumption of the army. The contributions were found to be diſſipated, and Lombardy was exhauſted by two ſucceſſive requiſitions. The particular extortions of the Generals and the commiſſioners, had completed the ruin of that fertile, and not long before flouriſhing country. The commiſſioners of the executive power Salicetti, and his nephew Buonaparte, had acquired immenſe riches, and had ſet the example of pillage. They had been but too well imitated by the chief of the ſtaff Berthier, and by the other Generals, who had ſhared amongſt them the ſpoils of Italy.

The plunder of that country was the only point on which Buonaparte was in agreement with the Generals under his orders. Theſe laſt incited and headed by Berthier, [*Note* 18.] whoſe talents and advice had not a little contributed to the triumphs of Buonaparte, diſplayed during this interval of military ſtagnation the greateſt diſcontent againſt that General. Their complaints were principally directed againſt the imperious character of that young man, and againſt the indifference with which he had laviſhed during the whole campaign, the blood of his Generals and his ſoldiers. The rumour of theſe diſſentions having reached France, the directory

rectory dreading the conſequences which might reſult from them, took meaſures for ſurpreſſing them. It obliged Buonaparte and Berthier to write two letters, in which they diſavowed all motives of diviſion, which were ſaid to exiſt between them. The injunction of the directors, the ſupreme authority of Buonaparte, and the military events which followed, kept within bounds the ſpirit of jealouſy and hatred, which animated the chiefs of the French army.

Its wants were ſo preſſing, and the French Government was ſo little in a condition to ſupply them of itſelf, that however exhauſted Lombardy might be, Buonaparte was obliged to demand from it new ſacrifices. He convoked at Milan in the beginning of December, a general aſſembly of the nobility and clergy of the Dutchy, and impoſed on the inhabitants a new contribution of 5,000,000 of French livres, and a levy of 25,000 men. Theſe two demands which the preſence of their conquerors prevented the Milaneſe from refuſing preremptorily, excited an univerſal diſcontent, and there was every proſpect that the execution of them would be attended with the greateſt difficulty. Buonaparte did not find more good-will in the in-

inhabitants of Ferrara, Bologna, and Lodi, on which he likewiſe laid proportionate contributions, and the inhabitants of which it was his intention to ſubjeſt to military ſervice. The city of Lodi diſtinguiſhed itſelf a ſecond time by a vigourous oppoſition to the conquerors of the Milaneſe. It was accordingly placed in a ſtate of ſiege, that is to ſay, it was delivered up to the diſcretion of the Republican Generals.

At the ſame time that Buonaparte took theſe rigourous meaſures to maintain and augment his army, he employed himſelf alſo in extending and conſolidating the revolt of the inhabitants of the Dutchies of Modena, Ferrara, and Bologna. He aſſembled in the town of Modena a kind of federal Convention, compoſed of nearly one hundred deputies, charged with the office of conſtituting the Ciſpadan Republic, and above all, of arming the greateſt number of men they could for the purpoſe of re-inforcing the French army. All the inhabitants of the cities and counties of Modena, Reggio, Ferrara, and Bologna, from eighteen to fifty years of age, received orders to arm, under pain, in caſe of diſobedience, of being conſidered as enemies of their country and the

public

good. This confederation adopted the forms as well as the principles of the National Convention of France. It formed alſo *committees of public ſafety, and of general ſecurity*, and employed all the revolutionary means of its model.

The Pope in refuſing to accede to the conditions which the French Government wiſhed to impoſe on him, had not been blind to the dangers to which he expoſed himſelf. He was not ignorant that the French had reſolved if not to annihilate, at leaſt greatly to circumſcribe his ſpiritual and temporal power, and that they would make the utmoſt efforts to penetrate farther into his dominions, to plunder and to revolutionize them. Being conſcious that he had done every thing to allay the ſtorm which depended upon him, either in the character of a Prince, or of Head of the Church, he now thought only of employing all the means in his power to defend his exiſtence in theſe two reſpects. Being no longer able to reckon, at leaſt oſtenſibly, on the ſuccour of the King of Naples, and having reaſon to doubt the ſincerity of the interceſſion of the Court of Spain in his favour, he connected himſelf more cloſely with that of Vienna, and united his deſtiny with that

of the latter power. He augmented his army, and placed it on a war eſtabliſhment, [*Note* 19.] and ſought for extraordinary means of defence in the affection of his ſubjects towards him, and in their hatred to the French. He exhorted all the inhabitants of the territories of the church to arm; and to induce them to do ſo, neglected neither promiſes, nor privileges, nor rewards.

He was well ſeconded by the zeal and patriotiſm of the higher ranks, and the opulent people. They readily employed their money and their influence in raiſing ſeveral corps of volunteers. The Princes of Colonna and Borgheſe each raiſed a regiment at his own expence. The ſtates of the church aſſumed all at once a military aſpect, and their head after having ſhewn himſelf worthy of his ſpiritual elevation by his wiſdom and his attachment to principles, did himſelf no leſs credit as a Sovereign by his courage and his reſolution. On the 20th of December he ordered a body of troops to march to Faenza, [*Note* 20.] and took meaſures that it ſhould amount in a ſhort time to 20,000 men. He gave the command of it to the Auſtrian General Colli, (formerly the commander of the King of Sardinia's troops) who he had requeſted of the

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Emperor might be allowed to be placed at the head of his army.

The inaction of the Generals Alvinzy and Davidovich, not allowing Marſhal Wurmſer to hope for a ſpeedy deliverance, he was again obliged to rely on himſelf for providing means for the ſubſiſtence of the garriſon, and inhabitants of Mantua. He made ſeveral ſorties during the month of December. Thoſe of the 11th. and the 14th. were the moſt ſucceſsful. His troops got poſſeſſion of ſome boats loaded with proviſion and ammunition deſtined for the French army. This reſource, joined to ſome thouſands of horſes which were in the place, delayed for ſome time the neceſſity of a ſurrender.

Buonaparte quitted Milan on the 16th. and proceeded to Verona. His army had been conſiderably reinforced, partly by old troops from France, and partly by ſome thouſands raiſed in the inſurgent countries. He had beſides received from Piedmont a train of battering artillery; and it was ſuppoſed, that weary of waiting till famine might ſubdue Mantua, he had determined again to beſiege it in form: but the

certainty of his having ſhortly to ſuſtain another attack on the part of the Auſtrians, prevented him from thinking of this enterpriſe, and he felt that the real mode of reducing Mantua, was to be again victorious. He neglected no means to become ſo; he viſited the principal poſts of his army, and made diſpoſitions to be prepared for every event. He gave at the ſame time a freſh proof of the little reſpect he paid to neutral powers, by ordering a body of troops ſuddenly to enter the venetian Citadel of Bergamo, which commands the city of that name. To colour this violation of neutrality, he wrote to the Directory that he had been determined to this meaſure by the unfriendly diſpoſition of the inhabitants of this province towards the French; and to prevent the enemy's parties from diſturbing the communication between the Adige and the Adda. Many of his ſoldiers, he ſaid, had been aſſaſſinated by the people of the country, who favoured as much as poſſible the eſcape of the Auſtrian priſoners.

On the 19th of December General Laudohn, (nephew of the famcus Field-Marſhal of that name)

name) who commanded the right wing of Davidovich's army, reconnoitred beyond the Lake of Garda, and puſhed forward as far as the town of Breſcia. He met only ſome of the enemy's vedettes, whom he took. At the ſame time General Alvinzy detached a body of troops from the left wing of his army, which paſſed the Adige at Boara, and directed its march towards the dutchies of Ferrara and Bologna, where the French were reinforcing themſelves.

The object of the Auſtrians in making theſe movements on their right and left, was to draw the attention of the enemy to them, and to induce them to weaken their center. The march of General Laudohn towards Brecia and Bergamo was calculated to perſuade the French that the Auſtrians intended to carry the war to the Country between the Adige and the Oglio, as Prince Eugene had done in 1705. The object of ſending a body of troops into the countries of Rovigo and Bologna, was to cover the territories of the Pope, to facilitate the junction of his troops with the Auſtrians, and to oblige the French to place a large part of their force at this point.

point. Theſe preparatory diſpoſitions for the attack meditated by the Auſtrian Generals, had in part the effect which they promiſed themſelves from them. Buonaparte reinforced his poſts, as well in the Breſcian as on the lower Adige. He was not however deceived as to the real intentions of the Auſtrians. It was eaſy for him to judge that they had no other object in view but the deliverance of Mantua: he therefore took his meaſures, ſo as to be enabled, when neceſſary, to re-unite againſt them the greater part of his forces.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

The Auſtrians form a fifth army—Diſtreſs of Mantua—Sortie of Marſhal Wurmſer; and eſcape of the Engliſh Colonel Graham—March and ſucceſs of General Provera—Battle of St. Michael before Verona—March and ſucceſs of Mr. d'Alvinzy—Complete defeat of the Auſtrians at Ripoli and Corona—Buonaparte returns with reinforcements to the blockade of Mantua—Mr. de Provera arrives before this place—His rear guard is taken priſoners—His failure before the ſuburb of St. George—He is taken with his whole corps—Obſervations on the cauſes of theſe events—Loſs of the Auſtrians and the French.

THE Auſtrians had employed the end of November and the month of December in forming a fifth army. All the regiments had been completed; and General Frolich had joined Mr. Davidovich with about 6,000 men. By the end of December the Auſtrian army was as ſtrong as it had been before

before the expedition in the month of November; and no exertions or expence had been ſpared to enable it to renew the campaign with advantage. The Generals were informed of the diſtreſs the city of Mantua experienced. They knew that the garriſon was altogether in want of many neceſſary articles of ſubſiſtance, and was diminiſhed by ſickneſs and by ſervice. In order to give himſelf time to wait the effect of the expedition which was preparing, Marſhal Wurmſer had made on the 29th of December a very vigorous ſortie. He had killed and taken priſoners a great many men: but this had been more brilliant than uſeful, the environs of Mantua being ſo exhauſted of proviſions, that the garriſon could bring but a ſmall quantity into the place. Its critical ſituation did not allow General Alvinzy to remain any longer in a ſtate of inaction; and he kept himſelf in readineſs to renew the campaign as ſoon as the ſeaſon would admit of it. The neceſſity of haſtening appeared more preſſing on the arrival of the Engliſh Colonel Graham at headquarters. This officer, who exerciſed with the army of Italy the ſame functions which Colonel Crauford did with that of Germany, had followed Marſhal Wurmſer in all his expeditions, and had

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ſhut himſelf up with him in Mantua. The great importance of the Auſtrian Generals being exactly informed of the ſtate of the garriſon determined Colonel Graham to take on himſelf the charge of carrying this information to them. He acquitted himſelf with addreſs and good fortune in this hazardous commiſſion. He left the city in diſguiſe on the night of the 29th of December, and after having eſcaped the vigilance of the French patroles, arrived on the 4th of January at the head-quarters of the Auſtrians. Mr. d'Alvinzy received from him preciſe information of all that related to the city of Mantua and its garriſon. He learned that whatever might be the œconomy in the conſumption of the ſubſiſtence, it would be entirely exhauſted by the end of January. Theſe accounts did not admit of his loſing a moment; and it was reſolved to execute inſtantly the projected operations.

The Auſtrian army at that time amounted to near 50,000 men. About 10,000 were before Padua under the orders of Lieutenant General Provera; nearly 10,000 were at Baſſano, about half way between Mr. de Provera and Mr. d'Alvinzy, who was in the Tyrol with more than 25,000 men. It was reſolved that General Provera ſhould begin

the attack on the Lower Adige, while the center corps ſhould advance in force againſt Verona, and that the grand army ſhould put itſelf in motion in the Tyrol. The French army, notwithſtanding all the reinforcements which it had received, did not exceed 40,000 men. Every probability was in favour of the Auſtrians.

On the 7th of January the corps of Mr. de Provera left the neighbourhood of Padua, directing itſelf againſt Porto Legnago. On the 8th he met the French, attacked and defeated them, though they made a vigorous reſiſtance. He took from them the poſts of Caſella, Meclara and San Salvaro; and forced them to retire to Bevilaqua. The enemy, having been reinforced, endeavoured to recover the ground which they had loſt, but failed, and were again driven back to Bevilaqua; nor could they ſuſtain themſelves there, but fell back on Porto Legnago, where General Augereau was, who defended the Lower Adige with 10,000 men. Of the two French Generals Stever and Comus, the firſt was killed, and the ſecond wounded and made priſoner on this occaſion, in which the Vienna Volunteers, who had lately joined the army, particularly diſtinguiſhed themſelves. On the day following

following, the 9th, the Auſtrians purſued their advantages, again attacked the French, and with the ſame ſucceſs as the day before. They forced them from the villages of St. Zenon, Menerba, and Boſto, and drove them as far as Bonavigo, and Porto Legnago, after having taken 300 priſoners and 3 pieces of cannon. Theſe ſucceſſes brought Mr. de Provera to the banks of the Adige, the paſſage of which he muſt neceſſarily force to be enabled to get to Mantua

Buonaparte was at Bologne, when he was informed (on the evening of the 10th of January) of the march and ſucceſs of Mr. de Provera. Not doubting but that all the reſt of the Auſtrian army was at the ſame time in motion, he renounced for the moment the affairs which had called him to Bologna, [*Note* 21.] After having cauſed 2,000 men who were with him in that city to march immediately towards the Adige, he proceeded himſelf, firſt to the blockade of Mantua, and then to Verona. He reached this city in the morning of the 12th, at the moment when the diviſion of General Maſſena, who commanded there, was engaged with a part of the Auſtrian column that had come from Baſſano. This corps, whoſe deſtination was to alarm the enemy

on his center, and to keep in check there a part of his forces, had overthrown the advanced guard of Maſſena, and had driven it under Verona. That General then marched out of the town with all the troops that he had with him, and met the Auſtrians at the village of St. Michael. A very briſk action enſued, which was not deciſively favourable to either party. The Auſtrians attained their double object, which was to occupy General Maſſena at this point, and then to favour the march of a part of the corps from Baſſano, which was going to re-inforce Mr. de Alvinzy, in the valley of the Adige. The French claimed the honour of victory in this action, and ſaid, that they had taken 600 men, and 3 pieces of cannon. They did not add that they had loſt an equal number of men and 4 pieces of cannon. After this affair, the Auſtrians marched back towards the mountains, and the French reſumed their poſition before Verona.

Whilſt the Auſtrians were thus engaging the right and center of the French to draw their attention and their force to thoſe points, Mr. de Alvinzy commanded the principal attack on the upper Adige. He marched on the 11th. to

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Montebaldo; and on the 12th made an attack on the head of the French line. The Auſtrians drove them from ſome entrenchments, but could not make themſelves maſters of the redoubts of Corona, which could not be attacked in front. They turned them on the 13th, and ſucceeded in driving the enemy out of them, taking near 1,000 priſoners. General Joubert, who commanded the French in theſe parts, fell back from Corona on Rivoli, which was by nature, as well as by the works which the French had raiſed, the ſtrongeſt point of their poſition on the upper Adige.

Buonaparte was as yet ignorant what were the real projects of the Auſtrians, they had attacked at the ſame time the right, the center, and the left of his line; and had ſhewn on theſe three points forces nearly equal. Their movements had been till then well combined and executed. Buonaparte, uncertain againſt which point the Auſtrians would direct their greateſt force, had not yet ventured to weaken any part of his line, and had remained in the center, at Verona, that he might be ready to march with reinforcements either to the right, or to the left, as circum-

ſtances

ſtances might require. On the 13th at night he learned at the ſame time that General Provera had forced the paſſage of the Adige, and that General Joubert had been driven from Corona. Theſe two checks experienced at once by both wings were calculated to increaſe Buonaparte's embarraſſments, and to double his uncertainty with reſpect to the direction of the diſpoſeable troops which he had with him; but the report of the ſpies, and the conſiderable force which the Auſtrians had filed off towards Corona, left him no doubt of their deſigns, and convinced him that it was on the Upper Adige that they intended to make their principal efforts.

In conſequence he inſtantly ordered the diviſion of General Maſſena to ſet out from Verona for Rivoli; ſent directions to a corps which was at Defenſaro to proceed to the ſame point; and after having given inſtructions for the meaſures to be taken on his center and his right, went poſt himſelf with his whole ſtaff to Rivoli, where he arrived in the middle of the night. He immediately conſidered how he ſhould recover the important poſt of St. Marco, which is the key of the valley of the Adige; a poſt of which the Auſtrians had a few hours before obtained poſſeſſion.

General

General Alvinzy, who had concerted every thing to make a general attack on the day following, paſſed this ſame night in making preparatory diſpoſitions for it. He had not ſuppoſed that Buonaparte could have had time to reach Rivoli with reinforcements; and believing that he ſhould have to do only with the diviſion of General Joubert, he had conceived the project of turning it, and the hope of cutting it off. The French occupied the ſemicircle of mountains which ſurround the village and the valley of Rivoli, at the foot of which runs the Adige. Mr. d'Alvinzy's plan was to turn this poſition, by placing a column behind it, which ſhould cut off the road from Rivoli to Peſchiera and Caſtelnuovo, and ſhould at the ſame time prevent General Joubert from receiving reinforcements, and from effecting his retreat. This General was to be attacked at the ſame time vigorouſly in front; and Mr. d'Alvinzy flattered himſelf that he ſhould thus incloſe him between ſuperior forces, and break down in one day the principal barrier between him and Mantua. According to this plan he had detached a corps of 4,000 infantry, which was to take a poſition on the 14th in the rear of General Joubert.

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As ſoon as the French attacked, at four in the morning, the advanced poſts of the Auſtrians, and re-took that of St. Marco, Mr. de Alvinzy perceived that he had been prevented, and that contrary to his expectations the French had been re-inforced. All his diſpoſitions however having been made, and in part executed, he was obliged to make up his mind to engage in the poſition in which he had placed his army, although it ceaſed to be ſo advantageous, ſince the enemy had received ſuch re-inforcements. The battle began warmly at about five o'clock in the morning. The Auſtrians vigorouſly attacked the left of the French, made it give way, and drove it from height to height. After having forced it entirely out of the line they proceeded againſt the center, which they likewiſe made fall back, which movement the right alſo followed. Buonaparte ſeeing himſelf on the point of being completely defeated, ordered a brigade of reſerve to march to the center, the defence of which he intruſted to General Berthier, and went himſelf to the left, which was loſing ground every minute. At this moment, ſo critical for the French, General Maſſena appeared with the diviſion which was coming from Verona. Buonaparte inſtantly ordered

ordered it to his left, which being re-inforced and rallying, renewed the attack againſt the Auſtrians, and after an obſtinate engagement, re-took a part of the poſts which it had loſt. Whilſt matters were in this ſituation on the right of the Auſtrians, their center and left gained freſh advantages over the enemy, and after having carried ſeveral entrenchments, reached Rivoli, the principal poſition where the enemy had re-united almoſt all their forces and their Artillery. At the moment when they gained poſſeſſion of the ſtrongeſt poſts of this poſition, the column which had been detached to turn it, appeared at a diſtance on the heights behind the French. This moment ſeemed likely to be deciſive in favour of the Auſtrians, and would undoubtedly have been ſo, if, whilſt that column took the enemy in the rear, the reſt of the Auſtrian army had re-united and had made a vigorous attack in front; but the main army remained divided into three columns, which endeavoured ſeparately to make themſelves maſters of all the heights, in order to ſurround the French. This enabled the latter to place themſelves in force between theſe columns, and to take them in flank.

Till that time the battle was entirely in favour of the Auſtrians, and every thing ſeemed to promiſe them a complete triumph. However diſtreſſing Buonaparte's ſituation might be, he did not deſpair of victory. He judged that it was poſſible to turn the diſpoſitions made by the Auſtrians againſt themſelves, and that what ſeemed likely to effect his ruin, might on the contrary produce that of his enemy. He ſaw that if he could ſucceed in retaking Rivoli, the column which had turned him being thus inſulated, would itſelf be cut off and loſt. In conſequence, ſending a brigade to keep this column in check, he rallied, re-animated, and led his troops again to attack the corps which had taken Rivoli, and recovered that precious poſt. As the poſſeſſion of it muſt decide the day, the Auſtrians returned to the charge, and made ſuch vaſt efforts that they again took this poſition. Buonaparte, knowing that it could not be left in their hands without his being expoſed to complete ruin, united his whole forces and made new diſpoſitions. He ſent General Berthier with all the cavalry to charge the enemy in the plain, and marched himſelf againſt the heights ſo long diſputed. Theſe two attacks, made with concert and fury, had the greateſt

greateſt ſucceſs. General Joubert re-took Rivoli; and at the ſame moment General Maſſena, who had gained the right of the Auſtrians, taking them briſkly in flank, threw them into diſorder, and decided their defeat. They retreated in great confuſion towards la Corona.

Buonaparte, victorious in front, was then enabled to diſpatch a conſiderable force againſt the 4,000 men who had turned Rivoli. He cauſed them to be attacked by ſeveral columns, which almoſt encircled them, and left them no reſource but to ſurrender themſelves, or to cut their way through with ſword in hand. This corps preferred the latter, and made the greateſt efforts to pierce through the troops which ſurrounded them: but having neither cannon nor cavalry, they could not reſiſt an enemy who had both theſe advantages as well as thoſe of poſition and number. The greater part of theſe 4,000 men were either killed or made priſoners. [*Note* 22.]

Such was the iſſue of the battle of Rivoli, which ruined the meaſures taken by the Auſtrians for the purpoſe of penetrating into the Dutchy of Mantua, and of delivering its capital. We cannot abſolutely affirm that the plan of their Generals was ill-

combined, but in the execution of it they committed ſeveral faults, of which it was impoſſible to be guilty with impunity, when oppoſed to a General ſo able and ſo active as Buonaparte. It was no doubt to the rapidity with which he advanced, and with which he made Maſſena's diviſion march from Verona to Rivoli, that he owed this victory. If he had deferred that movement for only one day, General Joubert would undoubtedly have been driven from his poſition, and perhaps cut off. Buonaparte decided the buſineſs by outſtripping Mr. d'Alvinzy; and it was no doubt as much owing to the good intelligence of ſpies, as to his own ability.

However important might be the victory of Rivoli, it delivered Buonaparte from only a part of his enemies. Previous to his departure from Verona to Rivoli he had been informed of Mr. de Provera's ſucceſs on the lower Adige; and whilſt he was defeating Mr. d'Alvinzy, he had good reaſon to apprehend that the former General would overcome every obſtacle, and ſucceed in breaking through the blockade of Mantua. This would have accompliſhed the principal object of the Auſtrians, and would have counterbalanced the effect of the battle of Rivoli. Buonaparte, deſirous to neg-

neglect nothing which might hinder Mr. de Provera from accompliſhing his object, without taking any repoſe, or allowing any to his troops, ſet out in the night of the 14th for the blockade of Mantua, accompanied by part of the troops who had fought at Rivoli. He left at that place General Joubert, with orders to attack the Auſtrians the next morning at la Corona. To inſure the ſucceſs of this enterprize, General Joubert ſent, during the night, a column which marched round Montebaldo, and arrived at day break on the heights which commanded la Corona. It was poſted there before the whole of the Auſtrian army was arrived; it then attacked them with advantage during its march, and took them in flank, whilſt General Joubert advanced directly againſt them.

The Auſtrians, overpowered by fatigue, weakened by their loſſes, and diſcouraged by their diſaſters, oppoſed no very vigorous reſiſtance. They were defeated, and loſt a great number of men made priſoners. The reſt continued their retreat, and proceeded to ſecure themſelves in the defiles of Tyrol.

Buonaparte arrived on the 15th at night at Roverbella with the reinforcements which be brought from

from the Upper Adige. He there learned that Mr. de Provera had arrived before the lines of the blockade of Mantua. We have ſeen before, that that General had reached on the 9th the banks of the Adige, between Porto Legnago and Ronco. Not being ſtrong enough to think of making himſelf maſter of thoſe two poſts, which would beſides have diverted him from his object, he reſolved to force as ſoon as poſſible the paſſage of the Adige at ſome point or other, and to march ſtraight to Mantua, without attending to the enemies whom he might leave behind. He employed the 11th, 12th, and 13th in making his arrangements, and in attempting to deceive General Augereau, who was oppoſed to him. For this purpoſe he made part of his troops march towards Ronco and Legnago, and ſent ſome pontoons to Niceſola to induce a belief that he intended to paſs the Adige at that place. But whilſt he was making theſe feints, he prepared to paſs the river oppoſite Anguiary, the moſt favourable point for this operation. On the evening of the 13th he raiſed a battery of ſome pieces of cannon on the banks of the river, and under cover of their fire ſucceeded in ſpite of the French in conſtructing his bridge. His advanced guard compoſed of volunteers

lunteers drove them from Anguiary; and the Auſtrians paſſed the Adige in defiance of all the efforts which the enemy made to hinder them. This being accompliſhed, Mr. de Provera recalled the troops which he had ſent towards Bonavigo and Legnago; and having left two battalions on the banks of the Adige, began his march towards Mantua, thinking only of being before-hand with the enemy. He paſſed through Cerea, Sanguinetto, and Nogara, where he arrived on the 14th in the evening, and where his troops paſſed the night. The next day he marched as rapidly as poſſible, paſſed through Caſtellara, and arrived at noon before St. George, a ſuburb of Mantua, which was one of the principal poſts of the blockade, and which the French had fortified in a very ſtrong manner.

As ſoon as Mr. de Provera had left the Adige, Generals Guieux and Augereau loſt no time in purſuing him with whatever troops they could aſſemble. The rapidity of Mr. de Provera's march did not allow them to overtake him, but they came up with his rear guard, which having to do with a very ſuperior force, and being wholly unſupported, was defeated and made priſoners. The ſame thing happened to the troops which Mr. de Provera had left on the

the Adige. The conſequence was that that General had not more than 5,000 men when he arrived before St. George. He found that ſuburb ſo ſtrongly entrenched, that however urgent the neceſſity was for forcing the lines of the blockade, Mr. de Provera did not dare to hazard an immediate aſſault on the ſuburb, with troops fatigued and ſmall in number. He deferred his attack till the next morning, and found means in the courſe of the day to concert meaſures with General Wurmſer. They agreed that on the next day the 16th they ſhould attack, each on their own ſide, la Favorite and Montado, which they hoped to be able to carry more eaſily than St. George. But whilſt they were preparing for this enterpriſe, Generals Buonaparte and Maſſena haſtened their march, and that of the 6,000 men, whom they brought with them. They arrived before Mantua on the night of the 15th, and proceeded to reinforce the poſts of St. Antony, la Favorite, and St. George. By this junction the French found themſelves at day-break about 17,000 men ſtrong, with the expectation of being ſtill more numerous in a ſhort time, General Augereau being on his march with his whole diviſion. This ſuperiority of force greatly embarraſſed

Mr.

Mr. de Provera. That General ſeeing himſelf hemmed in by ſo great a number of enemies, receiving no news of General Alvinzy, and having every reaſon to ſuppoſe he had been defeated, had no part left him but to endeavour to break through the blockade of Mantua, and to ſhut himſelf up with Mr. de Wurmſer in that place. The latter as he promiſed marched out of the citadel before day-break with almoſt all the troops under his command. He attacked and carried the poſt of St. Antony, then proceeded to la Favorite, and exerted all his efforts to force the entrenchments, and the corps of the enemy oppoſed to him. But this body, reinforced by the troops juſt arrived, ſhut up within its lines, and protected by the fire of its works, put a ſtop to the progreſs of Marſhal Wurmſer, and in ſpite of the vigour of his attack prevented him from advancing further. At the ſame inſtant Mr. de Provera likewiſe attacked la Favorite on his ſide: but he met with inſurmountable obſtacles, as did Mr. de Wurmſer, and was inceſſantly repulſed by the fire from the enemy's entrenchments. Whilſt he was thus making uſeleſs efforts to ſtorm the lines of the blockade, ſeveral French corps were ranging themſelves behind, and were hemming him in. General

Miollis who commanded at St. George, then ſallied out of his entrenchments, and advanced in front againſt Mr. de Provera. The latter attacked on ſeveral points, and threatened on all, had it no longer in his power to reſiſt ſuch a force. Nevertheleſs after having bravely defended himſelf for a long time, and killed a vaſt number of the enemy, his troops being overcome by numbers and fatigue, he offered to capitulate, which was agreed to. The whole of his corps was made priſoners of war; but the officers were at liberty to return to the Auſtrian army on their parole. The Marſhal Wurmſer ſeeing his hopes once more diſappointed put an end to an uſeleſs conteſt, and retired within the walls of Mantua.

Thus ended this expedition, which like all thoſe undertaken by the Auſtrians in this campaign, commenced with the moſt brilliant ſucceſs, and concluded with the greateſt diſaſters. The failure was the reſult of the ſame cauſes, which had brought on the misfortunes of the months of Auguſt and November. The Auſtrians perſiſted in dividing their forces, and in making partial attacks. Buonaparte alſo perſevered, and certainly with more reaſon in

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uniting his troops and to engage in a maſs on one ſingle point. He was not however indebtedfor his ſucceſs to his tactics alone. He acknowledged himſelf in his diſpatches, and the diſpoſitions which he made clearly evinced, that he had been thoroughly inſtructed as to the projects of Mr. d'Alvinzy. It would be imprudent indeed to publiſh conjectures on the manner in which he received this moſt precious intelligence. What may be depended upon is that he did not procure it through the means of a common ſpy, but from ſome one whoſe ſituation afforded opportunities of being well acquainted with the plans formed by the Auſtrians. If Buonaparte had not been ſo exactly informed, it is reaſonable to believe, that inſtead of being ſo completely victorious, he would have been ſeverely beaten at ſome point or other, and that the Auſtrians would at leaſt have been enabled to break up the blockade of Mantua. That General admitted that he never incurred ſo great a danger, and *that his poſition hung as it were by a thread.* In effect if he had remained a day longer at Verona, the corps of General Joubert would undoubtedly have been routed, and perhaps cut off. If after the victory of Rivoli he

had ſtayed four-and-twenty hours more on the Upper Adige, it is probable that Mr. de Provera would have penetrated the lines of the blockade of Mantua, and formed a junction with Mr. de Wurmſer. In either caſes Mantua would have been delivered, and the French placed between two powerful diviſions of the army, would have been compelled to abandon the Adige, and to repaſs the Mincio. Far from being guilty of the leaſt delay, Buonaparte as if he had poſſeſſed the power of divination, haſtened from Verona to the Upper Adige, and from thence to the blockade of Mantua, on the very day, and at the very hour it was neceſſary for him to be there, in order to fruſtrate the operations of the Auſtrians.

He arrived at Rivoli ſome hours before General Alvinzy commenced the grand attack which he had projected. Buonaparte then oppoſing to him a very large force, and at the ſame time making uſe of it with the utmoſt dexterity, diſconcerted Mr. Alvinzy and made him experience a defeat in the very place where he had a right to expect a victory. From thence without either loſing an inſtant or granting any repoſe to his troops, he led them under the walls of Mantua, and arrived likewiſe

likewiſe ſome hours before Generals Wurmſer and Provera carried their combined attack into execution. He oppoſed to theſe two Generals, ſoldiers who thirty-ſix hours before were fighting at Rivoli, and who brought victory with them from the banks of the Adige to thoſe of the Mincio. This exceſſive exertion, the conſtant cauſe of Buonaparte's triumphs, might on this occaſion have drawn him on to utter ruin, had he not been informed with preciſion of the numbers, poſition, and deſigns of his enemies. Without this immenſe advantage he would not have dared to move his troops with almoſt magical celerity, and to expoſe thoſe points which he had left without ſufficient means of defence to be forced in his abſence. However brave, able and fortunate, he would never have ventured to play ſo hazardous a game. He was beſides much aſſiſted by the quality of the troops with which he had to contend, the Auſtrian Army being chiefly compoſed of recruits. He was not leſs ſo by the errors of the Generals oppoſed to him. They committed ſeveral, both on the upper and lower Adige; but the greateſt undoubtedly was the ordering Mr. de Provera to commence his campaign before he could be joined by the troops aſſembled at Faenza by

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the Pope, or before they could have time to march towards the Po, with a view of cauſing a diverſion there. If either had happened, Buonaparte would probably have left a greater number of troops on the lower Adige, which would have ſet Mr. d'Alvinzy more at his eaſe, or if he had not done ſo, Mr. de Provera, and the Papal troops would undoubtedly have broken up the blockade of Mantua, and formed a powerful army by their junction with Mr. de Wurmſer. The hurry of Mr. de Provera's march cannot be excuſed by the preſſing neceſſity of relieving Mantua: a delay of a few days would not have put that place in the hands of the French, ſince it held out ſixteen days after his defeat. The reſult of this expedition, which reſembled in its ſhort duration and fatal conſequences, thoſe of the months of Auguſt and November preceding, had a deciſive effect in favour of the French. It ſecured to them the poſſeſſion of their conqueſts in Italy, by throwing Mantua into their hands. Theſe advantages are inconteſtible, but what is by no means ſo, is the account ſent by General Buonaparte and Berthier, of the number of Auſtrians killed, wounded, and priſoners.

They

They eſtimated that of the killed or wounded at 6,000, which is not very far from the truth, but they calculated that of the priſoners in one letter to be 23,000, in a ſecond 25,000, and in a third 20,000. [*Note* 23.] In like manner they reckoned the number of cannon taken at one time to be 44, and at another 60. This variation in an article ſo eaſily aſcertained as men and cannon, alone makes it doubtful what degree of credit ſhould be given to theſe reports. Other conſiderations contribute to prove their exaggeration. Even allowing that the liſt of officers taken priſoners as ſent by Buonaparte was exact, (which it is not) whoever knows the formation of the Auſtrian battalions and ſquadrons may judge how erroneouſly the French Generals have ſtated the account. In fact, calculating from the rank the moſt favourable to their reports, the number of officers is not ſufficient for 12,000 men, even deducting all thoſe who might be abſent as attached to the equipage, and to commiſſariate. The accuracy of this method of calculating the number of priſoners, has been confirmed by ſeveral former occaſions. It might be objected that ſome of the officers had been killed, but an equal

equal proportion of ſoldiers having without doubt fallen, the officers and ſoldiers taken priſoners muſt continue in the ſame proportion both in the battalions and ſquadrons. Following therefore neither the French accounts, nor thoſe publiſhed at Vienna, after the moſt exact information I have been able to obtain on this ſubject, I ſhall eſtimate the loſs of the Auſtrians under both the Generals Alvinzy and Provera, at 17,000 men, in killed, wounded and priſoners. The French ſaid nothing of that which they ſuſtained during theſe ſix days; it undoubtedly fell far ſhort of that of their enemies, though it amounted to upwards of 7,000 men, in killed, wounded, and priſoners.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Retreat of the Auſtrians in Tyrol and Friuli—Battles of Carpedenolo and Avio—Defenſive poſition taken by the Auſtrians.—Surrender of Mantua—March of the French to the Papal territories—Proclamation of Buonaparte—Battle of Senio—Conqueſt of Romagna, of the Dutchy of Urbino, and of the march of Ancona—Taking of Loretto—Letters between the Pope and Buonaparte—Treaty of Peace between his Holineſs and the French.

AFTER the fatal days of the 14th, 15th, and 16th of January, the Auſtrians wholly incapable of undertaking any thing, or of even preſerving the places they held, thought only of ſaving the wrecks of their army. Mr. d'Alvinzy ſecured himſelf in the defiles of Tyrol, and all the troops which were between the Adige and the Brenta, fell back on this laſt river, and marched towards the Terviſano: they were not immediately followed by the French who alſo required ſome time to recover from the loſſes and fatigues they had ſuſtained.

In two days however they began to purſue the Auſtrians, whoſe rear guard they overtook on the 26th of January. They attacked it at Carpedenolo, and after a very ſmart engagement they killed by their own account 200 men, and took 900. At the ſame time General Joubert marching up the two banks of the Adige followed the Auſtrians into Tyrol. He attacked their advanced poſts at Avio, and made ſome priſoners amounting, as he reported, to 400. He continued to advance for ſome days, and ſucceſſively took poſſeſſion of the towns of Torbole, Roveredo, and Trent, as faſt as they were evacuated by the Auſtrians. If we may believe that General, they left in this laſt town 2,000 ſick or wounded, and loſt in their retreat 1,800 men taken priſoners. The Generals Maſſena and Augereau marched, the firſt towards Feltre, and the other towards Treviſo, and continued as well as Joubert to advance till they had arrived before the new defenſive poſition which the Auſtrians took behind the rivers Adige, Lavis, and Piave. Their line extended from Botzen or Bolzano, (the point where the defiles of Tyrol become impenetrable, or at leaſt cannot be turned) to the mouth of the Piave, which falls into the Ad-

Adriatic ſea, above and near to Venice. They divided their army into three principal bodies, one of which defended Tyrol, and another Friuli, where they placed the greateſt number of their Forces. The third body ſtationed between the two firſt, covered the ſpace encloſed between the ſources of the Lavis and the Piave. It was in this poſition defended by three rivers, and a chain of almoſt inacceſſible mountains, that the Auſtrians, obliged to abandon Mantua and Italy to the French, and having no other view than that of covering the heriditary dominions, concentrated their remaining forces, and waited for new ones. Their army was ſtill under the command of Lieutenant General Alvinzy, whom His Royal Highneſs the Archduke Charles replaced ſoon after.

The diſaſters and retreat of the Auſtrians deprived them of all hope of preſerving Mantua. This place, for which the Houſe of Auſtria had made ſuch great exertions, and had ſuffered ſuch conſiderable loſſes, was at length obliged to capitulate: its garriſon much diminiſhed by the ſword, but ſtill more by diſeaſe, had been long deprived of common neceſſaries, and reduced to eat horſe fleſh. Overwhelmed with fatigue, miſery, and

want, it had borne them all in the hope of preſerving to the Emperor a place on which depended his power in Italy. It was reduced to the laſt extremity, when the Generals Alvinzy and Provera made a laſt effort for its relief. The event of this expedition reduced Marſhal Wurmſer to the hard neceſſity of ſurrendering a fortreſs which he had defended during four months with a perſeverance and activity, worthy of the higheſt applauſe. The honourable conduct of this veteran officer ſecured to him the reſpect even of his enemies, and the capitulation which they granted him bore teſtimony to the high eſtimation with which he had inſpired them. It was ſigned on the 2d of February; the principal articles were: that the garriſon conſiſting of 18,000 men, ſhould become priſoners of war, but be conducted into the territories of the Emperor to be there exchanged in preference to all others [*Note* 24.] That Marſhal Wurmſer, all the Generals, the officers of the ſtaff, 200 cavalry, and 500 individuals at the choice of Mr. de Wurmſer, ſhould not be priſoners of war, and ſhould return into the Auſtrian dominions with 6 pieces of cannon and their artillery men; that all the Generals and officers

ſhould

ſhould keep their ſwords and baggage, and the privates of the infantry retain their knapſacks, and thoſe of the cavalry their cloak bags. Beſides theſe conditions Mr. de Wurmſer obtained advantageous terms for the inhabitants of Mantua, and ſecured to them the exerciſe of their religion, and the enjoyment of their property and privileges. The juſt regard thus paid to the rank, the age, and the conduct of Marſhal Wurmſer, reflected ſo much the more honour on Buonaparte, as he had not hitherto given any opportunity of praiſing his moderation.

The French General having no longer any opponents in Italy, reſumed the execution of thoſe plans of plunder and diſmemberment, which had been concerted either by himſelf or by the leaders of the French Republic. After the defeat of the Generals Alvinzy and Provera, he had haſtened to reinforce the troops which he had ſtationed in the Dutchies of Bologna and Ferrara, and had diſpatched General Victor thither with orders to penetrate into Romagna. Shortly after he went himſelf to take the command of this detachment, in order to give more diſpatch and greater ſucceſs to the expedition. He was preceded by two proclamations,

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in the firſt of which, after having enumerated the injuries which the French pretended to have received from the Pope, he declared that the armiſtice concluded between his Holineſs and the French Republic in the month of June preceding, was at an end. The ſecond of theſe proclamations exhibits ſo well the ſtyle and character of Buonaparte, and drew on him ſuch deſerved odium both in Italy and France, that I think it right to tranſcribe the whole of it.

" The French army is going to enter the terri-
" tories of the Pope.—It will be faithful to the
" maxims which it profeſſes; it will protect religion
" and the people. The French ſoldier carries in
" one hand the bayonet, ſure pledge of victory,
" and offers with the other to the different towns
" and villages, peace, protection, and ſafety:
" Woe be to thoſe who ſhall diſdain it! and who
" ſeduced by men of the deepeſt hypocryſy and
" villainy, ſhall wantonly draw down upon their
" dwellings the horrors of war, and the ven-
" geance of an army which has in the ſpace of ſix
" months made priſoners 100,000 of the beſt
" troops of the Emperor, taken 400 pieces

" of

" of cannon, 110 ſtandards, and deſtroyed five " armies.

" ARTICLE I. Every village or town in which " the Tocſin ſhall be ſounded at the approach of " the French army, ſhall be inſtantly burnt and the " magiſtrates ſhot.

" ARTICLE II. The pariſh in which a French- " man ſhall be aſſaſſinated ſhall be declared in a " ſtate of war; a flying column ſhall be diſpatched " thither, hoſtages ſhall be taken, and an extraor- " dinary contribution levied.

" ARTICLE III. All the Prieſts, Monks, and " miniſters of religion of whatever deſcription, " ſhall be protected and ſecured in their reſpective " ſtations, if they conduct themſelves according " to the principles of the goſpel. Should they be " the firſt to tranſgreſs them, they will be ſubject " to military execution, and treated with greater " ſeverity than other citizens." [*Note* 25.]

On the 1ſt of February Buonaparte made himſelf maſter of Imola; and marched the next day to attack Faenza, in front of which the Papal troops were entrenched behind the river Senio. Theſe troops which had never before been in action ventured nevertheleſs to wait for the conquerors

querors of the Auſtrians, and were deſirous of ſhewing that report had not done juſtice to them. As ſoon as the French appeared on the left bank of the Senio, they were cannonaded from the batteries which the troops of the Pope had erected on the oppoſite bank. Buonaparte brought againſt them a legion of Italians which he had raiſed in Lombardy: this body of troops, which like its opponents had never been before engaged, but which was ſupported by the French, attacked in concert with them this little army, which was quickly broken and put to flight. It loſt 14 pieces of cannon, 1,000 priſoners, and 400 killed or wounded. The French loſt only 40 men; ſuch at leaſt was the account of Buonaparte, who alſo aſſerted that ſeveral prieſts had been killed in the field of battle.

After this eaſy victory, the French arrived under the walls of Faenza, the inhabitants of which aſſembled at the ſound of the tocſin, and flew to arms. Buonaparte forced the gates of the city with cannon; he had not the barbarity to put in execution the threats contained in his proclamation, and did not give up the town to pillage. He contented himſelf with aſſembling all the

the Prieſts and Monks, whom he harangued, and brought back, as he ſaid, to the *Principles of the Goſpel.* He thought himſelf ſo ſure of the effect which his ſpeech had produced upon them, that he diſpatched two ſuperiors of Religious Orders, one to Ravenna, and the other to Ceſenna, (the country of the preſent Pope) to prepare the inhabitants for his reception. It was a circumſtance not a little extraordinary that one of the moſt ſtrenuous ſupporters of the faction moſt adverſe to the Catholic Religion, ſhould make choice of two Monks for his ambaſſadors.

After the capture of Faenza, the French advanced into Romagna, and poſſeſſed themſelves of the towns of Forli and Ceſenna, near which runs the famous Rubicon. They purſued their march the following days without meeting with any oppoſition from the papal troops, which being divided into ſeveral ſeparate ſmall bodies, were not able to make any effectual reſiſtance. Moſt of theſe corps retreated at the approach of the French, and thoſe whom the latter came up with, were either taken or diſperſed. After having traverſed Romagna, Buonaparte entered into the dutchy of Urbino; he met with no farther op-

 poſition;

poſition, advanced into the march of Ancona, and made himſelf maſter of the town of that name, where he took 1,200 of the Popal troops, and a great quantity of cannon and arms of all ſorts, that place being one of the principal arſenals in the Pope's territories. On the 11th. Buonaparte ſent a detachment to take poſſeſſion of Loretto, in the hope of finding there the boaſted treaſure of the Holy Virgin; but care had been taken a few days before, to remove the greateſt part of it. The French found nothing there but the Statue in wood of the Madonna, ſome relics, and ſome valuable articles, worth nearly 100,000 livres (£4,000 ſterling) which General Berthier eſtimated nevertheleſs at a million, (£40,000 ſterling.)

Buonaparte at this period iſſued a proclamation, which there was little reaſon to expect from him, and which concurred with the capitulation granted to Marſhal Wurmſer, to ſhew that he was not inacceſſible to the ſentiments of moderation, juſtice, and humanity. Satisfied, he ſaid, with the conduct of the French prieſts, who had taken refuge in Italy, he forbad, under the ſevereſt penalties, all the inhabitants of the country

try, as well as all the individuals of his army, to moleſt them, under any pretence whatever; ordered that they ſhould be lodged, maintained, and fed, at the expence of the convents, in the dominions of the church; and ended his proclamation with ſaying, that he ſhould ſee with pleaſure, whatever the biſhops and other charitable eccleſiaſtics ſhould do to ameliorate the deſtiny of the baniſhed prieſts.

After the taking of Ancona and Loretto, the French continued to advance into the territories of the church, directing their march to Macerata and Foligno. Their progreſs, which nothing could ſtop, there being no probability that the Pope's troops would diſpute the paſſage of the Appennine, filled Rome with the greateſt alarms. In the perſon of Buonaparte, they ſaw Brennus and Attila. They repreſented him to themſelves arriving in the capital of the chriſtian world and of the arts, making himſelf maſter of its riches, deſtroying its monuments, and overturning the pontifical throne. All the rich and conſiderable perſons of Rome prepared to quit that city; and his Holineſs himſelf made diſpoſitions for placing his perſon in a ſtate of ſafety. All the riches of

Rome and Loretto were packed up, and ſent to Terracina. At the ſame time that the Pope took meaſures to eſcape the tempeſt, he neglected nothing to avert it. Foreſeeing all the conſequences, which might reſult from the arrival of the French at Rome, he thought it right to prevent it by making all the ſacrifices which they exacted from him.

Buonaparte on his ſide was not leſs diſpoſed to terminate his expedition by a treaty. His object was leſs to advance to Rome, than to excite apprehenſions in the Pope of his doing ſo, and to determine him to agree to the conditions, which the French Republic choſe to preſcribe. Buonaparte felt that he could not without imprudence penetrate farther into the Papal territories. Whatever victories he had gained over the Auſtrians, and however weakened they were, it was poſſible they might attempt to take advantage of his abſence, and the diſtance of a part of his army. In addition to this, he would have been obliged for the purpoſe of ſecuring the obedience of a vaſt country and a city ſo populous as Rome, to maintain a conſiderable body of troops in that place, and would in that caſe have weakened his army, and have afforded the Auſtrians the opportunity of attacking

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it with advantage. If he had left in the dominions of the church only a ſmall body of men, he would have had reaſon to apprehend that their weakneſs being known, the Pope's troops might aſſemble, and being ſupported by a people who were numerous and ill-diſpoſed to the French, might cut off the return of the latter, engaged as they would be in a difficult country, and where every thing was againſt them. Being unable at any rate to employ more than one month in this expedition, Buonaparte inſtead of undertaking an uncertain and dangerous conqueſt, was right in preferring a treaty which gave him without riſk all the advantages that he could expect from the war. He had beſides received from Paris inſtructions conformable to theſe views, the Courts of Madrid and Naples, having made advances to the executive directory in favour of the Pope.

Theſe conſiderations induced Buonaparte to take advantage of the firſt pacific overtures made by Holineſs. Having received from cardinal Mathei, a letter as affecting as it was dexterous, he returned an anſwer on the 13th of February, and announced to him that he granted his Holineſs five days ſo the purpoſe of ſending him a negociator, provided

vided with full powers to treat for peace. Two days afterwards Buonaparte received the following letter.

" *Dear Sir, health and apoſtolical Benediction,*

" Being deſirous to terminate in an amicable " manner our exiſting differences with the French " Republic, by the retreat of the troops which you " command, we ſend and depute to you as our " Plenipotentiaries, two eccleſiaſtics, Cardinal " Mathei, who is perfectly known to you, and " Mon Signor Galeppi, and two ſecular perſons, " the Duke Don Louis Braſchi our nephew, and " the Marquis Camillo Maffimi, who are inveſted " by us with full power to concert with you, to " promiſe and to ſubſcribe ſuch conditions as we " hope will be juſt and reaſonable, binding our- " ſelves by our faith and word, to approve and " ratify them in ſpecial form, that they may be " valid and inviolable at all times. Being aſſured " of the ſentiments of good-will, which you have " manifeſted, we have abſtained from any removal " from Rome, and by that you will be perſuaded " how great is our confidence in you. We finiſh

" by

" by aſſuring you of our greateſt eſteem, and by
" giving you the paternal apoſtolical benediction."

PIUS 6.

Given at St. Peter of Rome the 12th of February.

This letter, and the arrival of the negociator was quickly followed by the concluſion of peace; and Buonaparte returned to the Pope the following anſwer:

" *Moſt Holy Father,*

" I ought to thank your Holineſs for the
" obliging things contained in the letter, which
" you have given yourſelf the trouble to write
" to me. The peace between the French Repub-
" lic and your Holineſs has been juſt ſigned. I
" congratulate myſelf on having been able to
" contribute to your particular repoſe. I conjure
" your Holineſs to diſtruſt thoſe perſons who at
" Rome are ſold to the Courts which are enemies
" to France, or who allow themſelves to be ex-
" cluſively guided by thoſe malicious paſſions
" which always bring on the ruin of ſtates. All
" Europe knows the pacific and conciliating vir-
" tues of your Holineſs. The French Republic

" will,

" will, I hope, be always one of the trueſt friends " of Rome. I ſend my Aid-de camp, Chief of " Brigade, to expreſs to your Holineſs the eſteem " and perfect veneration which I have for your " perſon, and I beſeech you to believe the deſire " which I have to give on every occaſion proofs " of that reſpect and veneration, with which I " have the honour to be your very obedient ſervant,

BUONAPARTE, General in chief."

From the Head Quarters at Tolentino,
February 19.

The Articles of peace were nearly the ſame with thoſe of the armiſtice concluded in the month of June preceding, of which this treaty might be ſaid to be only a ratification. The principal conditions were, that the Pope ſhould give up irrevocably to France Avignon, the Comtat Venaiſſin, the Dutchies of Bologna and Ferrara, and the legation of Romagna; that he ſhould pay in two months 15,000,000 of French livres over and above the 21,000,000 ſtipulated in the armiſtice concluded in the month of June, of which 5,000,000 only had been paid; that the French ſhould remain in poſſeſſion of the citadel of Ancona till peace ſhould be eſtabliſhed

bliſhed on the Continent, and of the provinces of Macerata, Umbria, Perugio, and Camerino, till the 36,000,000 due from the Pope ſhould be entirely paid. They likewiſe confirmed the articles which ſtipulated the gift of the ſtatues, pictures, and precious manuſcripts. The French made beſides, as Buonaparte wrote word, a good harveſt, of theſe in Romagna, the Dutchy of Urbino, and the march of Ancona.

Such was the price at which the Pope who had never declared war againſt the French, and who had only made it for the purpoſe of ſelf defence, was obliged to purchaſe the preſervation of the throne of St. Peter. It coſt nearly the third part of the dominions of the church, and more than one year of his revenues, to ſatisfy the ambitious views and the rapacity of the French Government.

After having acquired by this treaty new pecuniary means for the ſubſiſtence of his army, from the cheſts of which a treaſurer named Flachat had juſt ſtolen 6,000,000 (£250,000 ſterling) Buonaparte employed himſelf in laying alſo under contribution the Grand Duke of Tuſcany, and the Republic of Venice. In this manner did the French accompliſh their purpoſe of making this

campaign at the expence of the neutral powers, and thus did the latter, for the ſake of a neutrality which was conſtantly violated, make greater ſacrifices than it would have coſt them to defend the entrance of Italy againſt the French, or to drive them from thence after they had invaded it.

There remains only to preſent the reader with ſome general obſervations on the whole of the campaign taken together, and on its reſult.

CHAP. VIII.

It would be uſeleſs for me to enlarge on the aſtoniſhing ſucceſſion of events, which I have been deſcribing. The facts ſpeak for themſelves, and are too ſtriking to require being detailed. Piedmond invaded, and the King of Sardinia forced to an ignominious peace; Lombardy conquered; both banks of the Po republicanized; the King of Naples

Naples detached from the Coalition; the Pope deprived of nearly one third of his dominions; all the north of Italy a prey to the miſeries of war, and to political convulſions; that country but lately ſo rich and flouriſhing, robbed of its wealth and ſplendor: Such is the picture preſented to us by this memorable campaign, which will be to poſterity a ſubject of admiration and regret, and which the annals of war with a place on a level with, if not above, that of 1706, [*Note* 26.]

No perſon has ſo much contributed to the iſſue of the campaign of 1796, and by it to the peace which will follow this war, than the commander of the French army, Buonaparte. [*Note* 27.] None of the Generals of the Republic have performed ſervices ſo important and ſo difficult. He is the only one amongſt them who has not owed all his ſucceſs to the ſuperiority of his forces, or to political cauſes. Active, enterpriſing, able, and above all fortunate, he has committed few military faults, has not ſuffered his adverſaries to commit any with impunity, and has not in perſon experienced one defeat. The war of Italy, which till 1796, had been, if I may uſe the expreſſion, only an epiſode of the general war, he made its principal and leading

object; and there where the Emperor ſeemed to have the leaſt to apprehend, he made him experience the moſt ſenſible loſſes, and cauſed the moſt ſerious alarms.

If Buonaparte has been ſo great as a General, he has been far from ſhewing himſelf ſo as a conqueror or as a man. The cruel manner in which he treated the towns of Milan, Pavia, Lugo, and Arquata; the burning of Binaſco and ſeveral other villages; the maſſacre of a great number of their inhabitants; the outrages and pillages which he ſanctioned by impunity as well as by his own example, have tarniſhed the ſplendour of his victories, and have left him no other claims to the admiration of poſterity. The deſpotiſm which he exerciſed over the countries conquered by his arms, the exceſſive contributions which he impoſed on the inhabitants, and the extreme rigour with which he inforced the meaſures ordered by the French Government, have fortunately weakened the great effect of opinion, which his victories might have produced in Italy. Notwithſtanding the formation of the Ciſpadan and Tranſpadan Republics, and although they furniſhed many thouſands of auxiliaries to the army of Buonaparte, one cannot doubt the averſion which the majority

majority of the inhabitants of this country has for the French, and for their political principles. The violent inſurrections which broke out whenever the latter had experienced any check, afford an unequivocal proof of the ſentiments of hatred and vengeance with which they had inſpired them as well as of all the evils which they had occaſioned. [*Note* 28.] If Buonaparte has by his political conduct placed himſelf below the height to which his military triumphs had raiſed him, neither has he kept up to it by his perſonal qualities. The bombaſt, the boaſting, and the marvellous which mark all his letters to the Directory, the conſtant exaggeration of the loſſes of the enemy, the ridiculouſly diminiſhed eſtimate of his own, the perpetual repreſentation of the deſtruction of the Auſtrian armies when they had only been beaten, the capture of Mantua ſo often announced as very near many months before it took place, the circumſtance of 4,000 men laying down their arms at Lonado at his command, have given to his narrative the appearance of a military romance; and ſtill leave juſt doubts, not of the reality of his victories, but of the extent of their conſequences.

In fact, if one takes the trouble to caſt up the number of Auſtrians whom Buonaparte has ſucceſſively declared to be killed, wounded and made priſoners from the opening of the campaign to the capture of Mantua incluſively, we ſhall find that the killed or wounded amount to near 50,000, and the priſoners to more than 100,000 men. In order to enable the reader to judge of the degree of credit which ſhould be given to this enumeration, I will preſent an account of the number of Auſtrian troops ſent into Italy, from the month of March 1796, to the month of January 1797, which I have every reaſon to believe to be a pretty correct ſtatement.

The army of Mr. de Beaulieu at the opening of the campaign - -	30,000
Troops which came from the upper Rhine with M. de Wurmſer - -	30,000
Re-inforcements ſent to Mr. d'Alvinzy during the months of September, October, and November -	25,000
Troops detached from the corps of M. de Frolich and the armed Tyroleſe	11,000

Freſh

Freſh re-inforcements ſent to Mr. d'Alvinzy in December and January	9,000
Total.	105,000

From this ſtatement, rather exaggerated than under-rated, we find that according to the accounts ſent by General Buonaparte, he muſt have taken killed or wounded 45,000 men more than the Auſtrians employed in Italy during this campaign; not to mention that at leaſt 10,000 died in the hoſpitals, and that after the capture of M. de Provera, and the defeat of M. d'Alvinzy at Rivoli, there ſtill remained to the latter about 30,000 men, either in the Tyrol or on the Brenta.

Perhaps it may be acceptable to compare the ſtatement which I have juſt given with that of the forces ſent alſo by the French into Italy, and with that of the loſs which they ſuſtained.

The army of Buonaparte (or of the lower Alps) before the opening of the campaign - - - - -	30,000
Troops drawn from the two armies which had made war in Spain, and which	

were

were ſent into Italy, in March, April, and May - - -	35,000
Army of Kellermann, (or of the upper Alps,) which after the peace with the king of Sardinia, was ſucceſſively incorporated with that of Buonaparte, - - - - -	25,000
Reinforcements which arrived from the interior, 'till January 15, 1797	18,000
Troops raiſed in Italy - -	12,000
Total	120,000

Buonaparte found himſelf at the end of January at the head of about 60,000 men. He had therefore loſt at that period, an equal number in killed, priſoners, rendered unfit for ſervice, or dead in the hoſpitals: that is to ſay, only 15,000 leſs than the Auſtrians. If one is ſurpriſed that the difference between the loſs of the one army almoſt always victorious, and that of the vanquiſhed army, was not greater, a reaſon for it will be found in the indifference with which Buonaparte always laviſhed the blood of his ſoldiers; an indifference to which he owed almoſt all his ſucceſs,

in

in the ſacrifices of men which he made at Lodi, at Fonteniva and Arcole, and more than all, in the diſeaſes occaſioned by the climate, the blockade of Mantua, and the intemperance of the French ſoldiery. [*Note* 29]

It has been ſeen in the courſe of this work, from what cauſes and owing to what faults the Generals Beaulieu, Wurmſer, and Alvinzy, were ſucceſſively driven out of the Milaneſe, from the dutchy of Mantua, and finally from all Italy. After having ſuſtained for four years ſo many loſſes and expences, the cabinet of Vienna nevertheleſs formed, during this campaign, ſix powerful armies in Italy, made greater efforts, and diſplayed greater reſources towards the end of the war, than it had done in the beginning of it. Though it might probably have done better, had it begun as it ended, it deſerves applauſe however for the wiſdom with which it reſerved its means in a war, the long duration of which it was eaſy to foreſee, and for the energy with which it employed them in this laſt campaign. This would, without doubt have been a ſucceſsful one, if the means which were provided with vigour, had been directed with ability. But the

Auſtrian Generals, perſiſting in Italy in their old ideas of tactics, whilſt the Archduke was advantageouſly following new ones in Germany, conſtantly practiſed in the former country their ſyſtem of *Ubiquity*, notwithſtanding the ſucceſs with which Buonaparte oppoſed to them a contrary line of conduct. Their mode of carrying on the war was methodical and ſlow, whilſt his was enterprifing and violent: They were making combinations, whilſt he was preparing battles: They were ſhewing themſelves on all points, whilſt he made a point of appearing ſtrong but on one: They were extending themſelves, and endeavouring to circumvent him by their manœuvres, whilſt he contracted himſelf, and advancing rapidly in maſs againſt the point which it was of importance to him to force, broke in a moment the line and the combinations which they had formed againſt him. It was to this ſyſtem, invariably followed by Buonaparte, that he owed the victories of Milleſimo, Montechiaro, Caſtiglione, Roveredo, and Rivoli: it was by the rapid tranſpoſition and violent employment of his troops, that he gained ſuch brilliant ſucceſſes, in the Months of Auguſt, November,

vember, and January; and that at each of theſe periods, in leſs than ſix days, he diſconcerted plans, and diſperſed armies, which had been two months in forming.

Some ſecondary cauſes alſo contributed very much to the iſſue of this campaign. The council of war at Vienna choſe, as it had done in the preceding ones, not only to take the charge of forming the general plan of the campaign, but alſo to direct the execution and local application of it. The Auſtrian Generals, bound by poſitive inſtructions, not daring to undertake any thing contrary to them, and being leſs reſponſible for events, than for their obedience to the orders which they had received, were often obliged to ſacrifice to them opportunities of probable ſucceſs, even ſought for them leſs anxiouſly, and conſidered leſs how to deſerve applauſe, than how to eſcape cenſure. The firſt diſpoſitions of the Auſtrians being made with a great deal of care, exactneſs, and often with ability, and the General executing them with ſcrupulous fidelity, they were almoſt always crowned with ſucceſs, [*Note* 30]. But when the talents of the enemy, or the chance of war produced any unforeſeen

event, which reduced the Auſtrian Generals to the impoſſibility of executing the plan which had been dictated to them; then obliged to rely on their own diſcretion, not being in the habit of taking it for their guide, and fearing to commit themſelves, they neither dared, nor were capable of acting independently, and did not hazard any of thoſe deciſive ſtrokes, which in certain circumſtances can alone give victory.

Buonaparte was much more advantageouſly circumſtanced. The neceſſity in which the Executive Directory found itſelf of paying, maintaining, and ſubſiſting the armies of the Republic at the expence of the countries which they occupied, did not admit of its limiting the power of its Generals; and as thoſe had every thing to do, it was requiſite that they ſhould have the power to do every thing. To theſe conſiderations was added the confidence which Buonaparte's firſt victories inſpired. They taught the Directory that it might rely on the talents and good fortune of this young man. They left it altogether to him to direct at his will the force which was entruſted to him. Exempt from all reſponſibility, and neither miſtruſting himſelf or his

his fortune, he could take advantage of all favourable circumſtances, and could even ſeek for victory in hazard. All the confidence which the Directory had in Buonaparte, he extended to the Generals who were under him, and left them the liberty of regulating their conduct according to circumſtances and their own judgment. He had ſeldom occaſion to repent of the latitude which he gave them; and when they made a bad uſe of it, he employed them no more; he changed his Generals, but not his ſyſtem. He owed to it in great part his ſucceſſes; as thoſe of the Archduke in Germany reſulted principally from the full powers which he had received, and from the independence in which he was placed, of the direction as well as cenſure of the aulic council of war.

Buonaparte appears alſo to have very ably employed another powerful means of ſucceſs, that of treachery and ſecret intelligence. Imitating in that reſpect Prince Eugene, he ſpared no pains or expence to procure faithful ſpies, and to gain over people, who were in a ſituation to admit of their being well informed. Taking with one hand money from the countries which he had conquered, he laviſhed it with the other to purchaſe or to diſcover the

the ſecrets of his enemies. [*Note* 31] The Auſtrian Generals having little money to diſpoſe of for the ſame object, and not being able to procure it in the ſame manner that Buonaparte did, had it not in their power to be equally prodigal. In this they laboured under a very great diſadvantage; and it is not one of the leaſt real cauſes of their reverſes. Thoſe which they experienced in the latter months of this campaign, reſulted alſo in great part, from the quality of the troops which they commanded. The armies which were formed in the months of November and January, had a conſiderable proportion of recruits. The flower of the army of Italy had been deſtroyed or taken in the fatal expedition of the month of Auguſt; and what then eſcaped, was afterwards ſhut up in Mantua with Mr. de Wurmſer. The ſixth army formed ſince the month of January, and of which the Archduke Charles has taken the command, is alſo in great part compoſed of young ſoldiers. That of the French on the contrary, with the exception of ſome thouſands of men raiſed in Italy, is compoſed of the beſt troops of the Republic. In proportion as the latter diſengaged itſelf by peace from part of its enemies, it diminiſhed the number of its armies, and ſent to

thoſe which it retained, the choice part of thoſe which it ſuppreſſed. Thoſe the troops which had been employed againſt Spain, la Vendée, and the King of Sardinia, went to repair the loſſes of the armies in Germany and Italy. The latter conſiſts at preſent of none but formed and veteran ſoldiers; whilſt the Emperor has been only enabled to ſupply with recruits, the void which has taken place in his armies. The French republic has at this time the ſame advantage over the Emperor, with reſpect to the quality of troops, which that Prince had over it at the commencement of the war. [*Note* 32.]

March, 1797.

FINIS.

NOTES

FOR THE

CAMPAIGN OF ITALY.

Note 1. *Page* 218.

THE Bocchetta is a chain of mountains, over which, forming many windings, paſſes the great road from Lombardy to Genoa. On the top of the higheſt of theſe mountains, the road contracts itſelf ſo much that ſcarcely three perſons can paſs abreaſt. It is properly ſpeaking this paſs which is known under the name of Bocchetta. It is the key to the territories of the Genoeſe Republic.

Note 2. *Page* 219.

The city of Genoa is ten miles in circumference. The regular troops of the Republic do not exceed 3,000 men, but it can, if neceſſary, aſſemble 30,000 militia. It had as many as 18,000 on foot in the laſt war in which it was engaged. This town was bombarded in 1746 by an Engliſh fleet, and taken by the Imperialiſts who had

forced the paſſage of Bocchetta. It will no doubt be be recollected in what manner it delivered itſelf from the latter.

Note 3. *Page* 243.

Buonaparte having aſſembled this council of grenadiers, made them an energetic harrangue, in which he did not diſſemble the dangers that attended this *coup de main*. The anſwer of the grenadiers was, " Give us ſome brandy, and we will ſee what is to be done. It was given them in abundance, and produced a greater effect than the ſpeech of Buonaparte. An officer of the Auſtrian ſtaff related to the author this fact, which was imparted to him by a French officer, who was preſent at the battle of Lodi, and was made priſoner ſome time afterwards.

Note 4. *Page* 247.

This Baſſeville, ſecretary to the French Embaſſy, was maſſacred three or four years ſince by the populace of Rome, whom he had irritated by his conduct, and his revolutionary diſcourſes.

Note 5. *Page* 249.

It was five miles from this town that Francis I. King of France was made priſoner by the Imperialiſts, in 1525. He was conducted from thence, and impriſoned at Pizzigtone.

Note

Note 6. *Page* 254.

Bologna is, next to Rome, the richeſt, and moſt important city of the dominions of the church. It has nearly 100,000 inhabitants.

Note 7. *Page* 254.

The town of Ancona is ſmall, but very rich. It has a citadel and a pretty good port.

Note 8. *Page* 254.

The reader is without doubt ſtruck with the hardſhip of this laſt condition, which had likewiſe been impoſed on the King of Sardinia. The directory had the effrontery to deprive two Sovereigns of their moſt precious right, and moſt ſacred duty, that of maintaining the public tranquility, and of puniſhing thoſe who diſturb it. It dared to protect criminals from the power of juſtice, and to conſtitute itſelf arbiter between Princes and their ſubjects; and this, whilſt it puniſhed with death every Frenchman who did not acknowledge its authority; whilſt it accuſed the coaleſced powers with wiſhing to interfere in the Government of France, and profeſſed to make war againſt them, only to prevent their realizing that project, and to puniſh them for having conceived it. By reducing two Sovereigns to this degree of humiliation, one knows not whether the Directory did not in truth ſurpaſs in deſpotiſm thoſe who

at the beginning of the century, wiſhed to force Louis the XIV. to dethrone his own grandſon.

All the world certainly knew that the Chiefs of the French Republic had never ceaſed from its firſt eſtabliſhment, to ſupport and recompence all ſtrangers who partake of their principles, and endeavour to put them in practice. But it was not expected that they would make this protection one baſis of their diplomatic ſyſtem, and that they would force Sovereigns themſelves to ſanction the rebellion of their ſubjects.

Note 9. *Page* 256.

When ſending an account to the Directory of this expedition, Buonaparte added, that on his going to Florence, the Grand Duke of Tuſcany *had requeſted him as well as the Commiſſioner Salicetti, to do him the honor to come and dine with him, which they had thought proper to accept.*

Note 10. *Page* 257.

It was under the walls of Lugo that the Romans were defeated by the Gauls with the loſs of 25,000 men: Beliſarius built a fortreſs there.

Note 11. *Page* 258.

The Caſtle of Milan was beſieged in 1707 by Prince Eugene, and made an excellent defence. The Marquis de la Floride commanded there.

Note

Note 12. *Page* 259.

The laſt Duke of Mantua was put under the ban of the Empire in 1703, as a puniſhment for having taken part with the French. The Imperial troops commanded by Prince Eugene, made themſelves maſters of the whole Dutchy of Mantua in 1707. Since that period, the Houſe of Auſtria has remained in poſſeſſion of it. It is annexed to the Milaneſe.

Note 13. *Page* 276.

The French formed the ſame plan in 1703, and the Duke de Vendome, who commanded their army in Italy, received orders to penetrate through the Trentino into Germany, in order to form a junction with the Elector of Bavaria. But although Mr. de Vendome was very ſuperior in number to the Imperialiſts, he was unable to force the defiles of the Tyrol, and advanced no farther than the city of Trent.

Note 14. *Page* 280.

The King of Naples had made very conſiderable military preparations, and had raiſed his army to near 80,000 men. It conſiſts in time of peace of only 40,000, of which a great part are Swiſs.

Note

Note 15. *Page* 286.

The accuracy of this ſtatement may be relied upon, both with reſpect to the numbers of the French and Auſtrians, and with reſpect to their poſition. It was ſent to the author ſuch as he has given it, by an Auſtrian General officer who commanded a corps in that expedition. If on this occaſion particular ſtreſs is laid by the author on his authority, it is becauſe the Auſtrians were then for the firſt time ſuperior in number to the French, and becauſe ſome readers might perhaps be induced to doubt this from the iſſue of the expedition.

Note 16. *Page* 288.

Theſe two poſts are very ſtrong, and have been conſidered as highly important in all the wars of Italy. They have always been occupied by the armies which had to defend the entry of the Veroneſe and the Dutchy of Mantua.

☞ *By error of the preſs* Note 17 *has been omitted in the work: it comes in after the words*, " of the Auſtrians was exaggerated," *page* 292, *line* 3.

Note 17. *Page* 292.

It was impoſſible to entertain a doubt of this in reading the diſpatches of General Berthier, chief of the ſtaff, which bore the ſame date as theſe of Buonaparte. The firſt

firſt eſtimated the loſs of the Auſtrians at 5,000 men made priſoners, and 3,000 killed and wounded; whilſt the ſecond made the latter amount to 8,000. The accounts of theſe two Generals had already been contradictory with regard to the defeat of Mr. de Wurmſer in the month of Auguſt. Buonaparte wrote that he had taken from 12 to 15,000 men, and 70 pieces of cannon. Berthier in a letter equally official, written a few days afterwards, fixed the number of priſoners at 9,000, and that of the cannon taken at 45. The laſt-mentioned General, being chief of the ſtaff, muſt neceſſarily have been as well informed on theſe points as Buonaparte himſelf, and cannot be ſuſpected of wiſhing to leſſen the enemies loſs. I could give other examples of the difference in the reports of theſe two Generals. Theſe contradictions ſhew the juſt meaſure of Buonaparte's veracity.

Note 18. *Page* 302.

This General is the ſon of the late firſt clerk of the war office, and of the repoſitory of plans at Verſailles. He owes his military fortune to Marſhal de Broglio, to whom he was Aid-de-camp in 1789, when the Marſhal commanded the army aſſembled round Paris.

Note

Note 19. *Page* 306.

The troops of the Pope, whatever ridicule be attached to their name, would not be contemptible if they had good officers. They are well kept, and have good pay. They were engaged with the French in an affair very honourable for them, though unfortunate, ſince they had never ſeen fire, and had to do with the moſt experienced troops in Europe.

Note 20. *Page* 93.

It was near this town ſituated on the Flaminian way, that hiſtorians pretend the famous triumvirate was formed. It was likewiſe in this town called by ſome Fayenza, that the earthen ware known by the name of *Fayence* was invented. Raphael, Julio Romano, and Titian, did not diſdain to employ their pencils in painting ſome of theſe earthen veſſels.

Note 21. *Page* 315.

He had marched into that town to intimidate the Pope, and to induce him to ſue for peace. He had alſo in view to engage, or rather to force the Grand Duke of Tuſcany to pay 2,000,000 to the Republic, to indemnify it for the trouble and expence it had incurred by *defending the port of Leghorn againſt the Engliſh*. Buonaparte renewed his demand after the defeat of the Auſ-

ſtrians

trians, and the Grand Duke thought it not prudent to refuſe it.

Note 22. *Page* 323.

The reader will perhaps not be diſpleaſed to read an extract from the private account which the author has received from the officer who commanded this column.

" I had the command of the firſt column, conſiſting " of 4,000 men: without a ſingle horſe or cannon, " each ſoldier and officer on foot, provided with iron " cramps, preceded by pioneers to break the ice. I " marched thus during two days and two nights without " halting, over rocks covered with ſnow, and without " finding a ſingle buſh to make fire with. The third " day, after a march equally ſevere, but through a " country leſs diſmal, I ſucceeded according to the " general plan, in turning the poſition of the enemy, " who were entrenched at Rivoli, on the banks of the " Adige. Whilſt I made this movement with my " corps, three columns attacked the entrenchments of " Rivoli in front, and carried them. The enemy re- " took them, and we again ſucceeded in driving them " out; but by one of thoſe inexplicable fatalities, peculiar " to the Auſtrian army in Italy, the three columns " which had attacked in front, having once more " loſt the entrenchments, my column found itſelf cut " off, and abandoned by the reſt of the army. I had

" now nothing left but to cut my way through the ene-
" my, for I could not bring myſelf to capitulate.
" Without cannon or cavalry I had to make my way
" through a victorious army, which attacked me with
" all the advantage ariſing from numbers, from the
" ground, and from the nature of their arms. Ac-
" cordingly the greateſt part of my troops was either
" killed or taken. Almoſt all the ſtaff officers of my
" corps were wounded and made priſoners.

" Seeing no longer any means of rejoining our army,
" which had retired into the mountains, I turned with
" 10 officers towards the lake of Garda, upon the bor-
" ders of which I remained ſhut up in a country houſe
" for two days and two nights, in order to eſcape the
" French patroles in ſearch of us. On the third night
" I threw myſelf into a boat with my officers, and in
" ſpite of the vigilance of the French Feluccas we ſuc-
" ceeded in paſſing through them by dint of rowing, and
" happily arrived at Torbole, where there was an Auſ-
" trian garriſon."

Note 23. *Page* 335.

Amongſt theſe priſoners were the three Generals Provera, Klobos, and Hohenzollern, 5 Colonels, 5 Majors, 62 Captains, 78 Lieutenants, 48 Sub-lieutenants, and 24 Enſigns. Several officers comprehended in this liſt were improperly included, and amongſt others Colonel Luſignan,

Luſignan, who was one of the five Colonels ſaid to be made priſoners, although he was not taken.

Note 24, *Page* 340.

It had conſiſted at the time of the junction with Marſhal Wurmſer of 24,000 men; 6,000 had periſhed either by the ſword or contagious fevers; and a like number was in the hoſpitals.

Note 25 *Page* 343.

Theſe means were not beſides the only ones employed by Buonaparte to facilitate his march through the Papal territory, and for preventing the reſiſtance which he might have experienced from a numerous and armed people. Before he made uſe of threats, he had endeavoured to tranquillize and lull the Papal Government into ſecurity. He had written Cardinal Mathei a letter on the 20th of January, which contained the following expreſſions. " *We are on the point of unravelling the* " *plot of this ridiculous comedy.* You are witneſs of " the value which I attach to peace, and of the ardent " deſire to ſpare you the horrors of war. Whatever may " happen I entreat you to aſſure his Holineſs that he " may remain at Rome without inquietude. As firſt " miniſter of religion, he ſhall meet with protec- " tion both for himſelf and the church. You may " likewiſe aſſure the people of Rome, that they ſhall

" find in the French army, friends who will only re-
" joice at victory, as it may ameliorate the fate of the
" people, and deliver Italy from the dominion of ſtran-
" gers. My particular care ſhall be not to ſuffer any
" alteration to be made in the religion of their fathers."

Buonaparte joined to this letter, thoſe of Cardinal Buſca to Cardinal Albani the Pope's envoy at Vienna, which he had intercepted. They contained the detail of the meaſures taken by the Pope for his defence, and a view of the ſteps to be taken with the Court of Vienna. A few days after having written this letter to Cardinal Mathei, Buonaparte had ſent orders to citizen Cacault, agent of the Republic at Rome, to leave that town immediately, and to repair to him at Bologna.

Note 26. *Page* 355.

The French were at that time maſters of almoſt all Lombardy, and of the City and Dutchy of Mantua. One of their armies occupied theſe territories whilſt another beſieged Turin. After the battle of Cagliano gained by the Duc de Vendome, over General Reventlaw, Prince Eugene was obliged to retreat as far as Roveredo and Gavardo: but he ſpeedily reſumed the offenſive, and advanced early in May as far as Verona. Two months after, deceiving the Duke of Orleans who had ſucceeded Mr. de Vendome, he paſſed the Adige, the Tartaro, the Secchia, and the Tanaro, notwithſtanding all the efforts of the Duke of Orleans, upon whom he had

had ſtolen ſeveral marches. He entered Piedmont, and raiſed the ſiege of Turin after having gained a great victory over the French army: returning back again he re-entered the Milaneſe, ſucceſſively drove the French from all the poſts occupied by them, and obliged them to evacuate Lombardy.

Note 27. *Page.* 355

Paſcal Buonaparte, a godſon of General Paoli, was born at Ajaccio in Corſica in the ſame year (1769) that that iſland became ſubject to France. His father who died young had the rank of Major in the ſervice of that power. At the age of ten years Buonaparte was placed at the royal ſchool at Brienne, from whence he was removed to the military ſchool at Paris. While there, he diſcovered application and an inclination for the ſciences. In 1785, being then no more than fifteen, he was appointed Lieutenant en ſecond of the regiment *de la fere* of artillery, which he joined at Valence. His perſon is middle ſized, and his complexion is dark and ſwarthy; his countenance beſpeaks nothing remarkable, except his black eyes which are lively, and habitually fixed on the ground. He brought with him from Corſica, and preſerved both in the royal houſes where he was brought up, and the regiment into which he entered, Republican and elevated ideas, a ſpirit of independance, a great deal of pride, an extravagant opinion of his own nation,

nation, and a great contempt for the reſt of the world. This character as little adapted to military diſcipline as to ſociety, pleaſed neither his commanders nor his companions: the latter did not fail to beſtow on him thoſe little corrections which when given by equals, generally prove uſeful leſſons; they had however no good effect on the haughty and ſavage diſpoſition of this young man. Diſſembling, ſilent, vain and miſanthrophic, he read much, ſeldom went abroad, and almoſt always alone; he ſtudied hiſtory and politics, diſdaining the details of his profeſſion, which he hardly attended to. Though naturally ſilent, when the ſubject under diſcuſſion was to his taſte, whenever he deemed the auditory worthy of him, and more eſpecially when Corſica was the topic of diſcourſe, then he became animated, and ſpoke with great energy and warmth, though not with elegance. On theſe occaſions he diſcovered a good memory, a great degree of penetration and wit, a knowledge very uncommon for his age, and above all an extreme tenacity of opinion. Such was Buonaparte before the Revolution: till that period he had ſhewn neither the inclinations, the virtues, the vices or the manners of his age. His opinions, the violence of his character, and his ambition, would naturally induce him to take part in this revolution; he was ſuppoſed to have had a conſiderable ſhare in the diſturbances which agitated Corſica in 1789. The year following he rejoined his regiment, which

which was at Auxonne, taking with him a brother of the age of twelve. One of his companions enquiring why he took ſo young a man as his brother with him, he replied, *I wiſh him to enjoy a great ſpectacle, that of a nation which will ſpeedily be either regenerated or deſtroyed.*

Buonaparte attached himſelf more and more to the Republican party, and obtained a rapid advancement. He was for a ſhort time employed in the war of la Vendée, and alſo at the ſiege of Toulon. Being at Paris on the 13th of Vendemiaire, he ſhewed himſelf on that occaſion one of the warmeſt partiſans of the Convention, and very actively ſeconded Barras. This laſt being made Director, offered Buonaparte the command of the army in Italy, on condition that he ſhould marry the widow of the Vicomte de Beauharnois who had been guillotined. The young Italian accepted the terms, and departed for the Italian army, which he found in the greateſt want of arms, clothes, and ammunition. He found the means to procure at Genoa, a part of what was wanting; and the victories which he obtained from the beginning of the campaign, very ſoon placed his army above all want.

This biographical note was given me by an officer who ſerved ſeveral years in the ſame regiment as Buonaparte, and who was perfectly capable of appreciating him.

Note

Note 28. *Page* 357.

It would have been very ſurpriſing if the French could have made themſelves beloved in Italy, by making it ſubmit to the moſt deſpotic yoke, by deſpoiling it of its moſt precious effects, and drawing from it more than a 100,000,000 of livres by contribution. I have thought it right to preſent in this place the particulars. Lombardy was obliged to contribute 25,000,000 of livres; Mantua 800,000; the Imperial Fiefs 200,000; the Dutchy of Modena 10,000,000; Maſſa and Carrara 600,000; Parma and Placentia 20,000,000; the Pope 36,000,000; Bologna and Ferrara 3,700,000; Leghorn as the depot of Engliſh magazines 8,000,000. If we add to theſe contributions, of which two thirds have been paid, the ſeizure of all the money which was found in the public coffers; 51 cheſts of ſilver plate taken at Milan, Lodi, and Bologna. If we add the immenſe value of the requiſitions in kind made by the French, the pillage, the extortions, and the robberies committed by the French army, we may have an idea of the late of Italy, and of the ſentiments which its inhabitants muſt feel for their conquerors. Buonaparte had no heſitation to ſay in the proclamation which he made to his ſoldiers in entering into Carynthia, that all the expences of the army of Italy during eleven months had been paid by the conquered countries, and that he had beſides ſent 30,000,000 of livres into France.

Note

Note 29. *Page* 361.

I certainly do not undertake to ſay, that this eſtimate of the forces which the French and Auſtrians had in Italy, and of the loſſes which they ſuſtained there, is arithmetically exact. Every judicious reader will perceive, that to determine this point with preciſion, one muſt have at the ſame time the ſtatements made in the reſpective war departments of Vienna and Paris. I have only pretended to give a near and probable eſtimate: I have every reaſon to believe it to be ſo, from the numerous reſearches which I have made on this ſubject, from the aſſertions of perſons to whom I have applied, and from the information which they have given me on the force, and the period of arrival of the different corps which have been reſpectively ſent into Italy during this campaign.

Note 30. *Page* 363.

We may recollect, that in the three expeditions undertaken for the relief of Mantua, in the month of Auguſt, November, and January, the Auſtrians were victorious during the three or four firſt days; they were almoſt always ſo in the courſe of this war, whenever they began the execution of an offenſive plan; and this from the cauſes I have juſt ſhewn.

Note 31. *Page* 366.

The day after the firſt battle of Caſtiglione (the 4th of Auguſt) he gave 900 pounds to and Italian ſpy, who

gave him in the courſe of the day an exact account of the poſition of the Auſtrians, and of the number of their troops. In conſequence of this information the French General made in the night of the 4th the diſpoſitions which might be moſt advantageous, and which procured him the victory which he gained the next day.

Note 32. *Page* 367.

Theſe are not the only cauſes which have given the French ſuch a great ſuperiority over the Auſtrians in this campaign. There are others which aroſe from the nature of the country in which the war was carried on, and from the difference between the ſoldiers reſpectively employed. The theatre of war has been very diſadvantageous to the Auſtrians. The mountains of Piedmont and Tyrol, are almoſt all extremely difficult of acceſs. The valleys which ſeparate them are covered with mulberry trees and vines, planted in hedge rows, or in arbours forming narrow covered ways, which muſt be forced one after the other by the ſoldier. The roads are defiles lined with walls, and are nevertheleſs the only places where the cavalry can act. The ground in Lombardy is not more favourable for war. It is not mountainous, but it is equally divided by vine and mulberry hedges, and the culture of rice requires a vaſt number of ditches full of water, which are no leſs embarraſſing. A General muſt not hope to direct the movements of his troops on the ground: he can only manœuvre on maps and

and according to the whole of his poſition taken together. In the Italian Tyrol a battalion can never march or attack in front. As ſoon as it advances to the enemy it muſt be ſcattered about as *tirailleurs;* then each man muſt act for himſelf, and conſider himſelf alone as a ſmall army. He muſt advance with rapidity when he is ſupported; retire in the ſame manner when he is not; he muſt fire a propos; then put himſelf under cover; he muſt call his companions when he has found a good paſs. What diſadvantage does not the Auſtrian ſoldier labour under in ſuch a country! he is obliged to fight with a muſket weighing eighteen pounds, to carry ſixty cartridges, a very heavy knapſack, and a cloak around his breaſt which almoſt ſtifles him. In this condition he is to contend with the French ſoldier, whoſe muſket weighs no more than a fowling piece, who has nothing but a wretched coat upon his back, which undoubtedly does not embarraſs him, and whoſe natural agility as well as his ſpecies of courage renders very fit for this kind of war.

All new methods have ſucceeded in war from the Macedonian Phalanx to the tactics of Frederick. The French owe a great part of their ſucceſſes to the new mode of fighting which they had adopted. They precipitate themſelves like a ſwarm of waſps on all the points which they deſire to force. Fifty drums beat the charge without ceaſing; at this noiſe which animates the aſ-

ſailants,

ſailants, and intimidates thoſe who are to wait their attack, the braveſt advance ſhouting and mutually encouraging each other. Young Generals put themſelves at their head and ſhare their dangers. The timid maſs follows at ſome diſtance, and fills up the ground. Artillery has but little aſſiſted the ſucceſſes of the French in Italy; they almoſt always charged with the bayonet. The Auſtrian army is brave, very brave; well managed it would be the firſt in Europe. But nothing is done to excite and uphold the bravery and good-will of the ſoldier. He is left to all the horrors of his profeſſion; the idea of killing or being killed is conſtantly preſented to his mind naked and unqualified. It is never diſguiſed by the enthuſiaſm of honour, by the ſound of military muſic, and the rolling of the drum. At the moment of action they ſend into the rear the muſic, and the colours, thoſe precious enſigns, which have both in antient and modern times been ſo often the pledge of victory, and of the devotion of the ſoldiers. It is thus that an army whoſe elements are almoſt perfect, has been ſo often beaten by one very inferior with reſpect to material compoſition. Poſitions and entrenchments have beſides been conſtantly relied on, although it ought to have been obſerved that they were always carried. In this war inanimate nature as been of no uſe, living nature has done every thing.

End of the Notes for the Campaign of Italy.

ERRATA.

Page	Line.	
3	2	*and elſewhere for* Ehrebreitſtein, *read* Ehrenbreitſtein.
7	16	*for* Morelle *read* Mozelle
85	23	*for* ſent *read* ſend
87	4	*for* new *read* knew
93	15	*and any where elſe, for* Petrarah *read* Petrarſch
106	2	*for* there *read* then
107	11	*for* on *read* of
108	11	*for* paralled *read* parallel
110	5	*for* were *read* was
118	13	*for* from *read* of
123	1	*for* of *read* to
132	3	*for* Bournonville *read* Beurnonville
137	2	*for* in *read* it
146	6	*for* moſt *read* more
158	21	*for* driving *read* deriving
168		*for* Note 36, *read* Note 31
175	1	*for* added *read* adopted ; *line* 10. *for* diverted *read* directed
181	16	*for* new *read* knew
182	8	*leave out the word* to
185		*for* Note 43 *read* Note 38
201	3	*for* where *read* were
213		The contents of CHAP I. of the Campaign in Italy have been omitted in the book ; look for them in the Index
220	13	*for* order *read* ordered
221	24	*for* ſucceed *read* ſucceeded
224	25	*for* then *read* than
234	7	*for* appentines *read* appennines
247	25	*for* Annibal *read* Hannibal
287	16	*for* exceſſive *read* exceſſively
288	25	*for* with *read* of
292	3	*after the words* was exaggerated, the Note 17 comes in
303	6	*for* directors *read* directory
318	17	*for* Deſenſaro *read* Dezenzano
330	16	*for* was *read* were
331	1	*for* to engage *read* in engaging
335	20	*for* to commiſſariate *read* to the commiſſariate
341	11	*for* of *read* for
349	20	*for* by Holineſs *read* by his Holineſs
355	9	*for* with a *read* will
362	12	*for* he made a point of appearing *read* he aimed at being, &c.
263	22	*for* General *read* Generals
367	2	*for* thoſe *read* thus
376		*for* Note 20, page 93 *read* Note 20, page 306